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Editors’ Preface
Foreword
For the 6th year in a row we met to honour the memories of Dr. 
Guido Carli and Prof. Alberto Predieri. This time, in Lucca, we discussed 
the issues related to the contagion of global markets originated in the 
subprime mortgage credits.
Once again, the twofold meeting purposes was met: 1. to exchange 
friendly and openly our points of view, through the discussion of original 
pieces of scientiﬁc research; 2. to provide the public opinion with a clear 
explanation of the implication of ﬁnancial developments, and the impact 
on the economy.
The excellent group of scholars we invited this year prepared 
papers, memos and comments, which converged on the common viewpoint 
that public authorities and private players pushed too much for the 
creation of ﬁnancial securities, losing any contact with the effective 
market risks. The result is a change in central bank behaviour (Paul 
Wachtel), bank management (Wenying Jiangli and Matt Pritsker), and a 
strengthening of Sovereign Wealth Fund role (Fariborz Moshirian). The 
crisis was inside the transmission mechanism of the bubble, has been 
ﬁnanced by credit (Yuliya Demyanyk), and the relationship between 
securitization and wealth has played a prominent  role (Bill B. Francis, 
Iftekhar Hasan, Haizhi Wang, and Cristiano Zazzara). We conﬁrmed 
the result of the previous Colloquium on the difﬁculty to forecast these 
developments by means of econometric modelling and research, while 
the need to heavily rely on the intuition of students and policy makers, 
i.e. “metaeconomics”, is by-passing economics!
A large part of the success of the meeting is due to Iftekhar Hasan 
and Cristiano Zazzara, who took care of the scientiﬁc organization, and 
to Monica Degl’Innocenti, who managed the entire organization in a 
very excellent way, and made possible the printing of these proceedings 
in a very short period of time.
Associazione Guido Carli
Fondazione Cesiﬁn Alberto Predieri
Editors of the Journal of Financial Stability
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First of all, I would like to warmly welcome all participants at this Sixth 
Colloquium on “Derivatives, Risk-return and Subprime”, also on behalf 
of the  President of the Associazione Guido Carli, Governor Mario Draghi. 
We would like to compliment the organizers – the  Carli Association and 
the Fondazione Cesiﬁn Alberto Predieri, in cooperation with the Journal 
of Financial Stability – for having chosen themes of great analytical and 
practical relevance and for having brought together  such a distinguished 
group of speakers and such a large audience in the magniﬁcent setting 
of the city of Lucca.
For the Guido Carli Association the organization of  this Colloquium is 
part of a  broad range of activities carried out under the leadership of 
Professor Paolo Savona, the Association’s scientiﬁc advisor. Conferences 
like today’s, research initiatives, scientiﬁc publications, and scholarship 
grants are all elements in a broader design, inspired by Guido Carli 
when he was Governor of the Bank of Italy. He considered essential 
for the Bank to promote the dialogue between academic economists 
and central bankers on key policy issues. To implement Carli’s vision 
is certainly the best and most appropriate way for the Association to 
honour his memory. 
For these reasons, Governor Draghi and myself deeply regret to have been 
unable to be here with you today to participate in what promises to be a very 
stimulating scientiﬁc and intellectual debate. Unfortunately, the current 
situation of acute tension in the international markets and ﬁnancial 
system implies a constant monitoring by the institutions participating in 
the international network of central banks and supervisory authorities 
both within the Eurosystem and among the G-7.
The severity of the current crisis is also clearly reﬂected in the 
topics analysed by the various papers that will be presented at this 
Conference.
I do not pretend to address the full implications of the present situation 
in these short introductory remarks, but a few considerations may be 
appropriate.
Fabrizio Saccomanni
Director General of Banca d’Italia
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While the basic ingredient of every ﬁnancial crisis is the system’s 
tendency to build up risks over a protracted period of time and to 
shed risky positions abruptly, it must also be acknowledged that what 
distinguishes the latest episodes from those of the past is the leveraging 
of such positions made possible by ﬁnancial innovation. What is more, 
ﬁnancial leverage produces unwelcome effects upon the real economy 
not only during the retrenchment phase, as one would normally expect, 
but even during upswings, with considerable distortions in the relative 
prices of different types of assets.
The recognition of the key role played by ﬁnancial leverage in the 
recent crisis –  including through innovative products involving high 
complexity and high risks – led the Financial Stability Forum, under the 
chairmanship of Governor Draghi, to identify three key issues that must be 
tackled jointly by the private sector and the public authorities to produce 
a system that is both less crisis-prone and more robust. This means, in 
short, a ﬁnancial system in which intermediaries have a stronger capital 
base, less leverage and where a more effective regulation is established 
to foster transparency, adequate risk management and sound practices.
The speciﬁc measures proposed by the FSF to achieve these objectives 
are well known, but it is worthwhile noting that several of them are 
already in course of implementation and many other actions have been 
undertaken by the private sector to complement these public-sector 
initiatives in a truly cooperative spirit. Important interventions have 
also been undertaken by the US government to counter severe threats to 
the ﬁnancial system.
Central banks have also been confronted by new challenges as they 
have been required  to provide, under stress conditions, huge amounts of 
liquidity – with  innovative instruments and procedures –  to operators 
in the money markets. This has been crucial for ensuring the operation 
of the ﬁnancial markets in general. At the same time, central banks have 
been careful to signal that a more active presence in the money market to 
ease liquidity during the turmoil would not be misconstrued as a sign of a 
weakened commitment to price stability. On both counts, the experience of 
the main central banks would appear to have been positive. In particular, 
the Eurosystem has managed to accommodate banks’ greater demand 
for liquidity without jeopardizing the goal of keeping inﬂationary 
expectations consistent with price stability in the medium term.
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As Governor Draghi noted in a recent speech in Berlin: “ The crisis we are 
facing is one of the most severe and complex of our times. The challenges 
will be substantial: restore price stability that would support growth, 
and ensure that the needed adjustments in bank and households balance 
sheets and in internal and external macroeconomic imbalances take 
place in an orderly manner. This will require action on the monetary, 
ﬁscal, and regulatory front. It will also require decisive action by the 
private sector to repair balance sheets, strengthen corporate governance, 
and improve the functioning of markets”.
I would like to conclude by wishing to all participants a fruitful dialogue, 
hoping that today’s Colloquium will provide useful  insights on how the 
crisis developed and concrete indications for its resolution.
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Derivatives, subprime and the surroundings. This is the subject of our 
meeting. It is a ﬁnancial theme, indeed a theme of ﬁnance at the edge, 
even of risk ﬁnance. It is an issue about which much has been written and 
said, and about which much more will continue to be written and said. 
Undoubtedly, due to shortcomings in the law and/or the shortcomings of 
men, derivatives, or better their creation and spread, have caused endless 
difﬁculties and disagreements and above all, as today’s commentary 
shows, real economic-ﬁnancial disasters, in their turn matrices of a 
negative spiral which one cannot see an end to.
The reasons for, and effects of the rapid growth in the market of credit 
derivatives were clearly outlined in the ﬁnal considerations of the 
Governor of the Bank of Italy, 31 May 2001; which I believe constitute 
a reference point for all. Also, because they present a series of solutions 
designed to overcome or at least temper the crisis situation, a little 
turbulent to say the least, one might even venture, ruinous. They take up 
again the recommendations of the Financial Stability Forum in its recent 
report and propose as primary solutions the rapid adoption of the new 
prudential criteria of Basel II, with an increase in capital requirements, 
in particular for structured ﬁnance.
But I won’t go into these issues as I am, after all, a professor of 
Administrative law. If Governor Draghi were present, I could say that the 
only qualiﬁcation I have to speak is that I was once a Faculty colleague 
of his for 10 years and, moreover, of the same generation. I did sit beside 
him through the long and tedious monthly Faculty meetings, but I can 
assure you that we never spoke about derivatives or the like, but rather of 
research posts or book resources or the acquisition of new spaces for both 
ourselves and our collaborators.
And really mine is solely a welcome address. Precisely in that spirit of 
typical greeting, I cannot help but remember that ﬁnancial trading was 
born in Lucca, or that Lucca was one of the original places of choice for 
this kind of activity. I am reminded of this by our very austere venue, 
which is at the same time both alluring and revealing of the rich past 
that went into its making, and also by the series of monuments, palaces, 
Giuseppe Morbidelli
Professor of Administrative Law, “La Sapienza” University, Rome
Chairman, Fondazione Cesiﬁn Alberto Predieri
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churches and oratorios which accompanied you on the short journey 
from your hotels to this lecture hall. I believe that they might even have 
moved your souls a little.
Certainly, when one starts to discuss the birthplace (for example of the 
ﬁrst Parliament, the ﬁrst truly independent judge or to remain closer to 
our theme, the ﬁrst bank), controversy and uncertainty abounds, almost 
as when it comes to identifying the ports of call that Ulysses made. 
The fact remains that, up until the XII century, Lucca was one of the 
most well-developed and lively Italian cities, indeed European cities, in 
promoting the circulation of money not only at a local level, but also at a 
national and international level. 
The Lucchese merchants were indeed among the ﬁrst to attend the fairs 
of Champagne and Flanders from the XII century, to take part in trade 
with Southern Italy, to operate in a vast and constant way in the square 
of Genoa and so through out the Mediterranean. They were the ﬁrst to 
regularly visit the centres of Provence and Languedoc and to take the 
lead in the new markets of the day, such as the England of Henry III and 
the Kingdom of Sicily following the Anjou conquest.  In addition to trade 
in silk, where they were the undisputed leaders in its production for 
centuries, and many other products, such as wool, leather, cereals, cheeses, 
salted goods, oil, wine and precious metals, the Lucchese also widely 
practised trade in money, both through currency exchange, deposits and 
interest loans. More generally, they had an important activity of Financial 
trading with the secular aristocracy, the high clergy, in the Roman curia 
and some European courts, in particular the English and Anjou. The 
origins of such activities are traceable in the manual exchange, practiced 
by local campsores, in the shade of the  San Martino’s Cathedral. Under 
protection and jurisdiction they carried out exchange operations – at least 
from the beginning of the XII century – as an interesting inscription from 
1111 shows, placed under the portico of the Cathedral. The importance 
of this inscription is not only in the early activities of the activities of 
the market and the exchange, which took place under the Cathedral, 
but especially in witnessing the institutional protection that the Bishop 
and his court guaranteed to the foreign merchants and to the square’s 
frequenters. It was the highest ecclesiastical authority of the diocese that 
ensured the transparency and honesty of the commercial operatives’ 
and ﬁnancers’ transactions. “... nec furtum nec treccamentum facere 
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..” reads the stone. The inscription is, therefore, also representative of a 
solid presence and efﬁcient commercial jurisdiction (as guaranteed by 
the Episcopal authority) aimed at ensuring the regular course of trade 
and the activities of the market. But above all it should be remembered 
that the exchange operations were accompanied by additional contracts, 
primarily insurance against the risks of travel, for which there is talk 
of a Lucchese precedent, but also with provisions establishing rates of 
interest: distance exchange in fact gave the merchants the opportunity 
of circumventing the usual church prohibitions on usury. In addition, 
the payments were not in cash, but with coupon payment, by means of a 
formal promise, with guarantee of a rate and with underlying interest: 
hence the bill of exchange; while the letter of exchange was in essence a 
precursor to the banker’s cheque. 
The birthplace, the presence of an authoritative jurisdiction, the 
stratiﬁcation of reﬁned rules (sanctioned as merchant code at Guinigiano 
in 1406, which was the example for each lex mercatoria of the era), the 
capacity and the imagination to create what today one  would call 
ﬁnancial products, led to the bankers, tax collectors, entrepreneurs and 
merchants playing an important role in the economic history of France, 
Flanders and England. It anticipated a habitus and a journey towards 
new shores, in search of new initiatives which still today characterise 
the Lucchese community. William II used to swear oaths by “sanctum 
vultum de Lucca” and a distinguished Belgian historian (E. Pirenne) 
said that the Lucchese bankers can undisputedly boast of having started 
the science of ﬁnance in the West, as their fellow Renaissance countrymen 
had led the way towards Humanism.
The proof of having both a commercial and a ﬁnancial aptitude is given 
indirectly by Dante, who deﬁned the Lucchese as barterers. It is known 
that Dante didn’t go easy when launching his invectives (I would say 
anathemas) at the Tuscan cities, Lucca included (which had given him 
hospitality and the love of a gentlewoman, Gentucca Morla): apart from 
Florence, the subject of multiple curses, Pisa was deﬁned as the “disgrace 
of nations”, Arezzo was inhabited by snarling curs, Siena by “vain People“ 
and Pistoia should have been burnt to the ground.  
So then, in this context, the deﬁnition of barterers also suggests (albeit 
from a negative perspective) their particular ability to trade. Even if, 
after the effect of political, economic and social events which it is not 
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possible to retrace, this primacy has been on the decline, as seen in the 
example given by the restricted circle of optimates (the so-called good 
men) enrolled in the Golden Book of the city (only those who had the 
right to administer the City: a real and true oligarchical Republic). Even 
after this, those prerequisites which every good merchant and citizen 
must have, have never disappeared: defence of tradition and at the 
same time the search for the new, industriousness, devotion to sacriﬁce, 
propensity for thrift and saving, as great as was the effort required to 
make an earning. Indeed, these prerequisites, determining economic 
independence,  are those which allowed for the continuation of a long 
political independence (up to 1847 or more precisely until January 1799 
when Napoleon’s army entered  Lucca) and with this the defence of their 
own identity (of which the thick, solid city walls bear witness).
In essence, here one can ﬁnd, and one has always found, a ﬂair for 
company risk taking, risk to produce and to trade, but not as an end in 
itself; on the contrary, to invest and build.
Certainly times have changed: globalisation, technological potential, 
the extremism of ﬁnancial techniques and the interconnections between 
the markets. They have meant that the ﬁnancial market of our day is 
increasingly condensing elements of structural complexity, and of 
products resulting from innovative engineering activities, each inventive 
and directed towards satisfying the sophisticated needs of institutional 
ﬁnancial operators. These results are for the most part obtained from the 
use of derivative ﬁnancial instruments which include options and swaps 
in different forms and with different underlying. The transactions in 
derivatives generate complicated structures whose average life lengthens 
day by day in a world where, however, uncertainty becomes a factor. 
The cyclical crises of the various markets has often shown the 
ineffectiveness of most of the forecasts that the ﬁnancial institutions 
have made, and on which they have based their investment decisions 
and market operations. At the same time the derivative risks not only 
from the transactions themselves, but particularly from the globalisation 
of the market that generates  a high and complicated intertwining of 
relationships between the ﬁnancial brokers, increase at a  fast pace. 
How does one react? How many tools are there to reduce this risk? 
Present today there are well-known experts from some very renowned 
universities and highly prestigious ﬁnancial and credit institutions. 
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Certainly there won’t be a lack of useful pointers, for all levels. I can say 
in passing though that there are hypothetical legislative instruments, 
monetary policy instruments and supervisory instruments. However I do 
not want, nor could I, invade the specialized ﬁelds of our speakers and 
discussants. 
What I feel sure of however, is that domestic remedies are not required 
here, but those on a world level, because of the network of interrelations 
which tie us all together. 
Not only. Techniques with different characteristics for regulating are 
required. We have too many laws,  recommendations, directives and self-
regulatory codes. And when the subject is too detailed and all pervasive, 
uninhibited operators move like mice in the cheese.
I am not saying that we need to return to XII tables, but we must focus on 
a few provisions which address the crucial points and in particular what 
is in my opinion the mother of all crisis situations: conﬂict of interest. 
Perhaps until we arrive at - as proposed a long time ago by Guido Rossi 
– the express prohibition, or at least, a draconian style control of the 
movement of all or almost all those products that today the inexperienced 
saver is invited to buy more or less in good faith - but in the face of such 
complex ﬁnancial market offers, almost all of us are inexperienced-  . 
These have real risks that the good sense of the past, that of the Lucchese 
merchants, would lead one to avoid a priori.

Sixth Colloquium

FIRST PAPER
CENTRAL BANKING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
IS THERE SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN?*
Paul Wachtel
Professor of Business Economics
Stern School of Business, New York University
Central banks have a venerable history that starts in the late 
17th century with the establishment of the Swedish Riksbank and the 
Bank of England.  However, the modern notion of central banking did 
not begin to emerge until late in the 19th century when central banks 
began to proliferate. The Bank of Italy was established in 1893 and 
the American Federal Reserve System in 1914. The spread of central 
banking to virtually every political jurisdiction is a 20th century 
phenomenon. Moreover, as the 20th century drew to close, students of 
central banking seemed to have settled on a clear consensus concerning 
the role of central banks. But, consensus among economists is often 
ﬁckle and as soon as the 21st century opened the consensus began to 
fall apart.  
The aim of this essay is to explain the 20th century consensus 
and analyze how it fell apart in the ﬁrst decade of the 21st century. To 
begin, what was the consensus? On the micro side, the importance of 
clearly deﬁned and fairly applied bank regulation is a sine qua non 
of good central banking. This was not always obvious and for a time 
in the post war period, the emphasis among central bankers was on 
macro goals and micro banking issues were forgotten1. The early post 
transition experiences in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the 
Asian crisis, gave clear proof to the importance of regulatory structures. 
In many transition countries (see Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2009), 
banking crises occurred soon after the establishment of private banking 
systems and central banks because the bank regulators did not have the 
authority or expertise to function adequately. 
* A preliminary version of this paper was presented to the 2nd Center for International 
Banking, Insurance and Finance Conference, University of Groningen, May 26-27, 2008.
1 The banking crises in Asia in the 1990s caught the IMF by surprise. The fund was staffed 
with macro economic analysts and it did not have the organizational capability to respond 
to bank regulatory issues.
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On the macro side, the 20th century ended with a widely shared 
understanding of how a central bank should use either an exchange 
rate or short term interest rate instrument to target the inﬂation rate. 
The mid 20th century debates between the Keynesians and monetarists 
concerning the role of monetary policy petered out towards the end the 
century.  
Just a few years ago, it seemed unnecessary to ask what central 
banks were supposed to do. Inﬂation targeting and transparent 
regulation of banks were the answers. But events since the summer 
of 2007 have turned the consensus on its head.  Surely, most observers 
would now agree that a fresh look at what central banks can and should 
be doing is worth undertaking. 
We start with a closer look at the old 20th century consensus. We 
will then look at the 21st century challenges to the consensus and ask 
whether something new is really going on.  I will suggest that there are 
four distinct features of the current crisis that distinguish it from the 
past and that will deﬁne 21st century central banking. 
The 20th century consensus
The 20th century consensus is really a late in the century 
development. Banking and central banking around the world in the 
middle of the century was quite different. In the early post war period 
central banks were often given a broad macroeconomic mandate that 
might include income distribution and unemployment in addition 
to price stability. Inﬂation was tolerated or even viewed as a benign 
consequence of efforts to attain other goals. The universal acceptance 
of the primacy of a price stability objective only emerged late in the 
century. Further, at mid century an independent banking sector 
was the exception rather than the role in both developed and less 
developed countries. Government ownership or control of banks was 
common.  And the central bank was often an arm of the government 
ﬁnance ministry (see Cukierman, 2007) and frequently served as a 
government development bank as well. An independent central bank 
with clear macro objectives and a role in maintaining the soundness of 
the banking sector without political interference only emerged late in 
the century.  However, thinking changed rapidly in the last few decades 
of the 20th century and the consensus view spread rapidly around the 
world. 
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In this section, we will take a closer look at the late 20th century 
consensus. In addition, we will point out some weaknesses in the 
strength of the consensus.   
First, on the micro side, the central bank is the lender of last resort 
(LLR) to depository institutions.  That is it prevents runs on individual 
banks by a willingness to provide liquidity against collateral to solvent 
institutions. In this way the central bank protects the banking system 
against systemic crisis.  
This role was ﬁrst articulated by Walter Bagehot. It is interesting 
to note that Bagehot discussion in Lombard Street (1873) is a little 
different than the received 20th century wisdom. His description of the 
lender is bolder and broader than the typical 20th century central bank 
conception of the LLR. He does not limit the LLR function to depository 
institutions. Bagehot advocates almost limitless lending to any market 
or institution attacked by panic or the potential for panic. Bagehot 
speciﬁes that this lending be at high interest rates but that had more 
to do with stemming gold (capital) outﬂows than imposing a penalty on 
borrowers. The difference between Bagehot and the 20th century central 
banking consensus is prescient. We will see later that the central bank 
response to the 21st century crisis is a turn back to Bagehot’s 19th century 
formulation.
The emphasis on the LLR role of the central bank raises 
some concerns about the 20th century consensus that are often not 
addressed.
The LLR function has an important corollary which was often 
overlooked. There is a moral hazard presented by the expressed 
willingness of the CB to provide liquidity to banks that have no where 
else to go. So to avoid the moral hazard, the LLR function necessarily 
implies a regulatory and supervisory function as well. This link is an 
obvious one – if the LLR function is akin to a line of credit then it has 
to come with strings attached – covenants caveats and the ability to 
measure credit risk.  Thus, the LLR should have a banker’s concern with 
its customers which means that there is an inherent link between the 
LLR and bank regulation and supervision. 
The 20th century consensus often forgot that the LLR is a 
banking function. The emphasis on the macro stability role of central 
banks led some countries to separate bank regulation entirely from the 
central bank.  The best known example of this is the UK where a broad 
ﬁnancial sector regulatory agency, the Financial Services Authority, was 
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established in June 19982. Michael Foot (2006), one of the original FSA 
managing directors said that:
There was also a concern within the Central Bank that the split [taking the bank 
regulatory staff out of the Bank of England] would make it more difﬁcult in future 
for the Bank to play its role of Lender of Last Resort.  Hitherto, it had committed 
its balance sheet on the basis of knowledge provided by its own staff as to the 
likelihood of that money being recovered. (Foot, 2006, Parag. 18)
The assumption was that the memo of understanding governing 
the relationship between the lender and the supervisor would 
adequately address the coordination problems. Needless to say the 
strict separation is being reexamined in the light of the Northern Rock 
experience3. Writing in the light of the current crisis, Stanley Fischer 
(2008), Governor of the Bank of Israel, noted that: 
...it is essential for the central bank to be very closely involved in the supervision 
of the ﬁnancial institutions. This is the present situation in nearly all countries, 
with the central banks bearing the responsibility for the economy’s ﬁnancial 
stability, and having the unique capacity of being able to inject liquidity into the 
ﬁnancial markets as necessary, and of being able to act as the “lender of last 
resort” in a ﬁnancial crisis. ...
The need for a very close connection between the central bank and the supervision 
of banks features in an important report issued in April this year by the Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF) entitled “Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience”. 
The conclusion in the report – stressing the need for central bank involvement 
in the supervision of banks and other ﬁnancial institutions with similar impact 
on ﬁnancial stability – receives strong support from the current crisis. (Fischer, 
2008)
There has been much discussion concerning the independence 
and organization of banking supervision (e.g. Quintyn and Taylor, 2004) 
and there is agreement that no particular model dominates.  However, 
the inherent relationship between lending and supervision was often 
overlooked.  It was not so clear a few years ago but it is now that the LLR 
is a banking function as well as being a source of liquidity.  Separation 
of the LLR function from the supervisory role is problematic because 
2 There is another notable example of the complete separation of bank supervision from 
the central bank – the Euro area.  Bank supervision is nationally based while the ECB is 
responsible for lending.  This is a result of the historical evolution of the Euro and has yet 
to be tested by any serious Euro area banking crises.
3 Northern Rock is a large UK building society that experienced losses as a consequence of 
the US subprime mortgage crisis.  There was a run on the bank in September 2007 and the 
bank was nationalized in February 2008. 
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lending involves credit risk and credit risk warrants monitoring or, in 
this instance, supervision. 
There is another aspect of the 20th century consensus concerning 
the LLR that bears a closer look. The 20th century view of the central 
bank LLR function was deﬁned earlier as the provision of liquidity 
to individual banking institutions. This belies an important aspect 
of modern banking. Money markets are well developed and there are 
ample sources of liquidity. Even many emerging market economies have 
both a Treasury bill market and an inter bank market. Thus, the LLR 
function as the consensus views it may be superﬂuous. It is hard to 
imagine an individual bank with adequate collateral that cannot sell 
assets or borrow in existing markets.  
A bank that requests a loan from the central bank is probably 
experiencing something more serious than a liquidity problem. In 
all likelihood it signals solvency problems or systemic issues in the 
banking system or some other reason why the markets for liquidity stop 
functioning.  Thus the 20th century consensus view of the LLR may be an 
anachronism. However, as we will see later, the 21st century crisis in the 
US, UK and the Euro area, at least in its early stages, was a liquidity 
crisis of a different type. We will have more to say about the 21st century 
role of the LLR.
Second, we turn now to the 20th century consensus regarding the 
macro role of central banks.  There are two aspects of macro monetary 
policy to examine. First, macro theory shows how monetary policy affects 
the economy with a model of the transmission mechanism.  Second, 
central bankers choose the goals, targets and instruments for the 
implementation of monetary policy. In both instances, early 20th century 
debates gave way to a widely accepted late 20th century consensus. 
Early macroeconomic theory discussions bounced from a 
Keynesian view that belittled the efﬁcacy of monetary policy to a 
monetarist view that placed all policy making bets on the money 
supply.  Late in the century, a consensus emerged in the form of a broad 
transmission mechanism that relates monetary policy to the economy. 
Monetary policy actions impact economic activity in the short run and 
monetary policy is responsible for maintaining long run price stability. 
4 The one area where he ﬁnds a lack of consensus is the policy response to deﬂation as 
experienced in Japan.  The Japanese problem was an area where micro and macro concerns 
intersect which will be a focal point of our discussion of the 21st century challenges to 
consensus.
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Goodfriend (2007) discusses the elements of the consensus4.   
Similarly, there was considerable controversy in the mid 20th 
century concerning the goals, targets and instruments of monetary 
policy.  However, the different views seemed to melt away in the last 
decade of the century as central banks began to recognize the primary 
importance of price stability.  Although U.S. law gives the Fed other 
goals, the central bank clearly emphasizes price stability.  It became 
fashionable around the world to make price stability the explicit goal 
of central banks through inﬂation targeting (Bernanke and Mishkin, 
1997 and Truman, 2003). More than 20 countries now have a formal 
procedure for inﬂation targeting and many others do so implicitly. 
With remarkable consistency, a short term inter bank interest rate 
(or something very close to it) is the operating target of choice and 
the inﬂation rate itself (sometimes explicitly sometimes not) is the 
intermediate target of choice as central banks pursue price stability.  
The macro consensus was not without its bumps. Although 
the primacy of price stability is well established, there are different 
opinions concerning the cyclical stabilization role of monetary policy. 
Similarly, inﬂation targeting emphasizes an explicit and clear statement 
and transparent policy but it need not preclude a response to cyclical 
ﬂuctuations.  
Inﬂation targeting is still rather new5 and there are differences 
in opinion about what price index to target. There is no consensus about 
the choice of target which could be the overall inﬂation rate in consumer 
prices or a core inﬂation rate with energy and food prices stripped out. 
Furthermore, how should the target be inﬂuenced by indicators of future 
inﬂation such as commodity price inﬂation or surveys or other inﬂation 
forecasts? Finally, should inﬂation targets include a role for asset price 
inﬂation? These questions received little attention during the 1990s 
as inﬂation targeting was enthusiastically supported. However, the 
recent ﬁnancial crisis provides reason to examine the questions again. 
The increase in housing prices, an example of asset price inﬂation, 
contributed to the crisis.  Moreover, commodity price inﬂation has made 
managing the crisis more difﬁcult. We will return to these questions 
later on. 
There is one little noticed aspect of the late 20th century macro 
consensus which is troubling. It does not concern the macroeconomic 
5 New Zealand was the ﬁrst explicit adopter of inﬂation targets, in 1989.
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relationships themselves; the mid century wars between the Keynesians 
and the monetarists are long over.   Nor does it involve the implementation 
of monetary policy.  There is a hint to this problem in the very structure 
of our discussion; in the 20th century we looked at macro monetary policy 
and micro ﬁnancial structure issues as separate concerns. 
Typically, macro discussions viewed monetary policy to be 
independent of the micro concerns of the central bank.  The macro policy 
discussions presume that there is a smoothly operating banking and 
ﬁnancial system that provides a consistent and unchanging framework 
for the transmission of monetary policy to the economy. A profound 
and important early 21st century lesson is that this cannot be taken for 
granted. 
There may be a strong and sound 20th century consensus 
concerning the role of central banks. However, it only works when it 
works.  The 21st century, in its infancy, has presented some new realities 
that challenge the consensus.
The late 20th century had its share of ﬁnancial crises even in 
developed countries. However, we tended to examine systemic banking 
crises as the consequence of a speciﬁc regulatory failure or even more 
simply, a failure to regulate. Two prominent examples come to mind. 
First, the post privatization Mexican banking crisis of the mid 1990s 
(see Gil Diaz, 1998) occurred because privatization of banks in 1991-92 
was accompanied by ﬁnancial sector liberalization and the failure to 
put regulatory structures in place. The banks had every incentive to 
lend vigorously (the new owners paid dearly for the banks) although 
credit departments had little expertise. Similarly, the capabilities 
of bank supervisors had atrophied after a decade of state ownership. 
The liberalization eliminated requirements that banks hold Treasury 
securities but failed to put in place a system of reserve requirements 
for the banks. Even without corrupt behavior, the structure invited poor 
judgment and allowed for little oversight. 
The US Savings and Loan crisis can be characterized in similar 
terms.  It began with a macro shock as high short term interest rates 
made the S&Ls (traditional holders of mortgages in the old days of the 
1980s when mortgages were by and large long term, ﬁxed rate, and 
unsecuritized) unproﬁtable.  The regulators (with the cooperation of an 
over eager Congress) took one step after another to relax regulatory 
constraints and supervisory oversight in order to give these banks proﬁt 
making opportunities.  Regulatory forbearance and legislative changes 
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were used to help right the losses from maturity mismatch inherent in 
the structure of these institutions. The approach created moral hazards 
which led to misguided expansion, some corruption and a massive crisis 
as eager bankers responded to the incentives. 
Both the Mexican and US crises are viewed as the result of poor 
judgments in changing regulatory policy. Lessons were learned from 
these mistakes and the 20th century consensus was unscathed. The 
crises that emerged in the 21st century might be more of the same. 
Mistakes are made and lessons will be learned.  As the Biblical prophet 
Ecclesiastes said:
“What has been is what will be, and what has been done is what will be done; 
there is nothing new under the sun.”
Or is the 21st century really different? The second part of this 
essay provides an answer to this question. Although the crisis looks 
like many of its predecessors, there are important challenges to the 
central banking consensus.  Some changes have already been made, on 
the ﬂy, in response to crisis but additional changes that require careful 
development and legislative action will take some time.  
The 21st century crisis
The story of the banking crisis of the 21st century begins in early 
2006 when the US housing market began to slow down.  Housing starts 
and sales began to decline and prices stopped increasing.  This slowdown 
was viewed by macroeconomists as a positive development that would 
keep the economy from overheating. Some small signs of ﬁnancial 
trouble appeared in early 2007.  The second largest subprime mortgage 
lender in the US, Century Financial Corporation, ﬁled for bankruptcy 
and there were announcements of losses by subprime mortgage units of 
banks and by hedge funds that had to revalue asset backed securities. 
The ﬁnancial crisis leaped ferociously into the headlines in early August 
2007 when credit spreads widened dramatically. 
On August 9, 2007 BNP Paribas froze redemptions on three of its 
investment funds because it could not value the assets backed by US 
subprime mortgages.  This was an important step because it signaled the 
extent to which large banks and not only risk seeking hedge funds faced 
problems with mortgage assets and it demonstrated the international 
scope of the problems. Suddenly and dramatically, ‘money markets seized 
up.’ That is, market participants were reluctant to conduct transactions 
and interest rate spreads widened in certain key markets rapidly to 
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magnitudes rarely or never seen before. 
The spread between asset backed and nonﬁnancial corporate 
commercial paper in the US is historically very small.  For AA rated, 30 
day paper the premium on asset backed paper averaged 6 basis points 
(bp) in June and July 2007 and never exceeded 10 bp. It was 13 bps on 
August 8, 2007 and 51 bps just ﬁve days later.  The spread averaged 54 
bps in August and 84 bp in September 2007. Markets calmed down in 
the fall (the average spread was 35bp in October and 46 in November). 
However, further market concerns increased it to 145 bp average for 
December.  Even with all of the efforts to ‘calm’ the markets, the average 
spread in the ﬁrst two weeks of June 2008 was still 52 bp.  
Similarly, the TED spreads demonstrated the international 
dimension of the crisis.  Bloomberg data for the spread between 3 month 
LIBOR and 3 month US Treasury rates are shown below.  Historically 
the spread is usually less than 50 bp. On August 8, 2008 it was 44 bp 
and on August 20 it peaked at 240bp. It has stayed above 75bps since 
that time6. 
 
The speed with which this market liquidity crisis emerged was 
striking and central banks in the US and Europe responded immediately 
(see Borio, 2008). The ﬁrst of a series of central bank efforts to restore 
liquidity to money markets occurred on August 9, 2007. The ECB 
injected €95 billion of overnight funds and the Fed injected $38 billion 
6 The spikes in LIBOR rates may overstate the situation since there has been some criticism 
of the way in which daily LIBOR is calculated.
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with an extraordinary auction of funds.  
The Fed soon began to loosen monetary policy. On August 17 it 
reduced the discount rate by 50 bp and announced the availability of 
term ﬁnancing for up to 30 days. The target for the Fed funds rate was 
reduced by 50 bp in mid September. The clear willingness of central banks 
to intervene muted the sense of imminent crisis but the ﬁnancial news 
over the fall months was not good. Major ﬁnancial institutions announced 
write downs of assets and losses. There were major reorganizations of 
ﬁrms notably involving off balance sheet activity through so-called 
Structured Investment Vehicles. Efforts to raise additional capital were 
announced by Citigroup and UBS among others. 
In the UK, there was a run on a major mortgage lender, Northern 
Rock, which culminated with emergency loans from the Bank of England 
on September 13. The central bank took further steps in October when 
it guaranteed the bank’s deposits. Efforts to turn the business around 
or ﬁnd a buyer were unsuccessful and Northern Rock was effectively 
nationalized in February 2008.
The spikes in interest rates during the summer were attributed 
to illiquidity and increased perceptions of counter party risk. That is, 
ﬁnancial ﬁrms were hoarding cash. As noted, spreads narrowed in the 
fall, although they remained far above historical norms, as central 
banks added liquidity to the market. Towards the end of the year, 
spreads began to widen again. The spread between AA rated asset 
backed and nonﬁnancial corporate commercial paper in the US was 
wider in December than it had been earlier on. Further, the spread 
between US Treasury and agency securities which was typically around 
20 bps doubled in August and doubled again in December.  The widening 
spreads in December seemed to reﬂect concern about credit risk rather 
than just liquidity. 
The Federal Reserve responded on December 12 by introducing 
a new lending facility, the Term Auction Facility and increasing swap 
lines with other central banks.  Throughout the fall, US banks were 
reluctant to make use of the discount window so the Fed introduced 
this new procedure in order to remove the stigma of borrowing and to 
provide funds for longer periods of time. The ﬁrst auction was for $20 
billion and the amounts were increased through the spring of 2008, 
reaching $150 billion.
Over the ﬁrst few months of 2008, new information indicated that 
losses in the US mortgage market were increasing.  In mid-March, Bear 
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Stearns, a major US investment bank with large mortgage exposures 
faced bankruptcy. In a move unprecedented in modern times, the Fed 
used its emergency authority to make a loan directly to this non-bank 
ﬁnancial institution and then arranged for it to be taken over by JP 
Morgan Chase.  This bail out of an investment bank has been criticized 
for the moral hazard it introduces. Although, the shareholders were 
virtually wiped out, the Fed and the Treasury arranged ﬁnancing of 
the take over which exposes them to credit risk on the Bear Stearns 
portfolio of mortgage backed assets. 
At the same time, the Fed introduced two new lending facilities. 
First, the Term Securities Lending Facility announced on March 11, 
2008, provided for loans of treasury securities to the primary dealers. 
Second, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility utilized the Fed’s emergency 
authority in a historically unprecedented manner to lend directly to the 
dealers against a wide range of collateral including corporate securities 
and mortgage backed securities. The primary dealers in treasury 
securities are not banks; they are investment banks and broker dealer 
ﬁrms.  These new facility provided liquidity to the dealer and investment 
bank community in the wake of the Bear Stearns bankruptcy. 
Extensive lending by the Fed has altered its balance sheet 
dramatically.  In mid 2007, the Fed held almost $800 billion in Treasury 
securities. A year later, the amount was reduced by about $250 billion 
due to the new credit facilities. The composition of the balance sheet 
is important because the Fed now faces signiﬁcant credit risks on its 
portfolio.
The next major development in the US markets involved the 
government sponsored mortgage enterprises, FNMA and FHLMC. 
Although these institutions were founded as government agencies with 
the task of providing liquidity to the mortgage market, they have been 
private corporations for many years.  They do enjoy access to emergency 
borrowing from the Treasury which has always been interpreted 
as an implicit government guarantee that has enabled them to fund 
their activities at favorable interest rates.  They expanded rapidly in 
recent years and were heavily exposed to various sub prime mortgage 
instruments with increasingly high foreclosure rates.  As their stock 
prices declined, it became difﬁcult for the ﬁrms to raise more capital. 
The government made its guarantee of the GSEs explicit on July 13, 
2008 when the Secretary of Treasury, Henry Paulson, announced a joint 
Fed Treasury plan to provide lending to FNMA and FHLMC if needed. 
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As the summer of 2008 ended, the sense of ﬁnancial sector crisis 
or the fear of imminent melt down of ﬁnancial markets seemed to 
have abated. Interest at the Lucca symposium in mid-September 2008 
turned to the longer term implications of the crisis. However, the calm 
was misleading.  The very week of the symposium, the US government 
declined to support Lehman Brothers which immediately ﬁled for 
bankruptcy and by the end of week the Treasury Secretary asked 
Congress for far reaching and poorly speciﬁed powers to buy assets from 
ﬁnancial institutions and support them directly.  The 21st century crisis 
entered a new and more serious phase in the week that this paper was 
presented. 
  In a few weeks, we discovered that governments in the major 
capitalist economies were willing to take over ﬁnancial ﬁrms and impose 
state ownership even when the ﬁscal costs are substantial.  We do yet 
know what this will do the structure of the industry nor do know whether 
the inadequacies of the capital allocation mechanisms in the US will have 
long term consequences for growth? And, ﬁnally, we do not know what 
changes in regulatory structure will emerge from all of this? 
Although the story of the crisis is not over, we will turn to the 
features of both the crisis and the responses so far that mark the start 
of 21st century as very different from its predecessor. 
New things under the sun: 21st century challenges to central banks
The world economy is in the midst of a serious ﬁnancial crisis 
that will reduce economic activity globally.  However, our interest here 
is not the ups and downs of the world economy but the unique features 
of this episode.  We identify four features of the crisis that distinguish it 
from its 20th century predecessors.  Something new is going on – in fact 
there are at least four new things under the sun.
1. Crisis in markets. The 20th century LLR is designed for 
institutions in crisis while the current crisis appeared in markets 
rather than institutions. As a result, the Federal Reserve responded 
to the situation by innovating on the ﬂy because its LLR function was 
not geared to a world wide market crisis. Traditionally, the LLR serves 
solvent institutions in need of funds to continue business operations that 
cannot liquidate assets quickly enough. In the last year we have seen 
instead that the markets where liquidity is usually traded or obtained 
have stopped functioning at critical times 
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Banks were unwilling to lend to one another even over short 
periods reﬂecting an enormous desire to stay liquid and increasing 
fears of counterparty risks. This was a market problem that created 
problems for all participants.  In the absence of a smoothly operating 
LLR function that could gradually ﬁll the gaps, these fears snow balled 
and a virtual panic ensued.  
In a speech on May 13, 2008 Bernanke indicated that the 20th 
century model was not good enough:
However, it became abundantly clear that this traditional framework for liquidity 
provision was not up to addressing the recent strains in short-term funding 
markets. In particular, the efﬁcacy of the discount window has been limited by the 
reluctance of depository institutions to use the window as a source of funding. The 
“stigma” associated with the discount window, which if anything intensiﬁes during 
periods of crisis, arises primarily from banks’ concerns that market participants 
will draw adverse inferences about their ﬁnancial condition if their borrowing 
from the Federal Reserve were to become known. 
The liquidity crisis of 2007 was not a liquidity crisis faced by 
institutions.  Thus, it is no wonder that banks did not go beyond the stigma 
and approach the discount window. Instead there was an illiquidity of 
markets and, as Bernanke says, “the traditional framework was not 
up to addressing the recent strains in short-term funding markets.” 
The Fed’s policy innovations since December 2007 – TAF, PDCF, TSLF 
– are revolutionary. They redeﬁne the LLR function for the 21st century 
profoundly.  The Fed has extended the term of its lending, the amount 
of credit made available, the collateral accepted and the institutions 
eligible to participate. Lending through the discount window will never 
be the same again.
It appears that the crisis caught the Fed by surprise. Although 
there was some institutional weakness in the US – a few hedge funds 
and a few non bank mortgage lenders closed -- the depository institutions 
with a link to the central bank were not in trouble.  Thus, there was no 
traditional LLR role to play. The very efﬁciency and depth of modern 
money markets masked the emerging difﬁculties. But, the spillovers 
from the credit risk premiums in money markets were severely 
underestimated. We cannot fault the Fed and other central banks from 
reacting earlier to market problems because there were no signals of 
market problems in advance.
In the 20th century central banking consensus, the LLR function 
was available as a response to institutions in crisis.  That is, there is a 
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set of privileged institutions that have access to central bank lending for 
liquidity needs.  Here is how the US Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
web site describes it: 
The discount rate is the interest rate charged to commercial banks and other 
depository institutions on loans they receive from their regional Federal Reserve 
Bank’s lending facility--the discount window..... All discount window loans are 
fully secured.
It is no wonder that there is very little borrowing through this 
facility. In the US, the discount window – the hallmark of central banking 
- atrophied from lack of use.  From 1990 to last summer monthly average 
borrowings were never as much as $1 billion.  In the ﬁrst six months 
of 2007 (as the crisis percolated beneath the surface), the average was 
$111 million. And even as the markets ‘seized’ borrowing was $272 m 
in July, $975m in August and only $1567m in September.  The stigma 
about going to the discount window is very strong. The Fed lends through 
the discount window when banks come and ask.  With market liquidity 
drying up, one would think that banks would come and ask7. Banks 
seemed to prefer crisis to the stigma of going to the Fed.  
The ﬁrst new lending facility introduced in December 2007, the 
Term Auction Facility, was aimed at overcoming the stigma and providing 
liquidity to markets (see Armantier, Krieger and MacAndrews, 2008).  It 
allowed institutions to bid on loans from the Fed and to offer a broad 
range of collateral.  Thus, institutions could post collateral which might 
be illiquid and hard to value.  No borrower would be allocated more than 
10 per cent of the total amount offered at the auction.  Thus, institutions 
with speciﬁc liquidity needs could obtain funds without any stigma 
attached.  The facility tried to pump funds directly to the places where 
the interbank market was not functioning well. Further support for 
the market was provided by foreign exchange swaps arranged between 
the Fed and both the ECB and the Swiss National Bank. This provided 
dollar liquidity for non-US banks.  
The new element here is that the central banks were responding to 
a market liquidity crisis and not to individual institutions.  The facilities 
introduced in the spring offered liquidity to non-bank institutions as 
well. It seems that the 21st century central bank will be less focused 
on the depository institutions and will pay more attention to market 
7 The Fed has been aware of this very strong stigma for some time.  Several efforts were 
made in the last decade to lessen the stigma and ease and encourage access to the window. 
Bank behavior did not change noticeably.
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conditions.  Bagehot, writing in 1873, seemed to support this approach. 
As noted earlier, his view of the LLR function was much broader than 
that of the central banks of the 20th century.  In regard to a “domestic 
drain” (demand for cash or liquidity) he wrote:
In opposition to what might be at ﬁst sight supposed, the best way for the bank 
or banks, who have the custody of the bank reserves to deal with a drain arising 
from internal discredit, is to lend freely. The ﬁrst instinct of everyone is to the 
contrary....But every banker knows that this is not the way to diminish discredit. 
This discredit means, ‘an opinion that you have not got any money,’ and to 
dissipate that opinion, you must, if possible, show that you have money: you must 
employ it for the public beneﬁt.
He advocated the aggressive and free use of reserves as the way 
to manage a panic. I think that Bagehot would have supported the Fed’s 
innovative lending to markets.
We have already noted that a lending function entails an ability to 
scrutinize the borrower. Thus, central bank lending to non bank market 
participants should go hand in hand with supervisory authority over 
these institutions. In the next section we will develop further reasons for 
central bank regulatory authority over non bank ﬁnancial institutions.
Critical liquidity markets are likely to have many participants 
in addition to the banks and other ﬁnancial institutions. They could be 
ﬁnancial institutions that the central bank does not or cannot supervise 
and foreign institutions. Thus, there might be a renewed interest in the 
direct regulation of these markets.
Market regulation has been out of favor for some years but it is 
not new.  In the 1930s there was a perception (no longer widely held) that 
market abuses were responsible for the macroeconomic collapse.  Abuses 
in the stock market were thought to be the cause of the depression. As a 
result, extensive market regulation was enacted.  The SEC was created 
and regulation of stock issuance, registration, market operations and 
trading was introduced. Market regulation, at least for equities, was 
a hallmark of the 20th century. However, there was a tendency to move 
a way from such rules based oversight and in favor of principles based 
regulations8. However, recent experience may breathe new life into rules 
8 For example, the British Bankers Association (“Principles, not rules, key to regulation,” 
April 2007) reports that “Principles based regulation is the key to the future success of 
international markets according to over 50 senior representatives from the British and 
Swiss ﬁnancial services industries.”
http://www.bba.org.uk/bba/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=145&a=9936&artpage=all
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based regulation for market activity and instruments.
For example, more transparent rules for international interbank 
lending or trading of derivatives may have moderated the increases 
in spreads noted above. Similarly, standardization of mortgage 
contracts and information about borrowers may have muted the sub 
prime mortgage crisis. Of course, it is unclear whether new rules for 
the issuance or registration and standardization of complex traded 
securities and rules for markets where trading occurs will be enacted. 
A shift in approach to more rules based regulation would require new 
legislation and international coordination.  
In March 2008, the US Treasury released a “Blueprint for 
Financial Regulatory Reform” which includes a hodge-podge of speciﬁc 
and general recommendations.  In several places it hints at stronger 
market rules.  For example, it calls for enhancements to the oversight 
of mortgage origination.  Importantly, it calls for legislation that would 
merge the SEC and the CFTC in order to enhance regulation of securities 
and derivative markets. Investment companies and advisors would be 
subject to self regulation based on principles but the ultimate effect of 
these changes would be to extend regulatory rules to instruments that 
were previously free of oversight. 
The response of central banks in 2007 to the market crisis has 
a further important feature. The central banks began lending directly 
to non-bank ﬁnancial institutions. They did so because systemic risks 
in markets and institutions necessitated such lending. But, these 
innovative responses to crisis have far reaching implications. The second 
new thing in 21st century central banking is nonbank systemic risks.
2. Systemic risks in new places. Banks are still a source of 
systemic risks which requires special attention, but banks are no longer 
the only possible source of such risks. The Fed has acknowledged this 
with its new lending facilities and its intervention into the Bear Stearns 
situation.  In testimony to Congress, Bernanke (April 2008) said: 
....on March 13, Bear Stearns advised the Federal Reserve and other government 
agencies that its liquidity position had signiﬁcantly deteriorated and that it 
would have to ﬁle for bankruptcy the next day unless alternative sources of funds 
became available. 
This news raised difﬁcult questions of public policy. Normally, the market sorts 
out which companies survive and which fail, and that is as it should be. However, 
the issues raised here extended well beyond the fate of one company. Our ﬁnancial 
system is extremely complex and interconnected, and Bear Stearns participated 
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extensively in a range of critical markets. The sudden failure of Bear Stearns likely 
would have led to a chaotic unwinding of positions in those markets and could have 
severely shaken conﬁdence. The company’s failure could also have cast doubt on 
the ﬁnancial positions of some of Bear Stearns’ thousands of counterparties and 
perhaps of companies with similar businesses. Given the exceptional pressures on 
the global economy and ﬁnancial system, the damage caused by a default by Bear 
Stearns could have been severe and extremely difﬁcult to contain.
One cannot imagine a clearer statement that the Fed felt that 
systemic risks warranted its intervention. But, Bear Stearns was not 
a bank and was not subject to any formal Federal Reserve regulatory 
oversight.
The 21st century central banks have acknowledged that systemic 
risks warranting their attention can come from non bank ﬁnancial 
institutions. A question that will be debated for a long time is how far 
along the continuum of ﬁnancial institutions does the potential for 
systemic risk go?  Traditionally, banks are a potential source because 
their principal liabilities are transactions deposits. Interestingly, the 
biggest liability on the balance sheet of Goldman Sachs is overnight 
borrowing.  It seems that the Fed has just acknowledged that there is 
not much difference between banks and investment banks.  Explicit 
recognition of this might lead to profound changes in regulation. So 
the next new thing is that the central banks need to respond to and 
eventually regulate the potential for systemic risks from non-bank 
institutions9.  
Much of the ﬁnancial regulation in the US has its origins in 
Depression era legislation. Among the best known enactments of that 
period was the Glass Steagall Act that separated commercial banking 
and investment banking businesses by restricting the activities of 
banks10. The pendulum of bank regulation began to swing in the opposite 
direction in the 1980s and culminated with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act in 1999 that virtually eliminated the restrictions on bank activities. 
The only remaining restriction on the activities of investment banks is 
that they cannot issue deposits.  
9 Events since the symposia have overtaken these comments. The remaining large US 
investment banks have converted to bank holding companies (e.g. Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs) or been purchased by banks (Merill Lynch).  Thus, investment banking 
regulation and bank regulation have converged. 
10 The motivation for this legislation was the widely held view that the activities of the banks 
in the equity markets were responsible for the market crash, a view that is completely 
discredited now.
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The consolidated activities of large banks and investment 
banking organizations can be quite similar. The table below compares 
the balance sheets of two trillion-dollar ﬁnancial conglomerates 
– Bank America and Goldman Sachs11. For sure, there are differences 
in the balance sheets.  BA is still a traditional bank with lending and 
deposits the biggest balance sheet entries. The investment bank is 
more active in the securities business and, obviously, has non-deposit 
forms of ﬁnancing. However, both institutions make extensive use of 
collateralized purchases and sales in the money markets. Further, 
much of the ﬁnancing of both institutions is short term.  There is a 
major difference in the balance sheets that is due to regulatory impact. 
Goldman Sachs as a securities ﬁrm is not subject to the same capital 
requirements as Bank America.  Its capital asset ratio is 3.8%, less than 
half of that of the Bank America.  
Goldman Sachs Bank America
End 2007 data % of total ﬁrm assets
ASSETS
Cash    1.1 3.8
Securities 51.1 25.0
Loans & receivables 13.2 51.3
Collateralized (e.g. RPs) 32.4 10.9
Other 2.2 9.0
LIABILITES
Deposits or unsecured 
short term borrowing
7.8 60.4
Collateralized (e.g. RPs) 22.6 12.8
Other borrowing 62.3 13.8
Other liabilities 3.5 4.4
CAPITAL 3.8 8.4
A comparison of the annual reports indicates broad similarities in the 
activities and investments of these two institutions.  The business models 
11 The data are for the end of 2007 and were collected from Goldman’s 10K and BA’s call 
report.  There are broad differences in accounting and reporting for these forms so the 
comparison is suggestive. 
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may differ but in the end we are looking at two ﬁnancial conglomerates. 
They offer the same potential for introducing systemic risks. And, their 
capital adequacy and examination by regulators should be based on the 
riskiness of their balance sheets rather than their legal status. 
The comparison of capital ratios invites the following question?  Are 
the differences in the structure, activity and risks in commercial banks and 
investment banks or securities ﬁrms sufﬁciently different to warrant such 
large differences in capital holding? Bankers would argue that they are 
over regulated and hold too much capital.  In fact, the full implementation 
of Basle II might lead to lower capital requirements for large banks and 
that is one of the reasons why its implementation has been delayed in the 
US.  Prior to 2006, investment banks and non bank ﬁnancial institutions 
in the US had been increasing their leverage ratios.
Our second new thing is that there are important non bank 
institutions that will be increasingly the concern of central banks.  How 
this will manifest itself in regulatory changes is impossible to say. Of 
course, the broad risk based regulatory blanket of Basle II includes such 
institutions.  However, it remains to be seen whether legislation and 
regulators will continue to accept the vast differences in leverage ratios 
between investment banks and commercial bank holding companies 
which otherwise appear to be very similar. In the light of developments 
since September, a better question to ask is whether and capital 
regulation for non-bank ﬁnancial activities will be strengthened.
The March 2008 US Treasury proposals mentioned earlier includes 
many things that had been under discussion earlier but had been given 
signiﬁcant impetus by current events. Many of the proposals involve 
efforts to simplify and rationalize the American ﬁnancial regulatory 
structure but several proposals are clear and important statements that 
the 21st century is already very different. First, the report acknowledges 
that the Fed should be able to lend to non-depository institutions 
and therefore calls for giving the Fed access to information about its 
potential loan customers. Second, as mentioned already, the report calls 
for a complete revamping of market regulation by combining the SEC 
and the CFTC and suggesting new ways of rule making for ﬁnancial 
markets.  Third, it calls for an enhanced role of the central bank as an 
overall market stability regulator.  
The Treasury blueprint recognizes that rule making for markets 
needs to be revamped and that a central bank is responsible for 
monitoring systemic risks across the ﬁnancial system (see Jaffee and 
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Perlow for a discussion of the proposals). Systemic risks can occur in 
new and unpredictable places and the central bank and other regulators 
need to both look for the risks and be prepared to deal with them.
3. Crisis with regulation. In the previous section, we discussed 
systemic risks arising from institutions other than the traditional 
depository institutions. A related issue is that crises can arise even 
when there is a thoroughly structured and responsible regulator.  
The US crisis stems from a rapid increase in housing prices which 
might be termed an asset price bubble. Interestingly, the run up of house 
prices in the US was not extraordinary if we compare it to experiences 
in other developed countries (e.g. Australia, UK). The American ‘bubble’ 
was driven by very low interest rates in the post 2001 era; perhaps 
monetary policy was too loose for too long.  But loose monetary policy and 
asset price inﬂation are not unusual. However, some of the institutional 
features of the housing boom led to unusual developments.  
The expansion of the housing sector relied on institutional and 
instrument innovations that took place largely outside of the regulated 
ﬁnancial sector.  That is, the development of new mortgage instruments, 
the marketing of existing instruments and the securitization of these 
instruments fed the bubble. It can reasonably be argued that the 
regulatory oversight of these new instruments and markets has been 
inadequate. Speciﬁcally, the mortgage brokers issued new varieties of 
sub prime mortgages with relaxed lending standards12. The issuers of 
sub prime mortgages were virtually unregulated companies that sold 
the mortgages to banks and investment banks that eagerly repackaged 
them into complex securities. This ‘originate to distribute’ model was 
new and attractive because every step – issuance, sale, packaging, 
MBS sales, etc. – generated fees and revenues for the participants.   At 
the same time, these instruments did not stay on the balance sheets 
of regulated institutions – so, the regulators never really looked (see 
Calomiris 2008). The mortgage brokers are largely unregulated as is 
the securitization activities of banks and other ﬁnancial institutions. 
The problems that ensued emerged outside of the areas mandated to 
12 Between 1987 and 2006 the number of mortgage brokers increased from 7000 to 53000 
and their share of mortgage originations went from 20 to 58% (see James Barth, 2008).
13 The late Ed Gramlich who was serving on the Board of Governors did raise questions 
about mortgage developments publicly and within the Fed but he was pretty much ignored 
as a liberal nay sayer. See Gramlich (2007). 
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regulators.  However, that would be a weak excuse.  If the Fed, the SEC, 
etc wanted to articulate an opinion – its force would have been felt. 
They did not do so13. 
But, what if the regulators had looked? Would they have seen the 
accumulation of risks or would they have reacted in the same way as the 
private sector credit risk managers.  By using past experience for rating 
extra marginal shifts in behavior, the most sophisticated credit risk 
approaches simply failed.  The US credit ratings agencies will spend a 
long time rationalizing this failure. 
Another dimension of this phenomenon is seen in the US 
mortgage markets where the government sponsored enterprises, FNMA 
and FHLMC, are ﬂirting with insolvency.   These institutions are subject 
to regulation and even have their own dedicated regulator, the Ofﬁce 
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, OFHEO. Financial crisis can 
occur in the presence of reliable regulatory structures.  In the past, crisis 
in the presence of regulation occurred because the regulators purposely 
look away.  This was the case in Japan in the 90s and in the US in 
the 80s when regulatory forbearance served to intensify the problems. 
That is the regulators chose to withhold action in order to allow the 
institutions to self correct and grow out of their difﬁculties.  In the 21st 
century we see crises emerging in the presence of active regulation -- 
crisis with regulation.  
There are other examples of crises with reliable regulatory 
structures in place, in Scandinavia albeit just before the 21st century. 
The Scandinavian banking crises of the 1990s were overshadowed by 
emerging markets crises a few years later; they are not as ﬂashy or 
dramatic.   They are good examples of the phenomenon, massive banking 
crisis in countries with good regulatory structures.  Lars Jonung (2008) 
summarized the story: 
The three ...Nordic countries opened their capital accounts fully ﬁrst at the end 
of the 1980s. 
Financial liberalization affected the incentives of lenders and borrowers in a 
fundamental way. Bank lending could now be expanded without any binding 
regulatory restrictions. Banks entered into a ﬁerce competition for market shares. 
A lending boom started, channeling credit to the asset markets, mainly to the 
real estate and stock markets, causing rising asset prices ... Asset prices grew 
more rapidly than consumer prices. Rising asset prices formed the basis for rising 
collateral values, further fuelling credit expansion in a cumulative process.
The private sector, previously strongly rationed in the credit market, used the 
growth of asset prices as collateral for absorbing more debt. As lending from banks 
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and other ﬁnancial institutions in national and foreign currencies, in particular 
for property purchases, increased, the volume of bank loans as a percentage of 
GDP rose markedly.... 
In this process, the rate of inﬂation and inﬂation expectations increased further. 
Real after-tax interest rates .... were negative.... The ﬁnancial system experienced 
a period of extreme expansion.... 
The macroeconomic outcome was a strong boom... 
At this point in time, policy-makers did not perceive the risks inherent in the 
process of ﬁnancial integration. Initially they were unwilling to change either 
monetary or ﬁscal policy. Monetary policy was conﬁned to safeguarding the pegged 
exchange rate.... Fiscal policy remained expansionary at this stage. 
In Jonung’s description regulatory malfeasance does not play 
a role. However, liberalization led to a removal of constraints on the 
banking sector and a credit boom.  And if he has to lay the blame, he 
places it at the foot of macro policy makers for not realizing that monetary 
and ﬁscal policies were too expansionary. The growth in credit was not 
hidden. We can guess how contemporaneous observers would have looked 
at it prior to the crisis. They would have started with the observation 
that the Scandinavian ﬁnancial systems were rather shallow.  The ratio 
of credit to GDP in the mid 1980s was between 30 and 40%, rather low 
for highly developed countries. Financial liberalization and concomitant 
deepening of ﬁnancial markets would have been viewed as an important 
engine of economic growth. Similarly, American observers, including 
Alan Greenspan, looked to the expansion of the mortgage market as the 
key to extending the American dream of home ownership.
The current American experience with mortgage markets and 
the earlier Scandinavian crisis show that the presence of responsible 
regulation is not a guarantee that crisis can be avoided. Innovation by 
ﬁnancial institutions and lags in understanding its implications make 
it hard to avoid crises altogether.  Perhaps for this reason, the Treasury 
reform proposal calls for the establishment of the Fed as an overall 
ﬁnancial market stability regulator. However, it is not clear how the Fed 
would react prospectively to new crisis prone areas or whether it would 
mop up the mess when a crisis occurs.  
The Scandinavian experience of the 1990s offers suggests an 
additional lesson for the 21st century central bank.   That is, micro and 
macro policies are closely tied together which is the last new thing we 
will describe.
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4. Micro macro linkages.  The late 20th century infatuation with 
inﬂation targeting might put blinders on macro policy makers. They 
seem to have forgotten those earlier 20th century monetarist lessons 
about the quantity of money and credit. It might not be necessary to 
monitor monetary aggregates in order to maintain an anti-inﬂationary 
monetary policy. Inﬂation targeting does the job. However, that does 
mean that credit expansion does not matter. Maybe not the rate of growth 
of monetary aggregates in the old monetarist sense but how rapidly 
ﬁnancial deepening is taking place is a valid concern for monetary 
policy. Credit expansion, even without any inﬂationary indications, can 
have other implication.
The conclusion that banking crises can happen in developed 
countries with sound and reliable regulatory structures has implications 
for the role of central banks when bubbles occur.  There was a ﬂurry of 
literature a few years ago asking whether central banks should prick 
bubbles (see the references in Mishkin, 2008). I won’t review the pros 
and cons here but the general conclusion was that it is too dangerous a 
route to follow. No one is particularly able to see a bubble in the making 
and efforts to prick them run the risk of destabilizing the macro economy 
and responding to false signals.  
Greenspan was clear in his approach to bubbles – let them burst 
of their own accord and then use monetary policy to protect the banking 
system and the economy from the fallout (see Blinder and Reis).   Blinder 
calls this the mop up after approach and it worked well after the 1987 
market crash, after 9/11 and after the tech bubble burst in 2001-02.  A 
lesson – apparently unlearned by the Fed – from Scandinavia is that 
the mop up after approach can not always be counted on to mitigate the 
effects of a big bubble bursting.  
Other central banks are concerned with this macro-micro link. 
The central bank of Croatia has successfully controlled the inﬂation rate 
for several years (the 2001-07 average annual inﬂation rate was 2.7%). 
However a continuing credit boom has them constantly fretting (money 
and credit aggregates have grown as much as 15 to 20% in the last 
few years).  Is Croatia experiencing a salubrious ﬁnancial deepening or 
embarking on a dangerous bubble (see Kraft and Jankov)?  They worry 
constantly; do no know how to tell the difference nor what to do if they 
conclude that it is a bubble.  
It is no longer fashionable to monitor credit aggregates in the 
US but it is worthwhile to ask whether a credit boom played a role in 
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the ongoing crisis. Bank credit growth in the US in the 5 years ending 
August 2007 was 9.3% per year. Growth over the last three calendar 
years 2005-07 was 10.4, 11.0 and 10.2%, respectively. These ﬁgures 
suggest that the US experienced a credit boom in recent years which 
might have contributed to the weakening of credit standards and of 
ﬁnancial institutions.   
This observation raises important questions about monetary 
policy in the 21st century. The 20th century consensus was that inﬂation 
should be the sole concern of the central bank policy makers. The 
Federal Reserve sometimes seemed embarrassed that its legislative 
mandate includes maximal employment as well as stable prices. The 
dual mandate was one of the reasons why formally adopting inﬂation 
targets was unlikely. In contrast, the much younger central bank, 
the ECB, faced no ambiguity. The primary objective of the ECB is to 
maintain price stability.   Nevertheless, both central banks acknowledge 
that they play a role in maintaining ﬁnancial stability although these 
concerns are viewed as being independent of monetary policy.
The challenge that central banks face is that monetary policy 
actions have an effect on ﬁnancial stability.  That is a credit boom might 
have cumulative effects on stability without having any evidentiary 
effect on inﬂation. If this is so then macro monetary policy should be 
affected by stability indicators in addition to inﬂation indicators.  Central 
banks have hardly begun to understand the relationship between macro 
policy and their micro concern with ﬁnancial stability. Asset prices, 
including the prices of equities and houses, and credit booms are all 
affected by monetary policy and all have implications for ﬁnancial 
sector stability. However, how and when central banks should respond 
to these phenomena is largely unknown. In fact, it is more common to 
argue that central bankers should not respond to such things. However, 
if in the 21st century, the link between ﬁnancial stability and macro 
policy strengthens, then central banks will have to begin thinking about 
the issue.
More new things? The liquidity crisis of 2007-8 has broadened 
into a solvency crisis in ﬁnancial institutions around the world as asset 
prices continued to fall dramatically. As a result there are additional 
chapters of this paper to write.  The responses to insolvency – buying 
assets, recapitalizing institutions – have never been tried in sophisticated 
ﬁnancial markets like the US and Europe. They are now being tried in 
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this second phase of the 21st century crisis. It will take some time and 
another symposium to weigh the merits of different approaches.  History 
may provide some help but 20th century central bankers never seemed 
to think very much about the optimal response to systemic solvency 
crises.  They surely need something new under the sun.
Conclusion
The ﬁrst ﬁnancial crisis of the 21st century jumped into view a little 
more than a year ago.  And central banking has changed profoundly as a 
result. The central bank responses of the last few months are irreversible 
and central banking will not be the same again. At the same time, the 
changes in the policy environment are far from over. The evolution of 
regulatory structures and the outlook towards non banks and markets 
will continue unfolding well after the crisis passes. Both changes in 
attitudes about the role of regulation and speciﬁc legislative action 
are unlikely to occur rapidly and might not altogether.  However, this 
analysis of the new elements implies that such change should occur.
We have seen that there are four new things, and maybe more, 
under the sun that will make the 21st century central banking consensus 
different: 
1. Crises occur in markets rather than individual institutions 
2. Systemic risks arise in new places
3. Innovation means that crisis can occur in the presence of sound 
regulation
4. Macroeconomic policy has implications for ﬁnancial stability.  
A 21st century consensus is likely to emerge that responds to 
these new realities. It will also include some lessons, not yet written, 
about the response to systemic insolvency.  
But, as the crisis passes, innovation in the ﬁnancial industry 
guarantees that new instruments and markets and problems will pop 
up outside of the grasp of the new consensus. Bubbles and excesses will 
appear in places that were not previously imagined. Just like in the 
20th century, the central banking consensus will lag innovation. And, 
perhaps, the Biblical prophet was right and there really is nothing new 
under the sun after all. 
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Introduction
Let me begin by congratulating the organizing committee 
composed of: Paolo Savona Iftekhar Hasan, and Cristiano Zazzara and 
the sponsors: Associazione Guido Carli and Fondazione Cesiﬁn “Alberto 
Predieri” and the Journal of Financial Stability for putting together 
this interesting and important Sixth Colloquium on “Derivatives, Risk-
Return and Subprime”. It is obvious that this is a very timely topic, 
perhaps the topic of the decade given to potential of the ongoing crisis 
to spread across the globe.  
It is always a pleasure to discuss and comment on papers written 
by Professor Paul Wachtel. His papers can be characterized as being 
thoughtful, clearly written, and focused on an important problem or issue 
of the day.  This particular paper,“Central Banking for the 21st Century: 
Is there something new under the sun?” is consistent with these Wachtel 
characteristics.  The paper is clearly focused on an important topic and is 
exceptionally timely given the ongoing developments in global ﬁnancial 
markets.  The central focus of the paper is the evolution of the lender of 
last resort function of the central bank. In times of ﬁnancial stress this 
lender of last resort role is arguably the most important function of the 
central bank given that it is intimately and directly connected to issues 
related to ﬁnancial stability. In light of recent and ongoing events in 
global ﬁnancial markets and the unusual responses of central bankers 
to these developments, the question of how this lender of last resort 
should be structured and executed will be the subject of policy debates 
for years to come.
Comments and Observations on the Paper
by Paul Wachtel Central Banking for 21st Century:
Is there something new under the sun?
William Curt Hunter
Henry B. Tippie Dean of the College of Business, University of Iowa
Editor of the Journal of Financial Stability
48 COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE PAPER BY PAUL WACHTEL
Traditional Functions of Central Banks and the Issue of 
Financial Stability
Central banks in different countries perform many key functions 
including:
  • Operating and assuring the smooth functioning of the 
payments system,
  • Managing the macroeconomic performance of the aggregate 
economy, usually towards objectives such as price stability, 
sustainable economic growth, low unemployment, or a stable 
value of the currency in foreign exchange markets, among 
others, and 
  • Maintaining the safety and soundness of the banking through 
supervisory and regulatory responsibilities, and 
  • Standing ready to serve as a lender of last resort for troubled 
ﬁnancial institutions and more recently the ﬁnancial system 
as a whole.
 
Traditionally, the lender of last resort function has been exercised 
through the provision of liquidity to individual banks using the discount 
window or similar mechanisms or by injections of liquidity into the entire 
system via open market operations in the case of widespread ﬁnancial 
crises (for example the injection of liquidity by the Federal Reserve 
System and other central banks during the 1998 Russian default and 
the failure of Long Term Capital during the fall of 1998).  As Professor 
Wachtel points out in his paper, the 20th century lender of last resort 
function focused on and was designed to address crises of solvency or 
illiquidity in individual ﬁnancial institutions, most notable commercial 
banks, who until very recently (in most countries) were under the 
direct supervision of the central bank.  As I have argued elsewhere, this 
arrangement was very important since it gave the central bank access 
to the details about the banks’ ﬁnancial conditions - essentially inside 
information - that allowed the central bank through its examinations 
to distinguish between issues of solvency and temporary illiquidity in 
times of ﬁnancial stress.  In some sense, this was an assessment that the 
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market could not as easily perform on a contemporaneous or real time 
basis due to the opaqueness of bank operations and ﬁnancial dealings. 
This of course helped the central bank assess the credit worthiness 
of banks and the value of the collateral that might be pledged at the 
discount window.  
This structure of the lender of last resort function made perfect 
sense since systemic crises almost always originated in the banking 
sector.  As Professor Wachtel notes in his paper, we have more recently 
seen a trend towards the separation of the supervisory function away 
from the central bank to independent supervisory authorities in many 
countries, e.g., the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the United 
Kingdom.  I believe that this trend combined with innovations and 
changes in ﬁnancial institutions, instruments, and markets during the 
latter part of the 20th century essentially made much of the design and 
operations of the traditional lender of last resort function impotent—
and if not impotent then certainly less effective in dealing with the 
ﬁnancial crises and systemic risks and threats associated with the 
21st century.  Professor Wachtel expresses a similar view in his paper. 
Hence, we are in agreement.  A simple listing of some of the changes 
that have undermined the effectiveness of the central bank in dealing 
with ﬁnancial crises would include: 
  • The separation of the supervisory function from the central 
bank (as noted above)
  • The creation of new innovative ﬁnancial instruments via 
ﬁnancial engineering and their propagation outside the 
traditional banking system that allowed systemic risks to 
originate in institutions not under the direct supervisory 
control or oversight of the central bank
  • The lack of transparency (and opaqueness) of the ﬁnancial 
positions of the counterparties to complex ﬁnancial 
transactions, and 
  • The extent to which counterparty balance sheets are 
interconnected and unbooked losses are carried at inaccurate 
valuations.
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In such a world (as exits today) it is easy agree with the general 
conclusion expressed by Professor Wachtel - that the traditional lender 
of last resort function can not fully cope with the challenge posed by 
recent innovations in ﬁnancial instruments, institutions, and markets. 
In addition, I agree with Wachtel’s assessment that the way in which 
macroeconomic policy has evolved during the latter part of the 20th 
century - to the consensus view that price stability should be the primary 
if not the single goal of monetary policy and central bank operations - 
can also be problematical. That is, such a myopic view has the potential 
to lead to a situation where the central bank fails to recognize that 
its price stability policies have signiﬁcant implications for ﬁnancial 
stability.   
What Went Wrong?
At this point, I would like to give a slightly different perspective 
on what went wrong in the ﬁnancial system at the beginning of the 21st 
century.  This perspective will lead to conclusions that are similar in 
nature to those reached in Professor Wachtel’s paper.  Regarding the 
origins of the crisis, ﬁrst there was the issue of excessive liquidity in the 
economic and ﬁnancial system.  One might assert that it all began with 
the liquidity injections associated with events such as the century date 
change (Y2K) or the 2001 recession in the U.S.  And many would claim 
that the U.S. Federal Reserve kept its federal funds target rate too low 
for too long and thus lay the blame for the current crisis squarely at 
the feet of the Federal Reserve for seeding what some have labeled the 
Greenspan bubble (in housing prices).
There is little doubt, as Friedman taught us, that excessive 
monetary growth leads to inﬂation in the long run.  However, to the 
extent that we did have excessive money growth or excessive liquidity 
in the markets in ﬁrst few years of the 21st century, the result or 
outcome was asset price inﬂation (housing prices) rather than consumer 
price inﬂation. Perhaps the Greenspan Fed believed too strongly in 
the elevated levels of productivity growth generated in the U.S. by 
innovations in information processing technology and new business 
models.  After all, the Fed was able to allow the economy to grow at above 
what was thought to be its potential based on older estimates of trend 
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productivity growth without signiﬁcant consumer price inﬂation. With 
such good performance on the consumer price inﬂation front maybe the 
central bank took its eye off the ball in terms of asset price inﬂation and 
its probable/eventual impact on the real economy once the bubble burst. 
I think that Professor Wachtel was making this point in his discussion of 
the risks associated with central banks focusing only on price stability 
as their mandate and ignoring the implications of their monetary policy 
actions for ﬁnancial stability.  However, as a member of the Greenspan 
Fed from 1988 until the end of 2003, I must caution commentators not 
to simply lay the blame for the crisis at the feet of the Fed for running 
excessively easy monetary policy.  This would be too simplistic. 
During the early part of this decade, several other potent factors 
were either at play or were beginning to develop and had a signiﬁcant 
role in the performance of the U.S. and world economy and the growth 
in the housing market.  Included among these factors were:
  1. a huge saving glut in developing and emerging market 
economies that ran large surpluses - the world capital stock 
almost tripled from 2001 to 2005 
  2. these surpluses and savings were channeled into dollar assets, 
pushing down intermediate and longer term interest rates in 
the U.S. even as the Fed tried to raise interest rates
  3. the continued growth in the market presence of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac fueled by a congressional mandate (and a 
cozy relationship undoubted aided by campaign contributions) 
to stimulate the development of the U.S. housing market - this 
growth combined with low mortgage rates fueled the demand 
for housing in the U.S. 
  4. investors on a global developed an insatiable appetite for 
extra yield afforded by dollar based assets, especially those 
connected to housing
  5. a classical feedback loop developed - given the low interest 
rates, expanded growth in housing, and the demand for extra 
yield, innovative investment bankers and ﬁnancial engineers 
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who were paid handsomely to create higher yielding mortgage 
related structured products (CDOs, CLOs, etc.)
  6. at the same time commercial banks stepped up their housing 
related lending with low documentation loans and other 
new mortgage products commonly categorized as subprime, 
sometimes at predatory rates to uninformed borrowers....
widespread securitization allowed these loans to be originated 
but sold off into the secondary market
  7. and brokers outside the banking system were paid handsomely 
for originating and selling packaged and poorly conceived 
loans in the secondary market with the help of Fannie and 
Freddie
  8. the incentives in the ﬁnancial system were misaligned and 
led to the excessive creation of housing related paper and 
derivatives written on this paper
  9. rating agencies and insurers also played a role in the process 
since investment bankers and other players needed access (for 
a fee) to the proper ratings required  to design and sell their 
innovative products
All of these factors, and more, were elements of what - with 
hindsight - must be considered elements making up the perfect ﬁnancial 
storm.
Securitization, Trading, and the New Culture of Finance
Looking back over the early years of the decade, the acceleration 
of securitization most certainly played a signiﬁcant role in the ongoing 
systemic crisis.  The sale of securities from credit pools reached record 
levels around 2005 as banks transferred to their trading books assets 
that were too costly (i.e., the 8 percent capital charge) to carry on their 
credit books.  For the most part, the transferred securities were illiquid 
and essentially private placements. As Alan Greenspan has noted, 
this trend towards structured credit in the cheapest way possible to 
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avoid capital requirements was perhaps the most massive and blatant 
regulatory arbitrage ever.
In this environment, “too interconnected to fail” (e.g., Bear Stearns 
and AIG) attained equal status with “too big to fail” (e.g., Fannie and 
Freddie).  During the build up to the perfect storm, the entire fabric of the 
ﬁnancial system shifted from one where bank commercial lending was 
traditionally central to one where securities trading became dominant. 
Today roughly two-thirds of capital ﬂows go through ﬁduciaries, i.e., 
those institutions that act as managers, custodians, brokers, dealers, 
administrators, or trustees while credit banks, the dominant ﬁnancial 
force until the 1980s, have become marginalized.  With the shift in the 
focus to securities trading, warehousing, swapping interest payments, 
insuring against default, lending securities, arbitrage, valuation (or 
perhaps lack of valuation), and massive use of nonbank leverage, 
traditional bank lending is no longer at the center of the ﬁnance industry. 
This movement away from traditional bank lending has allowed 
systemic risks to originate outside the banking system and at the same 
time made the system more fragile since central banks may no longer 
have the advantage of direct supervising and overseeing these nonbank 
activities.  This is why our regulatory tools, based primarily on the old 
credit model have proved so ineffective in this new environment.
Conclusion
In the end, I think that Professor Wachtel is essentially correct in his 
broad assessment of the evolution of central banking from the 20th century 
to the 21st century.  The lender of last resort model needs to adapt to the new 
reality....and it has as the actions of the Federal Reserve and other central 
banks have shown in the last few days:  the Fed has loaned freely and the 
U.S. Treasury has stepped in to provide needed ﬁnancial backstopping for 
institutions and the system more generally. As Professor Wachtel states, 
the central banking (at least in the U.S.) has taken a step back to the future 
by essentially following the dictates of Walter Bagehot as described in his 
book Lombard Street. To paraphrase Bagehot, in times of ﬁnancial crisis 
the central bank should lend freely at a penalty rate on good collateral. In 
the current environment, I believe that the U.S. Federal Reserve is acting 
appropriately by lending quite freely (opening its Discount Window to 
nonbanks) and lending on nontraditional collateral at penalty rates.
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Federal Reserve Board. All errors are our own. 
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We use data from 2001-2007 to assess the impact of mortgage 
securitization on the insolvency risk, proﬁtability, and leverage ratios 
of US bank holding companies. Using instrumental variable estimation 
techniques, we ﬁnd that banks use mortgage securitization to reduce 
insolvency risk and increase leverage. We also ﬁnd that securitization 
techniques increase bank proﬁtability. Our results suggest that 
securitization techniques have played a positive role. This suggests that 
the current turmoil in mortgage  securitization markets is related to 
recent excesses in those markets, and that securitization activity will 
resume after those excesses are cleared up.
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I. Introduction
Asset securitizations have been an important and expanding part 
of banking since the early 1990s.  By the end of 2006, the outstanding 
amount of asset backed securities (ABS) stood at $US 2.1 trillion and 
global total issuance of CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) reached 
$US 550 billion (SIFMA, 2008).  Since then, the ABS market has dried 
up due to the recent credit crisis; many banks have faced near zero 
demand for some of their securitized assets, and banks have reported 
huge loan write downs, and many banks face increased insolvency risk 
(www.securitization.net). 
The mortgage securitization market  experienced a similar pattern. 
At the beginning of 2007  $180 billion of mortgages were securitized 
by month, while by August 2008, monthly mortgage securitization had 
dropped to $102 billion (SIFMA). Additionally, since July 2007,  subprime 
mortgage securitization has virtually dried up.
Given the growth of the markets for securitization, and their 
recent collapse, it is important to understand how securitization activities, 
particularly mortgage securitization, affect the banking sector. In this paper, 
we help to address this question by using pre-crisis bank holding company 
data from 2001 to Q2 2007 to empirically quantify the impact of mortgage 
securitization on banks’ insolvency risk, proﬁtability, and leverage. 
Securitization is a set of procedures which helps the bank fund and 
then transfer some of the risks of a selected pool of loans. For example, in a 
balance sheet CDO, the bank funds a pool loans that would have traditionally 
been held on balance sheet, by instead selling them to an off-balance 
sheet special purpose vehicle (SPV).  The SPV funds the loan purchases 
by issuing ABS whose cashﬂows are linked to the pool’s performance. The 
ABS are often tranched into risk classes that vary in their credit ratings. 
The most risky tranche (often the equity tranche) receives no rating at all. 
Banks often retain a tranche or provide other guarantees to the SPV to 
signal asset quality or an intent to monitor the borrowers.  
Securitization has the potential to signiﬁcantly impact banks’ 
insolvency risk, leverage, and proﬁtability.  Securitization affects the 
bank’s insolvency risk because it transfers some of the risk of a pool of 
loans to investors in the SPV, thus transforming the distribution of the 
asset side of a bank’s balance sheet.  This can reduce or increase insolvency 
risk depending on which tranches the bank optimally chooses to sell, and 
which it chooses to retain [Jiangli, Pritsker, Raupach (2007); Krahnen 
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and Wilde (2007)]. Securitization also affects insolvency risk and leverage 
because it will alter the bank’s optimal liability structure [Leland, (2007)]. 
Additionally securitization may increase insolvency risk if banks engage 
in regulatory capital arbitrage, which involves apparently transfering 
risk off balance sheet, while actually retaining the risk through implicit 
agreement to buy back its nonperforming loans.  
Securitization can affect the bank’s expected proﬁt in two 
ways. The direct effect increases expected proﬁts by expanding banks 
investment opportunities. However, securitization could lower proﬁts 
indirectly if its widespread use increases competition in loan origination 
[Instefjord (2005)], or if it leads to a deterioration in the quality of the 
loan pool [Parlour and Plantin (2007)], Duffee and Zhou (2001)], or if 
those who invest in ABS are not cognizant of the possible risks.     
Our empirical  analysis takes into account that securitization is 
an endogenous decision of the bank.   To control for endogeneity, we 
use a bank’s size as an instrument for its securitization decision.  A 
set of analyses including semi-parametric regression is used to justify 
our choice of size as an instrument.  We condition on size in univariate 
comparisons of banks that do and do not use securitization, and we use 
size as an instrument in multi-variate regressions. Using both analyses 
we ﬁnd that securitization reduces insolvency risk and increases 
leverage ratios. The results on proﬁtability were mixed: securitization 
statistically improved proﬁtability using the univariate but not the 
multivariate analysis. The results hold over a set of robustness checks 
including propensity score matching techniques which creates a 
matching sample of non-securitizers whose properties are compared 
with those of securitizers.  
Our paper is most closely related to the empirical literature on 
why banks use securitization, and how securitization affects banks 
risk proﬁle. The most consistent ﬁnding on banks reason for using 
securitization is that it reduces banks funding constraints, and thus 
increases the supply of credit [Hirtle (2007), Cebenoyan and Strahan 
(2004), Goderis et al. (2007)]; moreover securitization is not for 
regulatory capital arbitrage [Martin-Oliver and Saurina (2007), et al. 
(2004), Calomiris and Mason (2003)].  
There is a small literature on how securitization affects banks 
risk proﬁles. Franke and Krahnen (2005), using an event study, ﬁnd that 
securitization increases bank’s systematic risk, as measured by market 
beta.  Dionne and Harchaoui (2003), ﬁnd securitization increases banks’ 
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insolvency risk, as measured by banks ratio of regulatory capital to risk 
weighted assets. A complicating factor in all such analyses is that banks 
risk proﬁles may affect their decision to use securitization [Minton et al 
(2004); Bannier and Hansel (2007)] and this needs to be accounted for 
as part of the analysis. 
Our paper makes three contributions to the empirical literature. 
First, we ﬁnd that securitizers tend to be large banks that fund 
a relatively small fraction of their lending with deposits.  This is 
consistent with securitization serving as an alternative funding source 
when banks begin to outgrow their base of deposits.  Second, we employ 
a new measure of insolvency risk, a bank’s time deposit premium which 
is the interest rate spread between its uninsured and insured time 
deposits. Because the time deposit premium is a forward looking and 
market determined measure of ex-ante risk, we believe it improves 
on risk measures such as capital ratios that are based on accounting 
data.  We also believe that interest-rate spreads are a better measure 
of insolvency risk than the beta measures that have been used in event 
studies because beta measures covariance, which is a second moment 
measure or risk, whereas insolvency risk is more related to higher order 
moments and tail events.  
Our other contributions are more methodological.  We believe 
we are the ﬁrst paper to use size differences among relatively large 
banks as an instrument to control for the endogeneity of securitization. 
This approach will help us to produce more concise estimates of how 
securitization affects bank insolvency, capital structure, and overall 
proﬁtability.  
The remainder of the paper contains four sections.  Section II 
describes our data; section III studies how banks are affected if they 
have to retain securitized assets on balance sheet; section IV contains 
the instrumental variable analysis; section V describes our robustness 
checks; a ﬁnal section concludes.  
II. Data
Our data on securitization comes from FR Y9-C US bank holding 
company (BHC) data from the second quarter of 2001 to the second 
quarter of 2007. This allows us to study the effects of securitization on a 
consolidated basis that nets out securitization activities that might occur 
between two banks within the same BHC. The mortgage securitization 
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data is from the  schedule HC-S which covers the 1-4 Family Residential 
Mortgage Loans (Mortgage)1 Securitized mortgages are recorded 
by their outstanding principal balance of assets sold and securitized 
with servicing retained or with recourse or other seller-provided credit 
enhancements. It should be noted that the data distinguish between 
outright loan sales, and sales for the purposes of securitization.  We only 
focus on the latter.
For a variety of reasons, many BHCs that use securitization, 
do not use it in all quarters. For our purposes, a BHC is a mortgage 
securitizer if securitizes mortgage in any quarter. There is a total of 
2231 BHCs, but only 147 BHCs securitize mortgages. Even though the 
total number of banks that securitize mortgages is small, nevertheless, 
mortgage securitizers are important since they represent 67% of US 
BHC assets.
As a preliminary, in Table 1, we compare BHCs that securitize 
mortgage with those that do not along a number of dimensions, including 
their size, their credit risk, proﬁtability and leverage [Also see Table 3 of 
Jiangli and Pritsker (2008)].  To perform the comparisons, we compute 
time-series averages of the relevant variables for each BHC and then 
use the time-series averages in all subsequent analysis. 
The most robust difference between mortgage securitizers and non-
securitizers of any asset types is that securitizers are signiﬁcantly larger 
than non-securitizers where size is measured as the natural logarithm of 
on balance sheet assets. In addition securitizers have larger loans / deposits 
than non-securitizers suggesting that securitizers tend to be large banks 
that have outgrown their ability to raise inexpensive deposits as a source 
of funding. Consistent with specialization in ﬁnancial intermediation, 
securitizers also hold a much higher average percentage of the type of loan 
they securitize on their balance sheets than do non-securitizers. 
To study risk proﬁles, we use three measures of risk. The ﬁrst is 
the time deposit premium, which is the difference between the interest 
rates on small (< $100,000) insured time deposits and large (> $100,000) 
uninsured time deposits. The time deposit premium is a good measure of 
the banks insolvency, or tail risk because uninsured time deposits have 
risk-sensitive pricing [Gilbert, Meyer and Vaughan (2002)]. The time 
deposit premium has some caveats: For example, some above US$100,000 
1 Jiangli and Pritsker (2008) also consider other types of securitized assets, Home Equity 
Lines, Commercial and Industrial loans, Credit Card, Auto, and Other Consumer Loans
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time deposits may be insured if they are held in joint accounts, but US 
BHC data do not provide information on whether accounts are joint. 
Additionally, we do not have any information on the maturity and 
liquidity of the time deposits. Our second and third risk measures are 
the loan loss provision rate and banks charge-off ratio.  Both of these are 
measures of the expected loss rate of the bank’s portfolio.  
A raw comparison of the risk measures shows securitizers have a 
lower time deposit premium than non-securitizers, but the differences 
are often statistically insigniﬁcant. Further analysis suggests this is 
because of very noisy time-deposit premia among small non-securitizers. 
For the measures of expected loss, our results are stronger.  We ﬁnd, 
with a few exceptions, that both the provision and charge off ratios are 
statistically and economically signiﬁcantly higher for securitizers than 
non-securitizers.  
Securitizers are also more proﬁtable than non-securitizers, 
whether proﬁts are measured by return on equity (ROE), or return 
on assets (not shown). In addition, we found that securitizers tend to 
have higher leverage. However,  the raw comparisons for proﬁt and 
leverage are statistically insigniﬁcant. We believe that the statistical 
insigniﬁcance is partially driven by noise that varies with bank size, 
and that comparing banks of comparable size is a more meaningful 
comparison.  We revisit this issue below. 
III. Instrumental variables estimation
Our IV approach is motivated by the empirical observation that 
large banks are more likely to use securitization [Karaoglu (2005), 
Bannier and Hansel (2006), and Martin-Oliver and Saurina (2007)], 
presumably because those banks can overcome the ﬁxed costs of 
setting up a securitization program, and because large banks may have 
investment opportunities that outstrip their ability to raise funds via 
deposits. Currently, our analysis only focuses on mortgage securitizers 
because it is the most important and widespread.  Additionally, when 
banks securitize multiple types of assets, as many do, our methodology 
cannot identify which type of securitization generates our results.  
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A. Size as a valid instrument
To establish that bank size is a valid instrument we need to show 
that size is related to bank’s decision to securitize, but is not otherwise 
related to differences in the performance of banks that do and do not use 
securitization.  To study the relation between size and securitization, we 
sorted our BHC sample into seven size-buckets based on the quantiles of 
Ln(Assets), with size increasing with bucket number (Table 2). The data 
show that the likelihood of being a securitizer strongly and nonlinearly 
increases with size, moving from 1% securitizers in bucket 1 to 10% in 
bucket 5, and then jumping to 41% in bucket 6, and 100% in bucket 7. 
Securitization is clearly related to BHC size.  To motivate the use 
of size as an instrument, we also need to establish that size is unrelated 
to performance except through its affect on whether a bank uses 
securitization.  It is not technically possible to verify this claim without 
making some form of over-identifying restriction.  The restriction 
that we propose is that other than through securitization, beyond an 
estimable threshold, size has a linear effect on performance among 
large banks.  Under this restriction, if beyond a threshold size has no 
effect on performance among large banks that do not use securitization 
(the coefﬁcient relating size to performance is zero), then this could be 
interpreted as evidence that if large securitizers are different from large 
non-securitizers, then it is primarily driven by securitization, and not 
by size differences.  
It is possible to test whether size is related to performance among 
non-securitizers beyond a threshold. To do so, we estimated linear and 
semi-parametric variants of the regressions in equation (1)  in which all 
variables other than bank size enter linearly, while bank size is allowed 
to enter either linearly or semi-parametrically via the unspeciﬁed 
function G[Ln(Assets)]: 
(1)    
Where Y is the measure of performance which can be time deposit 
premium, ROE and leverage ratio. Mort (mortgage), HEL (home equity 
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loans), C&I (commercial and industrial loans), CreditCard (credit card) 
and Other (other loans) are the on-balance sheet loan amount. Z is a 
vector that includes other controls, such as loan quality measured by 
the delinquency loan ratio, and the interest rate on insured deposits. 
This equation can be more compactly written as:
 
Our linear speciﬁcation estimated equation (1) using subsamples 
that truncate an expanding sample of small banks from the analysis. 
The results [see Jiangli and Pritsker (2008)] show that beyond a 
threshold of small banks, size is unrelated to performance differences 
among large banks. 
To verify that our linear regression results are not due to the 
choice of linear functional form, we next approximated the function G[.] 
semi-parametrically using a cubic spline. Our principal results [Jiangli 
and Pritsker (2008)] is that beyond the smallest banks, increases in 
size alone do not appreciably alter nonsecuritizers performance. This is 
veriﬁed by the ﬂatness of the G[.] function for non-securitizing banks 
with Ln (Assets) > 14.58 (not shown), which correspond to size buckets 
5 and 6 for the non-securitizers.  
B. Univariate and multivariate size analysis
Our analysis suggests that size is a valid instrument for identifying 
the effects of securitization on bank performance, especially when 
studying banks in groups 5, 6, and 7.  We use size in two ways. First, we 
performed univariate analysis in which we compared securitizers and 
non-securitizers within and across size  buckets.  The within bucket 
results are mostly insigniﬁcant due to small numbers of securitizers 
in each bucket. The ideal comparison across buckets is between non-
securitizers in bucket 5 and securitizers in buckets 6 and 7 because 
the fraction of securitizers jumps between 5 and 6, but hopefully other 
bank characteristics that may be correlated with size do not. The ideal 
comparison shows that securitizers have lower insolvency risk, a higher 
ROE and leverage ratio than non-securitizers (Table 3).
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Table 4 reports our multivariate IV regressions. Size is used to 
instrument for securitization in a ﬁrst stage OLS and then second-stage 
regressions are estimated using predicted values for securitization.  For 
comparison purposes we also run un-instrumented OLS regressions 
of performance on securitization.  All regressions use data only from 
size groups 5, 6 and 7, because our analysis suggests size is a valid 
instrument for those size groups.  Our securitization variable is mortsec, 
which is an indicator for whether the BHC is a mortgage securitizer. To 
save space, the uninstrumented regressions only report the coefﬁcient 
for mortsec. In the ﬁrst stage OLS (not shown) size is positive and 
signiﬁcantly correlated with mortsec. This is not surprising given the 
strong relationship between size and securitization in Table 3.  
In the case of insolvency risk, the IV and OLS regressions 
produce signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcients on mortsec. Our reported 
IV point estimates suggest securitization reduces the time deposit 
premium by 350 basis points. Across different second-stage models (not 
shown), securitization reduces the time deposit premium by 50bps to 
380bps. These reductions are economically substantial and statistically 
signiﬁcant.   
The IV results on bank proﬁtability fail to detect a statistically 
signiﬁcant relationship between mortgage securitization and bank 
proﬁtability as measured by ROE. This is different from our ﬁnding 
in the univariate analysis, and we suspect part of the difference in the 
results may be because the multivariate analysis requires coefﬁcient 
identiﬁcation for more variables, some of which may be correlated with our 
instrumented securitization measure. The results for leverage are positive 
and statistically different from zero. Across multiple speciﬁcations (not 
shown), securitizing mortgages increase leverage ratios by 1.5% to 4.6%.
In sum, our univariate and multi-variate results for mortgages 
suggest that securitization reduces insolvency risk and borrowing costs 
by lowering the time-deposit premium. Additionally, securitization 
allows the bank to increase leverage, which helps the bank economize 
on costly equity capital.  Our results for proﬁtability are weaker, with 
only the univariate results suggesting that securitization increases 
proﬁtability.    
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IV. Robustness checks
We performed a series of robustness checks to verify our results 
from section III. In section III equation (1), we dropped the three 
measures of loan quality, and replaced insured (uninsured) deposit 
rates by total interest expense on insured (uninsured) deposits divided 
by total insured (uninsured) deposits; our results still hold. We also used 
a propensity score technique to compare mortgage securitizers and non-
securitizers, and our results still hold (not reported). 
One question is whether our ﬁnding that securitization reduces time 
deposit premia is due to securitization or due to (other) scale economies 
in risk-taking [Hughes, Mester and Moon (2001)]. Disentangling these 
possibilities will be difﬁcult since securitization is itself an important 
source of scale economies in risk-taking. Nevertheless, our analysis 
partially controls for these scale effects since we compare securitizers 
and non-securitizers that are similar in size.  This also automatically 
control for other sources of endogenous risk-taking that are related to 
size. Additionally, most researchers ﬁnd that scale economies disappear 
once bank asset sizes reach about $10 billion [see the survey by Amel 
et al (2004)], which is about the size of banks in group 5 in our sample 
This suggests that scale economies from non-securitization activities 
are essentially exhausted for groups 5, 6, and 7, which are the banks 
where most of our analysis is focused.  
As a ﬁnal robustness check to our results, we use the sample 
which contains the top bank holding companies only. Using this sample 
eliminates the inconsistency in estimation arising from that we treat 
two BHCs as independent observation, while they actually belong to a 
same top holding company. The number of the top holding companies 
is 2113. The results based on the top BHCs are almost identical to the 
original BHC sample.
V. Conclusion
Using bank holding company data from 2001-2007, we have 
conducted an empirical analysis of the effect that mortgage securitization 
has on BHCs. Our analysis focused on mortgage securitizations. Our 
approaches compare the average performance of large banks that securitize 
with banks of comparable size that do not.  We also usedinstrumental 
variable regression in which we use bank size as an instrument for 
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securitization since beyond very small banks, bank size has little effect on 
our performance measures, but has a signiﬁcant effect on the likelihood 
that banks securitize. Using different approaches, our results present a 
fairly consistent picture in the case of mortgage securitizers.  We ﬁnd that 
mortgage securitization reduces bank insolvency risk, increases bank 
leverage and increase bank’s proﬁtability.  
Our overall results suggest a very positive role for mortgage 
securitization.  This raises the question of how to interpret our results in 
light of the current turmoil in credit markets in general, and mortgage 
markets in particular.  Our interpretation is that the high proﬁtability, high 
leverage, and low insolvency risk that are associated with securitization 
in our analysis are reﬂective of a positive history of past experience with 
securitization in banking. Additionally, the relatively low time deposit 
premiums of securitizers suggests that the current turmoil in credit 
markets was not anticipated by uninsured depositors because it was not 
reﬂective of historical experience, but is instead reﬂective of recent excesses 
in mortgage and securitization markets. These excesses are documented in 
Ashcraft and Schuermann (2007), Dell Arricia et al (2007), and Mian and 
Suﬁ (2007).  If our interpretation is correct, then we predict that because 
of the positive effects that we estimate for securitization, securitization 
activity will pick-up again once the current problems in credit markets 
are cleared up.  Only time will tell if our prediction is correct.
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Table 1
Comparison of securitizers and non-securitizers
Non-Securitizers Securitizers
Mortgage N Mean Std De N Mean Std De p-
values
% 
difference 
of means
Ln(Assets) 2084 12.9131 0.9971 147 15.1113 2.4762 <.0001 15.7%
Loans/Assets 2084 0.6673 0.1298 147 0.6436 0.1291 0.0329 -3.6%
Mortgage/Loans 2084 0.2436 0.1572 147 0.2764 0.1381 0.0138 12.6%
Provision ratio 2084 0.0021 0.0046 147 0.0025 0.0021 0.3968 14.1%
NoAcc+Chargeoff/Loans 2084 0.0085 0.0112 147 0.0108 0.0103 0.0137 24.2%
Time deposit premium 2082 0.0268 0.0366 147 0.0226 0.0377 0.1836 -16.8%
ROE 2084 0.1040 0.0587 147 0.1126 0.0559 0.0836 8.0%
Leverage ratio 2084 0.9041 0.0371 147 0.9083 0.0219 0.1777 0.5%
Loans/Deposits 2084 0.8484 0.3444 147 0.9732 0.4474 <.0001 13.7%
Notes: All variables in column “Mean” (“Std. Dev”) are the cross sectional mean (Standard 
deviation) of the individual BHC time series average. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm 
of assets in thousand of U.S. dollars. Provision ratio is the total provision divided by total 
loans. NoAcc+Chargeoff is the sum of nonaccrual and charge-off loans over total loans. 
Rate on deposit is the interest expense on deposit divided by total deposit. Time deposit 
premium is the spread between the rate on large (above US$100,000) and small (below 
US$100,000) time deposits. ROE is the income before tax and extraordinary item and 
other adjustments divided by average equity. Leverage ratio is the total liabilities over 
assets. Column “p-values” report statistical difference between the means of securitizers 
and non-securitizers. % difference of means is the difference of securitizers’ and non-
securitizers’ mean over 0.5 times the sum of securitizers’ and non-securitizers’ mean.
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Table 2
Distribution of Ln(Assets) among  BHCs that hold Mortgages
A.  Raw Distrbution of Ln (Assets)
Quantiles 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99%
Ln(Assets) 12.22 12.66 13.41 14.58 15.63 18.41
Mean 13.06
Minimum 10.59
Maximum 21.59
Std. Dev 1.63
Obs 2232
B.  Distrbution of Ln(assets)  by Size Buckets.
Bucket  1  2 3   4   5   6 7
Quantiles < 25% 25%~50% 50%~75% 75%~90% 90%~95% 95%~99% > 99%
Fraction of securitizers 0.72% 3.78% 5.37% 6.61% 10.53% 41.11% 100.00%
# non-securitizers 554 535 529 311 102 53 0
# securitizers 4 21 30 22 12 37 22
Total 558 556 559 333 114 90 22
Notes: For all of the bank holding companies in our sample that hold mortages, the 
table reports the distribution of bank size measured by Ln (Assets) (Panel A).  Panel B 
decomposes the banks into seven size buckets, with bank size increasing with bucket 
number. Panel B shows that the fraction of securitizers increases with size, and jumps 
signiﬁcantly between buckets 5 and 6, suggesting that size is highly correlated among the 
very largest banks.
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Table 3
Comparison of banks that do and do not securitize
within and across bank size buckets
Size
 1-5
Size
2-5 
Size
3-5 
Size
4-5 
Size
 5 
Size
6 & 7
non-
sec
non-
sec
Non-
sec
Non-
sec
non-
sec
sec
Variable Mean p-value Mean p-value Mean p-value Mean p-value Mean Mean p-value
Provision 
ratio
0.0021 0.028** 0.0022 0.065* 0.0021 0.026** 0.0022 0.126 0.0022 0.0034 0.001***
Time depo 
premium
0.0271 <.000*** 0.0263 <.000*** 0.0236 <.000*** 0.0204 0.004*** 0.0200 0.0046 0.035**
ROE 0.1036 0.001*** 0.1050 <.000*** 0.1046 <.000*** 0.1066 0.002*** 0.1097 0.1278 0.014**
Leverage 
ratio
0.9044 0.306 0.9049 0.369 0.9051 0.379 0.9026 0.167 0.8994 0.9091 0.025**
Obs 2039 1483 944 414 100 59
*** Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level, ** indicates statistical signiﬁcance at 
the 5% level, and * indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
Notes:  The means of each grouping of non-securitizers to the left of size bucket 5 (non-sec) 
are compared to the mean of securitizers in buckets 6 and 7. For example, non-securitizers 
in size buckets 1-5 have a lower mean provision rate than securitizers in buckets 6 and 
7, with a p-value of 0.028. Groupings to the right of Size bucket 5 (non-sec) are compared 
with that group. For example, securitizers in buckets 6-7 have a higher provision rate 
than non-securitizers in bucket 5, with a p-value of 0.001. 
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Table 4
Instrumental variables estimates
Time deposit premium, ROE, and Leverage
A: size  5,6,7 IV Time-depo Primium ROE Leverage
mortsec -0.035
(3.81)***
0.009
(0.56)
0.030
(2.02)**
Mortgage/Loans        0.095
(5.48)***
0.030
(0.77)
0.037
(1.22)
Hel/Loans 0.209
(2.76)***
0.093
(0.87)
-0.179
(1.33)
C&I/Loans       -0.089
(3.35)***
-0.038
(1.54)
0.030
(0.80)
Credit/Loans      0.015
(0.36)
0.357
(2.29)**
-0.029
(0.94)
Other/Loans       0.131
(3.22)***
-0.036
(0.48)
-0.189
(1.77)*
3m-pastdue/Loans     -1.472
(1.98)**
3m+pastdue/Loans     0.166
(0.14)
NoAcc+Chargeoff/Loans       0.208
(0.90)
Loans/Assets          0.028
(1.24)
0.096
(1.94)*
0.092
(1.30)
Constant -0.009
(0.45)
0.048
(1.06)
0.844
(17.76)***
Observations 225 226 226
R-square       0.33 0.13 0.17
B: Size 5, 6, 7 OLS
Mortsec -0.016
(2.88)***
0.010
(1.36)
0.015
(2.25)**
Observations 225 226 226
R-square      0.36 0.13 0.19
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level, ** 
indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level, and * indicates statistical signiﬁcance at 
the 10% level.
Notes: For banks in size buckets 5 - 7, the table present results from instrumental variables 
estimation when bank’s time deposit premium, return on equity, and leverage are regressed 
on whether a bank is a mortgage securitizer.  In all regressions, the instrumented variable 
is mortsec, which is equal to 1 if the bank is a mortgage securitizer.  The coefﬁcient of 
mortsec measures the effects of mortgage securitization among large banks.

1. Introduction: Securitization - many beneﬁts, many dangers
Let me starting by thanking the organizers for letting me 
comment this paper. It is a lovely paper and I truly enjoyed reading it. 
The paper takes up a number of very topical issues revolving around 
securitization. More speciﬁcally the paper focuses on the effects of 
securitization on banks’ proﬁtability, insolvency risk and leverage. 
Being an empirical study, the paper uses a rich data set incorporating 
a relatively large number of variables at the level of bank holding 
companies. The empirical analysis involves an extensive econometric 
search for signiﬁcant correlations which the authors nicely put in 
the context of the current ﬁnancial turmoil to provide a perspective 
on it. Using standard econometric techniques, the authors are able 
to tease out statistically signiﬁcant effects of securitization on banks’ 
proﬁtability, insolvency risk and leverage. The authors go further from 
just reporting and discussing the econometric evidence by performing 
an interesting exercise on the likely effects of bringing securitized assets 
back to the banks’ balance sheets. Overall, the paper is well written, 
well structured and easy for the reader to follow from the ﬁrst page to 
the last one. Also, the paper strengthens the view or preconception that 
securitization offers many beneﬁts - diversiﬁcation beneﬁts, source of 
new and innovative ﬁnancial instruments to mention a few - but also 
involves a number of dangers like reduced monitoring incentives and 
increased likelihood of banks assuming tail risks.
2. Observations on credit risk transfer (CRT) markets
In the rest of my discussion I will ﬁrst write down some observations 
about credit risk transfer (CRT) markets before commenting the paper 
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more closely. Concluding comments then follow my discussion. CRT 
markets have grown rapidly during the last ten or so years.  One of 
the most important innovations in ﬁnancial markets has been the 
development of credit derivative instruments that allow banks to 
more actively manage their loan portfolios than ever before. CRT may 
be deemed desirable as it allows risk diversiﬁcation among different 
sectors of the ﬁnancial system, or, more generally, across different 
sectors of the whole economy, that cannot be achieved in other ways. 
On the other hand, if CRT arises because of ill-designed regulation, it 
may not be desirable. In this case CRT is driven mainly by regulatory 
arbitrage that may provide strong incentives for agents to assume tail 
risks thus increasing the future likelihood of adverse systemic events. 
Of course, at this level of generality it is easy to argue that timely 
intervention by authorities as well as proper measures to correct for the 
underlying regulatory biases would undo action by agents that rest on 
wrong incentives. But in reality it is very difﬁcult to e.g. ex ante identify 
genuine excess returns in the data for gross returns on risky investments 
and thus to argue that (particular) agents are enjoying returns (rents?) 
from investing in tail risks that have systemic implications. 
Research on CRT activities and markets has demonstrated (e.g. 
Parlour-Plantin, 2005) that asymmetric information - so pervasive in 
ﬁnancial markets, almost a deﬁning characteristic of ﬁnancial market 
relationships - can effectively close CRT markets.  On the one hand, in 
originating and pricing loans, banks develop proprietary information 
the stock of which is further increased as banks obtain additional 
private information through monitoring the borrowers. Because of 
adverse selection, the existence of proprietary information may inhibit 
the marketability of the loans banks have granted to their borrower 
customers. On the other hand, bank capital is scarce and banks want to 
recycle their capital in the secondary markets. Liquidity is highly valued 
by banks and they may want to sell loans to take advantage of private 
investment opportunities elsewhere. Now, CRT markets may close - face 
liquidity dryout or fall into a liquidity black hole - if the adverse selection 
risk is sufﬁciently high so that it is commonly perceived that only bad 
assets are offered to trading in derivative markets. In such cases then 
all loans are illiquid for the very reason Akerlof ’s (1970) analysis of 
lemons indicates.  However, if the perceived probability that banks are 
selling assets because they have received proﬁtable outside investment 
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opportunities and want to redeploy their capital is sufﬁciently high then 
there is pooling and CRT markets are liquid.  
The main reason for bringing out these features of the CRT 
market should be kept in mind when drawing (policy) conclusions from 
the Jiangli - Pitsker paper.  Similarly, I think we need take aboard 
research (e.g. Marsh, 2006) suggesting that active use of innovative CRT 
techniques adversely affect banks’ incentives to monitor its borrowers. 
Reduced monitoring effort tends to result in higher risk concentration 
as well as more correlated risks for banks, thus increasingly exposing 
them to insolvency risk. Furthermore, active shifting of risks off 
the balance sheet can potentially greatly contribute to making us 
(researchers, central bankers, supervisors etc.) less able to identify from 
market data genuine excess returns from (short-term) compensation for 
tail risks. There is also evidence (e.g. Coderis et al, 2007) indicating that 
securitization greatly increases banks’ target levels for loans, whereas 
the effects on actual loans tend to spread over time. This observation is 
particularly interesting once we take the potential general equilibrium 
effects seriously: there is the possibility of observing a lending boom 
fuelling aggregate demand boom as well as bubbly valuation paths. 
Needless to say, further research is required to make these conjectures 
stand on ﬁrmer grounds. But if anything, these concerns emphasize the 
role of ﬁnancial supervision and raise the issue of the need for a reform 
of the current regulatory framework.
3. Econometric evidence on the effects of securitization 
The paper is fundamentally an econometric search of economically 
and statistically signiﬁcant effects of securitization on banks’ proﬁtability, 
risk proﬁle and leverage. It argues that a priori the effects of securitization 
on banks’ overall performance, measured along the three dimensions 
of proﬁtability, insolvency risk and leverage, Is ambiguous, so we need 
data to bear on the issue of signing the effects. In running through the 
econometric exercise, the paper uses three methods. First of all, the paper 
performs an interesting experiment on the likely effects of bringing 
securitized assets back to banks’ balance sheets. The second and third 
method recognizes the endogeneity to securitize and restricts the analysis 
to mortgage securitizers. More speciﬁcally, the second method uses 
univariate comparison between securitizers and non-securitizers, while 
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the third method introduces conditioning and compares performance 
between similar sized banks that do and do not securitize using 
multivariate instrumental variable (IV) approach. The empirical analysis 
measures risk as the interest rate spread between uninsured and insured 
deposits and proﬁtability as return on equity. These measures are 
accompanied by leverage ratios to complete the set of measures to capture 
banks’ performance. The paper uses FR Y9-C US Bank Holding Company 
quarterly data from 2001.Q1 to 2007.Q2, which suggests that the data 
thus ends when interesting times in ﬁnancial markets begin! The data 
have information on mortgage loans, home equity lines, commercial and 
industrial loans as well as credit card, auto and other consumer loans. 
What is of interest in itself is that in the data the number of BHCs 
that engage in securitization is relatively small: altogether 2231 bank 
observations, whereof 2046 are never-securitizers.  
The econometrics on mortgage loan data appears to favour the 
following conclusions. First of all, securitization tends to reduce banks’ 
insolvency risk. Secondly, banks’ leverage seems to creep up for banks 
that securitize. Finally, securitization is apparently good news for banks’ 
proﬁts. While the data on mortgage securitizers are pretty clear about 
these effects, the experiment on non-mortgage securitizers, where the 
idea is to return securitized assets back on banks’ balance sheets, provides 
a less consistent set of conclusions. One of the underlying reasons could 
effectively be the small number of securitizers, so that heterogeneity 
swamps all systematic patterns potentially observable in data sets with 
larger number of securitizers. This is of course pure speculation and I was 
hoping the authors had dug deeper into this matter. Anyway, one of my 
main critical points about the paper is that I do not ﬁnd this experiment 
of returning securitized assets back on banks’ balance sheets convincing. 
The reason is that size matters and the set of non-securitizers also include 
non-trivial set of small banks, whose structure of the balance sheet is not 
representative of the larger banks. So, in a sense heterogeneity is not for 
the good here. Furthermore, in the case of the third approach mentioned 
above, the authors pursuit a careful analysis of the validity of the size 
as an instrument and give the impression that they are safe with the 
null of a valid instrument. However, the R2s in the various ﬁrst stage 
regressions - typically around 35 % - do suggest that caution should be 
exercised with this conclusion and that the problem of weak instruments 
may not be entirely rule out (see e.g. Stock et al., 2002).
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A related point here is that size has often been used to instrument 
informational frictions in empirical models testing for the presence of 
informational asymmetries and moral hazard in economic relationships. 
The underlying idea is that large banks are transparent, small ones more 
opaque. The question in the present context is that what if securitization 
opportunities are open only for large banks, e.g. CRT markets are liquid 
only for larger banks because of them being perceived as less likely to be 
subject to these information frictions?   If this is so, then CRT markets 
expand proﬁtable business opportunities for only those banks that have 
already solved the more fundamental problems rising from asymmetric 
information. This observation brings us back to my original discussion 
on CRT markets. 
Finally, I want to raise some minor points about the empirical 
analysis. First of all, the authors carefully motivate their reduced form 
approach to signiﬁcance testing by alluding to a priori ambiguous 
theoretical effects of securitization on banks’ performance. True, but 
the limits of signiﬁcance tests to gaining deeper understanding of the 
relationships underlying the data should be fully acknowledged. They are 
not always the most interesting ones and a more structural, theoretically 
motivated approach would, to my mind, force the data speak more. More 
speciﬁcally, some of the estimated signs of the coefﬁcients on different 
loan categories are difﬁcult to interpret as there is common theoretical 
structure to sustain them. Furthermore, on a more technical level, it 
is not clear whether the fact that loan shares sum to one is taken into 
account in the estimations.  More substantially, the paper concludes 
that derivative markets will recover despite the current turmoil. But 
I would be more cautious in that e.g. as CRT markets are riddled with 
asymmetric information problems, a lot of good risk needs to be placed 
in the market for trading to sustain liquid markets (pooling). This 
particular feature may delay the recovery of current markets, as many 
see predominantly bad risk being available in the markets for some time 
to come. But again, this is speculation which does not in any way change 
the fact that I am very positive about the paper which incorporates a 
lot of information, runs interesting and thought-provoking experiments 
and is deﬁnitely worth reading. 
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Securitization
The Jiangli-Pritsker paper presents evidence that seems to suggest 
a positive role for securitizations. In general, the role of securitizations 
will be a function of (1) the private information of the intermediary 
about the individual loans in the pool as well as (2) the residual 
(symmetric information) uncertainty about the repayment outcomes of 
the loans. Lets call them Variance (1) and Variance (2). If Variance (1) 
is important, the ﬁnancial intermediary is better of selling claims on 
the assets (loans) individually rather than as a pool. Pooling has an 
information destruction effect (see DeMarzo 2005) that worked to the 
disadvantage of the securitizing bank. On the other hand Variance (2) is 
important and it is not too highly correlated across the different loans in 
the pool, then pooling (the loans) and “tranching” may be optimal. Here 
the bank is able to use the diversiﬁcation effect of pooling to create a low 
risk and liquid security. The bank is able to reduce insolvency risk and 
increase leverage. Instead of attributing the current turmoil entirely to 
“recent excesses” it may be useful for the authors to see whether there is 
a difference in the performance of these securitizations as a function of 
the relative importance of Variance (1) and Variance (2). In other words, 
the authors could use proxies for Variance (1) and Variance (2) and see 
whether a sharper interpretation of their results is possible.
Incentives and Financial Crises
In their very interesting paper, “How Markets and Analysts 
React to Loan Securitizations”, Hasan, Francis and Zazzara make an 
important connection between the availability of low-interest ﬁnancing 
and risk-shifting incentives. They make a very important point. However, 
Comments and Observations on the Paper
by Wenying Jiangli and Matt Pritsker The Impacts 
of Mortgage Securitization on Bank Performance
Kose John
Charles William Gerstenberg Professor of Banking and Finance
Stern School of Business, New York University
82 COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE PAPER BY JIANGLI, PRITSKER
I want to go one step further and add a cautionary note: the regularly 
used incentive structures provide incentives to undertake highly risk-
shifting strategies even when low-interest ﬁnancing is not available.
This can be considered the “dark side” of complete markets. On 
one hand, the availability of the new markets and instruments such 
as derivatives and credit swaps has made it possible for the ﬁrms to 
hedge speciﬁc risks (for example, commodity price, exchange rate and 
interest rate risks) at low transactions costs. On the other hand, the 
possibility of modifying the probability distribution of cash ﬂows of the 
ﬁrm in speciﬁc custom-made ways at low cost opens up some important 
incentive problems. For example, the manager of a proﬁt center in a 
ﬁrm, compensated by a conventional performance-based compensation 
contract, can modify the probability distribution of the cash ﬂows of his 
proﬁt center to “game” very closely his compensation contract. A bank, 
which is subject to regulatory supervision, can modify its cash ﬂow 
structure to speciﬁcally “game” the rules of the particular regulatory 
regime in place. Although the presence of these incentive problems is 
not a new phenomenon, I will argue that the lowcost customization of 
probability distributions using complex derivative positions has made 
it possible to implement strategies speciﬁcally designed to “game” 
compensation structures in place, at the same time evading detection 
by conventional audit mechanisms.
In my paper, John and John (2006), we show that with commonly-
used incentive features in the compensation structure, managers have 
incentives to implement complex derivative strategies that lead to a slight 
reduction in default probabilities (or a slight increase in performance 
measures) with a high probability at the cost of allowing for the 
possibility of disaster states involving large losses, although with a very 
small probability. Such disaster states cause systemic instability (similar 
to the experience of Long-Term Capital Management in September 
1998). There are countless strategies which can be implemented to 
“game” compensation structures and regulatory regimes in place, using 
derivatives. The detailed positions in the different instruments and the 
resulting pay-off structures are discussed in John and John (2006).
I provide below a simple characterization of the generic strategy 
which can be implemented by a proﬁt center in a manufacturing ﬁrm or a 
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ﬁnancial institution is as follows: hold appropriate derivative positions to 
synthesize an incremental cash ﬂow distribution such that with 99.99% 
probability, it adds in a modest way to its earnings from the underlying 
activity, but with 0.01% probability, it causes large losses. The relative 
size of the modest increase and the large losses can be chosen such that 
the above strategy is a self-ﬁnancing one. Moreover, since the large-loss 
state may not “occur” for a number of periods, the proﬁt center can show 
superior performance for a number of periods prior to the realization of 
the large-loss outcome. Moreover since this is a selfﬁnancing strategy, it 
does not require any special low cost ﬁnancing. The incentive structures 
that can generate such risk-shifting behavior are endemic.
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Abstract
A mortgage contract of any type has three options: stay current, 
prepay, or default. The termination rates - either through prepayment and 
reﬁnance or serious delinquency, foreclosure, and default - of subprime 
mortgages originated between 2001 and 2006 have been surprisingly 
similar across origination years: around 20, 50, and 80 percent, evaluated 
within one, two, and three years after origination, respectively. For 
loans originated during the highest house price appreciation years, the 
exit option was dominated by prepayments. When the housing market 
slowed down, defaults substituted for prepayments. Also, as the number 
of terminated subprime purchase-money loans signiﬁcantly outweighed 
the number of  ﬁrst-time home buyers between 2001 and 2006, a single 
potentially positive aspect of subprime mortgages - an increase of 
homeownership in the U.S. - has most likely been overstated.
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1. Introduction
The subprime mortgage market was booming for the ﬁrst six 
years of this decade but collapsed in 20071. At ﬁrst, the collapse took 
the form of more than three times higher delinquency, foreclosure and 
default rates among subprime mortgage loans originated in 2006 and 
2007 compared with earlier years, many within months of origination. 
In 2008, the market froze completely and was essentially dead.
Many explanations for the crisis have already been offered by 
researchers, policy makers and individuals: mortgage rate resets, fraud, 
poor underwriting, discrimination, the housing market slowdown, and 
deterioration of unobserved loan quality, to name a few.
The negative consequences of the market’s collapse are well 
known, and include foreclosures and defaults resulting in families losing 
their homes; impaired credit histories for subprime borrowers; vacant 
properties that corrode the values of surrounding homes and destabilize 
neighborhoods; bank failures; and an overall economic slowdown.
The beneﬁts of the subprime lending boom are less obvious. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that if one looks at the subprime 
market another way, easier mortgage ﬁnancing might have promoted 
homeownership in the U.S. This “glass half-full” type of argument goes 
as follows: Even if default rates are about 20 percent - as they are for 
the most recent vintage of subprime mortgages - 80 percent of subprime 
borrowers still make their monthly payments. In this view, the  ﬁnancial 
innovation that spawned subprime lending promoted home ownership, 
and thus most borrowers beneﬁtted because they most likely would not 
have qualiﬁed for a mortgage under prime terms.
This study analyzes whether - in the entire history of the booming 
subprime market - borrowers intended to keep their mortgages long 
enough to substantiate the homeownership argument outlined above. 
Surprisingly, almost every other loan exited the subprime market in one 
way or the other within the ﬁrst two years after origination. Moreover, 
1 There is no exact deﬁnition of a subprime mortgage, even at this date when there has been 
a massive subprime mortgage crisis. The term “subprime” can be used to describe certain 
characteristics of a borrower (such as a low credit score, previous history of delinquency 
or bankruptcy) or of a lender (specializing on high-cost lending, selling fewer loans to 
Government Sponsored Enterprizes, or of a security of which a loan can becomes a part of 
(most risky securities are subprime, less risky are prime, and those in between are Alt-A) 
or a mortgage type (such as 2/28 or 3/27 hybrid mortgage contract, a product generally not 
available in the prime market).
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just 30 to 40 percent of all subprime loans in the analyzed sample 
were purchase-money. The remaining share belongs to borrowers who 
reﬁnanced their existing homes and reﬁnances do not contribute to an 
increase in homeownership. Among the purchase-money loans, more 
than 50 percent were terminated within two years after origination, 
and 80 percent were terminated within the ﬁrst three years of life. The 
number of purchase-money loans terminated as a result of foreclosure 
or about to be terminated (seriously delinquent) within 24 months 
after origination is almost as large as the estimated number of new 
homeowners (ﬁrst time home buyers) - about one million mortgages. 
This evidence suggests that the beneﬁcial role of subprime lending 
might have been overstated.
The “exit” from a subprime mortgage can take two forms: 
prepayment and default. In this study, a mortgage loan is “prepaid” if 
a borrower has either prepaid or reﬁnanced a mortgage loan within a 
certain period of time after the loan was originated. A mortgage loan is in 
“default” if a borrower has defaulted on the loan or has missed more than 
two mortgage payments, or the property is in the process of foreclosure 
or is real estate owned (i.e., is likely to default), within a certain period 
of time from origination. The terms “exit” and “termination” are used 
interchangeably in this paper.
Even though mortgage termination rates among all subprime 
loans originated in all years between 2001 and 2006 have been very 
stable - 50 percent when evaluated within the ﬁrst two years after 
origination - the split between prepayment and default ratios has been 
changing over time.
As shown in Figure 1, for loans originated in 2002, 2003, and 
2004, there were more than four times as many prepayments as defaults 
within the ﬁrst two years of a loan’s life. By 2006 the shares of prepaid 
and defaulted loans within that two year life were almost equal. This 
study attempts to analyze empirically factors that are associated with a 
higher probability of prepayment, default, or the two options combined 
during the pre-crisis years as well as the entire subprime era.
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Figure 1
Termination of Subprime Loans within 24 Months of Origination,
by Origination Year
Source: Author’s calculations based on
FirstAmerican CoreLogic Loanperformance, June 2008
Notes: All the loans used for this ﬁgure were securitized, originated as purchase-money or 
reﬁnancing, are the ﬁrst-lien mortgages, and have the borrowers and loan characteristics 
reported for them in the data. The data source: FirstAmerican CoreLogic Loanperformance, 
ABS Securuties, loan-level data, July 2008.
For the empirical analysis a simple logit model is used, and 
the impact of a set of explanatory factors - such as borrower and loan 
characteristicsand house price appreciation in the area surrounding the 
property - on a probability of either prepayment or default was analyzed. 
According to the estimated results, the main explanatory factors affecting 
the probability of subprime mortgage loans to prepay within two years 
after origination are: house price appreciation (pre-and post-origination); 
the presence of prepayment penalties associated with loan contracts; the 
resetting structure of mortgage rates (as with hybrid mortgages); and 
the combined loan-to-value ratio, which measures the amount of equity 
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in the house. The main explanatory factors affecting the probability of a 
subprime mortgage loan to default within two years after origination are: 
the FICO credit score; the combined loan-to-value ratio; the mortgage 
rate; and post-origination house price appreciation. Note that the credit 
score only affects the likelihood of defaults, not prepayments, and pre-
origination house price appreciation only affects prepayments, not defaults. 
Hybrid mortgages do tend to prepay and default more often than ﬁxed-
rate mortgages (see Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008) for supporting 
evidence); however, ceteris paribus, the sole fact that a mortgage contract 
type is a hybrid is not a very strong predictor of defaults.
The factors listed above as having the biggest impact on 
prepayments and defaults were not substantially different in the pre-
crisis years, with the exception of house price appreciation. This study 
formally considers each factor’s annual contribution to explaining either 
prepayments or defaults. For 2003 and 2004 vintage loans high house 
price appreciation is the main contributing factor for high prepayment 
rates. For 2005 and 2006 vintage loans low house price appreciation 
is the main contributor for the high default rates. Note, however, that 
being the largest contributing factor does not imply that house price 
appreciation is fully capable of explaining the magnitude of the crisis - 
symptoms of which are much higher default rates than those explained 
by housing market factors.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a 
discussion of the subprime mortgage crisis, the debate concerning an 
increase in home ownership because of subprime innovations, and 
a summary of previous research on delinquency, foreclosure, default, 
prepayment and reﬁnance options in the mortgage market. Section 3 
presents an empirical analysis of prepayment and defaults, and the 
marginal effect of each explanatory factor is documented. An annual 
factor contribution is calculated to formally deternime what factors are 
most responsible for the crisis. Section 4 concludes the article.
2. Subprime Mortgage Crisis
The boom in and subsequent collapse of the subprime mortgage 
market has drawn the attention of numerous researchers and policy 
makers. This section provides a literature review summarizing several 
academic and policy papers related to the analysis of the subprime 
mortgage delinquencies, defaults, and prepayments.
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The analysis of delinquencies and foreclosures is not new to the 
economic literature. For example, Von Furstenberg and Green (1974) 
analyzed the determinants of mortgage delinquencies, as opposed to 
foreclosures and defaults, based on mortgages originated between 1961 
and 1972. They conﬁrm and reference ﬁndings published as early as 
1969 and 1970 (by Von Furstenberg) that such factors as the loan-to 
value ratio (or equity-to-value ratio) and income of the borrower, among 
others, are important determinants explaining mortgage default. Note, 
this result was known some three decades before subprime issues, before 
the `accepted’ loan-to-values were found to be very large, and before so-
called no-income, no-documentation, no-asset loans were introduced to 
the market.
In a more recent, but pre-crisis analysis, Cutts and Van Order 
(2005) suggest that several economic models can, in fact, explain the 
main characteristics of the subprime market. In particular, \option-
based” models are consistent with pricing and loan characteristics of 
subprime mortgages (for example, improving a borrower’s credit score 
gives a better option for reﬁnancing); the “separating equilibrium” 
model is consistent with sorting borrowers into prime and subprime in 
the market through signaling mechanisms; and the “adverse-selection” 
models are consistent with a choice between the lower costs of the 
secondary market and the information advantages of the primary 
market. However, with the help of hindsight, we see that there are many 
issues that were and still are beyond fundamental and conventional 
economic modelling. For instance, Demyanyk (2008) show that the FICO 
credit scores failed to predict the subprime mortgage crisis, even though 
it is one of the most important determinants of serious delinquency and 
foreclosure in mortgage lending2.
Pennington-Cross and Chomsisengphet (2007) studied a sample of 
subprime securitized loans - ﬁrst-lien,  ﬁxed-rate, home-owner occupied, 
originated between 1996 and 2003. The authors notice that borrowers 
with subprime mortgages are more likely to cash-out reﬁnance compared 
to those with prime mortgages3. Moreover, subprime borrowers seem 
to be substituting mortgage debt for credit card debt and auto loans 
2 For a more detailed discussion of delinquency and foreclosure determinants, see Demyanyk 
and Van Hemert (2008).
3 A term `cash-out’ reﬁnance refers to a situation when a borrower reﬁnances an existing 
mortgage loan into a larger one, taking cash out. This, by deﬁnition, means that a borrower 
is extracting the equity from the house.
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(they tend to reﬁnance their mortgages when interest rates on credit 
cards and auto  ﬁnancing rise). Analyzing the performance of subprime 
loans, the authors observed that cash-out reﬁnances tend to default and 
prepay less frequently than non-cash-out reﬁnances. Demyanyk and 
Van Hemert (2008) observed that cash-out reﬁnances tend to default 
less frequently even than purchase-money mortgages, albeit during a 
later period of time, between 2001 and 2007.
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008) were among the ﬁrst who 
analyze the subprime mortgage crisis in great detail. Using loan-
level data, they  ﬁrst showed that-contrary to popular belief - the 
subprime crisis of 2007 was not conﬁned to a particular market 
segment-such as loans with mortgages rates scheduled to increase 
or no documentation loans. Instead, it was a (subprime) market-wide 
phenomenon. Second, they identiﬁed factors that are the most likely 
to be associated with a larger probability that a subprime mortgage 
loan would become seriously delinquent; these factors are: the FICO 
credit score, the combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV), the mortgage 
interest rate, and house price appreciation between the period of loan 
origination and a loan performance-evaluation period. These factors 
are not sufﬁciently different in the crisis years (2006 and 2007) than 
in the earlier years, and thus do not entirely explain the crisis, its 
magnitude, and its timing.
Even house price appreciation is not able to explain - all by 
itself or in a combination with other factors, a phenomenon called risk 
layering - why the subprime crisis was so rapid and large.
Demyanyk and Van Hemert also showed that there was some non-
measurable risk present in those mortgage contracts and that this risk 
was increasing over time. More speciﬁcally, they ﬁrst adjusted mortgage 
performance for values of observable characteristics at origination 
(borrowers’ credit scores, loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-income, etc.), 
loan characteristics (whether it is a ﬁxed-rate mortgage or a hybrid, 
whether it is home-owner occupied, whether there is a prepayment 
penalty associated with a loan, etc.), and house price appreciation since 
origination. Second, they calculated the adjusted performance of the 
loans for all vintage/age combinations in their sample; this exercise 
revealed that the market has been worsening each year, monotonically 
and dramatically, since 2001. In other words, the crisis did not just 
emerge suddenly in 2007 or 2008 - it has been brewing for at least six 
consecutive years before.
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Even though the ﬁnding described above is not readily 
observable by looking at the data - a statistical exercise is needed to 
see this deterioration of the subprime market - the authors show that 
securitizers, those who mostly dictated mortgage rates in the market, 
were at least to some extent aware of this gradual deterioration. The 
decline in loan quality was monotonic, but not equally spread among 
different types of borrowers. Over time, loans with high loan-to-value 
ratios had higher adjusted delinquency, foreclosure, and defaults rates. 
Securitizers started to link mortgage interest rates to loan-to-value 
ratios; obviously, they did not do so enough. Loan quality deteriorated 
while loan riskiness increased every year form 2001 to 2007. But the 
price of risk - the subprime-prime mark-up - in fact, declined. The 
combination of increasing loan riskiness and decreasing prices was not 
sustainable. In 2008, the market collapsed, and massive foreclosures, 
bank failures, and a credit crunch followed.
Haughwout, Peach, and Tracy (2008) took their analysis a step 
further and, building on the study done by Demyanyk and Van Hemert 
(2008), analyzed early defaults in subprime mortgages. Early default 
is deﬁned as either delinquency (missed payments) for more than 60 
days or foreclosure within the ﬁrst year after origination. The authors 
conﬁrm the  ﬁnding of Demyanyk and Van Hemert that while credit/
lending standards are important determinants of an early default, they 
are not capable of explaining the timing and the magnitude of a crisis 
in 2007 and 2008. They also conﬁrm that, while a reverse in the trend of 
house prices is a very important determinant of increased delinquencies 
and foreclosures in the immediate pre-crisis years, there is still a large 
unexplained portion of increased serious delinquencies.
Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2008), on the other hand, found 
that lending standards in the subprime mortgage market did deteriorate. 
The main driving force of the deterioration was the securitization of 
those loans.
Mian and Suﬁ (2008) attempt to further identify the causes of the 
subprime default crisis. The authors claim that the increased supply of 
credit, perhaps due to securitization, in areas where there were more 
mortgage application rejections a decade before the crisis (in 1996), 
relative to areas with fewer rejections, led to rapid increases in house 
prices between 2001 and 2005. The increases in house prices, in turn, 
led to subsequent defaults between 2005 and 2007, when housing values 
started declining.
93Yuliya Demyanyk
Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2007), using a unique data set 
covering homeownership experience in Massachusetts between 1989 and 
2007, found that homeownership that began with a subprime mortgage 
ended up in foreclosure 20 percent of the time; the number is about six 
times larger than a corresponding share of homeowners that began with 
prime mortgages. Also, one of the ﬁndings discovered by Foote, Gerardi, 
Goette, and Willen (2008), based on the same data set, was that almost 
half of residential foreclosures are concentrated in subprime mortgages, 
even if a subprime mortgage was a reﬁnance of a prime loan.
Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008) argue that even though 
borrowers facing negative equity in their houses are more likely to 
default, they may not default in the absence of an idiosyncratic shock, 
such as illness, divorce, or the loss of a job. Also, a borrower needs to 
consider if the cost of default - a part of which is a cost of renting after 
the default - outweighs a potential (future) beneﬁt in terms of home 
equity, should the home price increase in the future. In other words, 
negative equity is a necessary but not a su±cient condition for default.
Borrowers’ options to prepay or default on their mortgages 
have been analyzed in the context of the pricing mortgage contracts 
for decades. Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) provide an extensive 
literature review describing earlier work on analysis of prepayment only, 
default only, and default and prepayment as joint options. The authors 
theoretically unify several economic models to analyze prepayment and 
default options considered by borrowers simultaneously, and empirically 
test it on a sample of ﬁxed-rate, fully amortized loans originated 
between 1976 and 1983 and observed until the ﬁrst quarter of 1992. 
All those loans were purchased by Freddie Mac. Even though the loans 
were made and their performance evaluated long before subprime 
issues emerged, the implications of this research are very important. 
The authors found evidence of the interdependence of the decisions to 
prepay (exercise the call option) and default (exercise the put option). 
Forecasts that ignore that interdependence can lead to serious errors in 
estimating the default risk. For a related analysis, see also Pennington-
Cross and Chomsisengphet (2007).
Was the U.S. Subprime Crisis of 2007 Unique?
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008) show evidence that the 2007 
subprime mortgage crisis in the U.S. seemed in many respects to be 
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following the type of classic lending boom-and-bust cycle documented 
by DellAriccia, Igan, and Laeven (2008). First of all, there was a very 
sizeable boom in the subprime mortgage market. Depending on the 
deﬁnition of “subprime,” the market increased from three to seven times 
between 1998 and 2005 (see Mayer and Pence (2007) for the measures 
of the size and the increase of the subprime mortgage market based on 
HUD and LoanPerformance deﬁnitions). Second, there was a deﬁnite 
bust (collapse) of the market in 2007, re°ected in high delinquency, 
foreclosure, and default rates. Moreover, a year later, in 2008, the 
subprime mortgage crisis spilled over into a much larger  ﬁnancial 
crisis and a global credit crunch. Third, the periods that preceded the 
collapse were associated with loosening underwriting standards and 
deteriorating loan quality, and increasing loan riskiness - not backed-
up by an increasing price of this extra risk - the subprime-prime spread 
was actually declining over the boom period.
Increasing riskiness in the market together with the decreasing 
price of said risk leads to an unsustainable situation, which in turn, 
leads to a market collapse. Moreover, not only have Demyanyk and Van 
Hemert shown that the crisis followed a classic path known to policy 
makers and researchers in quite a few countries, they have also shown 
that we could have seen the crisis coming by at least the end of 2005. 
It is not clear, though, if we could have prevented it, even if we knew. 
Comparing the ﬁndings of DellAriccia, Igan, and Laeven (2008) and 
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008), it appears the United States in 
2007, Argentina in 1980, Chile in 1982, Sweden, Norway, and Finland 
in 1992, Mexico in 1994, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea in 1997 all 
experienced the culmination of similar (lending) boom-bust scenarios, 
though in very different economic circumstances.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), analyzing macro indicators in 
the United States preceding the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 and 18 other 
post World War II banking crises in industrial countries, also found 
striking similarities among all of them. In particular, there are, ﬁrst 
of all, similarities in the signiﬁcant increases in housing prices before 
the  ﬁnancial crises commenced. Even more striking is evidence that 
the U.S. had a much higher growth rate in its house prices than the 
so-called “Big-Five” countries in their crises (Spain in 1977, Norway in 
1987, Finland in 1991, Sweden in 1991, and Japan in 1992). Second, 
comparing the real rates of growth in equity market price indexes, 
there are again similarities among all the crisis countries before their 
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crises. Third, comparing the current account as a share of GDP, not only 
are there similarities, but the United States had deﬁcits more severe 
than those of the other countries had before their crises, reaching more 
than six percent of GDP. The authors noted, however, that there is a 
lot of uncertainty associated with the still ongoing 2008-crisis in the 
United States; therefore, it is impossible to project the path of the crisis 
resolution based on the other countries’ previous experiences.
Subprime Mortgages and Homeownership
Jaffee (2008) summarized attempts to analyze what went 
wrong with the subprime market that could cause the crisis and what 
went right - potential beneﬁts from subprime lending that might 
offset consequences of the subprime crisis. The author noted that the 
subprime mortgage market funded approximately ﬁve million home 
purchases between 2000 and 2006, with slightly more than one million 
loans going to ﬁrst-time home buyers. He suggests that the subprime 
mortgage market had at least one beneﬁt to the economy, and that was 
the increase in homeownership.
However, as shown in Figure 2, within the very ﬁrst year after 
origination, between 15 and 25 percent of purchase-money mortgage 
loans - those that fund home purchases, not reﬁnancing - were 
terminated for all origination years between 2001 and 2006. Within 
the  ﬁrst two years of origination, about 50 percent of all loans in the 
sample terminated, within the three years after origination, 80 percent 
of the loans were no longer current, i.e., exited the market in one way 
or another4.
Taking all origination years in the sample together, and focusing 
only on ﬁrst-lien, home purchase (purchase-money) mortgages that 
were securitized and for which the reliable data were provided, more 
than 600,000 loans were terminated within the very ﬁrst year after 
origination5. Within the ﬁrst two years after origination, approximately 
1.9 million loans were terminated. Among the terminated loans, slightly 
less than one million loans were seriously delinquent or in default; the 
remaining million loans were reﬁnanced or prepaid. The data seem to 
4 The shares for loans that entered the data set as reﬁnances, as opposed to purchase-
money are remarkably similar to those documented in Figure 2.
5 “Termination” is deﬁned as either serious delinquency (more than 60 days past due 
payments, in foreclosure, real-estate-owned), default, prepayment or reﬁnance.
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suggest that the number of foreclosed homes alone, (with mortgages 
funding the home purchases) already exceeds the number of ﬁrst-time 
home buyers. The number of prepaid and reﬁnanced properties is less 
informative as the data do not allow one to trace the after-prepayment 
outcome of the mortgages. A reﬁnanced loan can either be a new subprime 
loan and follow the original path described above - a borrower would 
either default or prepay again - or be a prime loan, which borrowers 
can also prepay or default upon. Given the degree of uncertainty on this 
issue, no inference based on the number of prepaid loans will be made 
in this article.
Figure 2
Termination of Subprime Purchase-Money Loans within 12, 24, and 36 
Months of Origination, by Origination Year
Notes: All the loans used for this ﬁgure were securitized, originated as purchase-money, 
are the ﬁrst-lien mortgages, and have the borrowers and loan characteristics reported 
for them in the data. The data source: FirstAmerican CoreLogic Loanperformance, ABS 
Securuties, loan-level data, July 2008.
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However, given that the shares of terminated loans for all vintages 
(origination years) in the sample are almost the same, subprime loans 
were hardly ever meant to last much longer than three years. Lenders 
must have known that these loans were temporary, i.e., it would be 
impossible to collect the interest rate payments during the entire loan 
term (usually 30 or 40 years). Therefore, there were prepayment penalties 
imposed, high interest rates and fees charged, and complicated loan 
modiﬁcations designed (the securitization structure is very complex, 
making individual loan modiﬁcations almost impossible).
Even if borrowers reﬁnanced their initial subprime loans|into 
more stable subprime or prime mortgages - those we observe in the 
data prior to prepayment or reﬁnance, the 80 percent termination 
rate within the ﬁrst three years after origination would indicate that 
the initial boom in subprime lending, at most, accelerated growth of 
homeownership, even if temporarily. In other words, as a hypothetical 
success example, if a borrower took out a subprime loan in 2001, say 
as a ﬁrst-time home buyer, and then reﬁnanced into a better loan in 
2004, the same borrower most likely could have skipped the subprime 
step and become a ﬁrst-time home buyer in 2004, starting with a more 
stable loan and avoiding high interest rate payments and prepayment 
penalties.
3. Loan Termination: Empirical Analysis
Analyzing the random sample of subprime securitized loans 
(between 2001 and 2006) as a cross-section, I estimate the following 
logit regression model.
(1)
where Z is either prepayment, default, or exit - through either 
prepayment or default option - from a subprime mortgage loan after 
24 months since origination;                                                 is the logit 
function;                              is the vector of explanatory variables; and
is the vector of regression coefﬁcients.
The explanatory factors used in the analysis are: the FICO credit 
score; a dummy variable indicating if full documentation was provided 
at origination; a dummy variable indicating if a prepayment penalty 
is present; the debt-to-income ratio (back-end); a dummy variable 
98 EXIT STRATEGY: THE ROLE OF A SHORT LOAN LIFE IN THE SUBPRIME CRISIS
indicating if a debt-to-income is not provided; the mortgage interest 
rate; a dummy variable indicating if a borrower is an investor; a dummy 
variable indicating if a mortgage was a reﬁnance at origination; the 
origination amount; the combined loan-to-value ratio; a margin for 
hybrid loans; a dummy variable indicating if a mortgage is a hybrid; 
a dummy variable indicating if a mortgage is an ARM (non-hybrid); a 
dummy variable indicating if a mortgage is a balloon; post-origination 
house price appreciation (between loan origination and loan performance 
evaluation periods); and pre-origination house price appreciation 
(between two years prior to origination and the origination periods).
The choice of the period when to evaluate loan performance, 
within 24 months of origination, was mainly driven by two factors: 
a calculation of the FICO credit score and the popularity of hybrid 
mortgages in the sample. The FICO credit score, as with any other 
credit score, measures the creditworthiness of individuals or businesses. 
Lenders/securitizers use these scores to estimate how likely it is that 
borrowers eventually will be delinquent or in default. By design, the 
higher the score, the less likely it is that a borrower will miss payments 
or go into default on a loan within one or two years after the score has 
been calculated (Demyanyk (2008)). The prevalence of hybrid mortgages 
is also important. More than one-half of subprime securitized mortgage 
loans are ARMs, and almost all of them are so-called hybrid contract 
types, which means they carry a ﬁxed rate for an initial period of time 
- usually two or three years - after which the rate resets. By starting the 
analysis at two (or three) years after origination, we eliminate the effect 
on these loans of mortgage rates resetting into mostly larger market-
driven rate plus a margin (see Demyanyk and Gopalan (2007) for a 
more detailed description and deﬁnitions).
3.1. Data and Variable Deﬁnitions
Loan-level data used for the analysis are provided by the the 
First American CoreLogic LoanPerformance database; in the data set, 
loan, borrower, and property characteristics are provided for about one-
half of all U.S. subprime mortgages. All loans in this data set have been 
securitized. According to the Mortgage Market Statistical Annual (2008), 
securitization rates are as follows: 60.7 percent (2001), 63.0 percent 
(2002), 67.5 percent (2003), 62.6 percent (2004), 67.7 percent (2005), 67.6 
percent (2006), and 74.2 percent (2007), and 77.3 percent (six months 
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of 2008). Among all subprime mortgages, the portion securitized ranged 
from 54 percent in 2001 to 75 percent in 2006.
For the empirical analysis of this study, only ﬁrst-lien subprime 
mortgages are used. The variables used in the analysis are described 
below.
Prepayment: a dummy variable that equals one if a borrower has 
either prepaid or reﬁnanced a mortgage loan within the ﬁrst two years 
of origination; the variable takes a value of zero otherwise.
Default: a dummy variable that equals one if: a borrower has 
either defaulted on a loan (foreclosure procedure was ﬁnalized) or 
missed more than two monthly mortgage payment; a property is in 
foreclosure or is real-estate owned (taken over by the lender) within the 
ﬁrst two years after a loan was originated; the variable takes a value of 
zero otherwise.
Termination: a dummy variable that equals one if a borrower has 
either defaulted or prepaid the mortgage loan within the ﬁrst two years 
of origination; the variable takes a value of zero otherwise.
FICO Score: the Fair, Isaac and Company (FICO) credit score 
at origination. The FICO score was recommended for use in mortgage 
lending by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 1995 as a measure of 
borrowers’ creditworthiness. The higher the score, the less likely a 
borrower will default on a loan within about two years of loan origination. 
Given the nature of FICO scores, it is expected that a relationship will 
be found between borrowers’ scores and the incidence of default and 
foreclosure during the subprime mortgage crisis.
Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio: the combined mortgage values of 
all liens divided by the value of the house at loan origination.
Debt-to-Income Ratio: the back-end debt-to-income ratio; it is de 
ﬁned as total monthly debt payments divided by gross monthly income, 
at origination. A higher debt-to-income ratio, i.e., a higher degree of 
indebtedness, makes it harder for a borrower to make his or her monthly 
mortgage payment.
Missing Debt-to-Income: a dummy variable that equals one if the 
back-end debt-to-income ratio was not provided in the data (reported 
as zero); the variable takes a value of zero otherwise. In the data, 
approximately 30 percent of loans did not have the debt-to-income value 
reported.
Cash-Out: a dummy variable that equals one if the mortgage loan 
is a cash-out reﬁnancing loan at origination and zero otherwise.
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Investor: a dummy variable that equals one if the borrower is an 
investor and does not owner-occupy the property and zero otherwise.
Documentation: a dummy variable that equals one if full 
documentation on the loan is provided and zero otherwise.
Prepayment Penalty: a dummy variable that equals one if there is 
a prepayment penalty associated with a loan and zero otherwise.
Mortgage Rate: the initial interest rate as of the ﬁrst payment 
date. A higher interest rate makes monthly mortgage payments larger 
and, therefore, can to make it more di±cult for a borrower to make timely 
monthly mortgage payments.
Margin: the margin for an adjustable-rate or hybrid mortgage 
over an index interest rate, usually the six-month LIBOR rate, 
applicable after the ﬁrst interest rate reset. A higher margin can make 
the mortgage rate larger after the reset and, therefore, can make it 
harder for a borrower to make monthly mortgage payments.
Product Type: there are four major product types in the subprime 
mortgage market: ﬁxed-rate mortgages (FRM), Hybrid Mortgages, 
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM), and Balloons. Three dummy variables 
for the latter three types are included in the regression analysis; the 
magnitude of their impact needs to therefore be interpreted as the e®ect 
on the probability of prepayment, default, or exit relative to a FRM. 
The FRM is chosen as a benchmark because FRMs show the smallest 
expected and realized probability of default.
Origination Amount: Size of the mortgage loan. Loan size can be 
associated with a size of a monthly mortgage payment; the larger the 
loan, the larger the monthly payment, the harder it can be for borrowers 
to make those payments timely. Also, the loan size can be associated 
with a borrower’s creditworthiness. One may expect less risky borrowers 
getting larger loans. Which one of the two effects is dominating is am 
empirical question; it is addressed later in this study.
Post-Origination House Price Appreciation: the MSA-level house 
price appreciation from the time of loan origination to the moment when 
the performance of loans is being evaluated. Appreciation is measured 
as a ratio of the house price indexes reported by the O±ce of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) for the two corresponding 
periods.
Pre-Origination House Price Appreciation: the MSA-level 
house price appreciation two years before mortgage origination and 
origination period.
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3.2. Explanatory Factors of Prepayment and Default
Prepayment
As shown in Table 1, column 1, within the ﬁrst two years of 
origination, house price appreciation that occurred after origination 
has the largest impact on a probability of a loan to prepay or reﬁnance. 
An increase in house price appreciation from its mean by one standard 
deviation is associated with a 13 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood that a loan will be prepaid, ceteris paribus. If houses in the 
area were appreciating two years prior to origination, a one standard 
deviation increase in appreciation is associated with a 7 percentage 
point increase in the likelihood to be prepaid.
Table 1
Impact of Individual Factors on the Probability of Prepayment, Default,
or Escape within Two Years of Origination. Sample: 2001 - 2006
A mortgage loan is labeled as “prepaid” if a borrower has either prepaid or reﬁnanced a 
mortgage loan within a certain period of time after a loan was originated. A mortgage loan 
is labeled as in “default” if a borrower has defaulted on a loan or has missed more than two 
mortgage payments, the property is in the process of foreclosure or is real estate owned 
(i.e., is likely to default), within 24 months after origination. The “exit” from a subprime 
mortgage is either prepayment or default. The reported results are the marginal effects of 
each variable i calculated as follows:                                                                      where 
                                  Z is either prepayment (column 1), default (column 2), or exit (column 
3) from a subprime mortgage loan 24 months since origination;
is the logit function;                                is the vector of explanatory variables; 3⁄4i is a 
standard deviation of variable i, and      is the vector of regression coefﬁcients.
Explanatory Factor Prepayment Default Escape
FICO Credit Score 0.19* -3.28*** -4.11***
If Full Documentation Provided (dummy) 0.38*** -1.31*** -1.21***
If Prepayment Penalty is Present (dummy) -6.27*** 0.65*** -5.29***
Debt-to-Income Ratio (back-end) 1.58*** 1.28*** 3.12***
If Debt-to-Income is not provided (dummy) 1.17*** 1.01*** 2.28***
Mortgage Rate 5.23*** 2.27*** 7.76***
If Investor (dummy) -1.05*** 0.93*** 0.00
If a mortgage a reﬁnance at origination (dummy) 2.68*** -1.08*** 0.73***
Origination Amount 3.03*** 0.75*** 4.16***
Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio -4.24*** 4.34*** -0.89***
Margin for Hybrid Loans 0.46*** 0.85*** 2.26***
If a Hybrid (dummy) 5.53*** 0.36*** 4.30***
If an ARM (dummy) 1.60*** 0.05 1.64***
If a Balloon (dummy) 0.72*** 0.51*** 1.48***
Post-Origination House Price Appreciation 13.28*** -4.29*** 7.31***
Pre-origination House Price Appreciation 7.31*** -0.46*** 6.39***
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The prepayment penalty factor has its expected effect on the 
probability of prepayment - it decreases it. The presence of repayment 
penalty in a mortgage contract, decreases the likelihood of prepayment 
within the two years of origination by about 6 percent. Based on the 
evidence documented in Figure 2 - that the majority of subprime 
mortgage loans prepay regardless of the origination year at the very 
early stages - loan originators and securitizers must have been aware of 
this pattern. To compensate for the expected losses of interest payments 
- the payments borrowers never make if they prepay the loan before 
the end of the mortgage term - prepayment penalties were imposed on 
about 70 percent of subprime securitized mortgages.
Hybrid mortgages tend to prepay more often; all other factors 
being the same, if a loan is a hybrid and has a mortgage rate scheduled 
to reset in two or three years, it is associated with an increase in the 
probability of prepayment by about 5.5 percentage points.
The mortgage rate at origination plays an important role as well: 
the higher the rate, the higher the chance that a loan will be prepaid 
within its ﬁrst two years. The marginal effect of the mortgage rate is 
approximately 5 percentage points.
If a mortgage was originated as a reﬁnancing, it is more likely 
to reﬁnance again after two years or less, compared to home purchase 
(purchase money) loans.
The smaller the downpayment at origination, the less likely 
a borrower is to prepay or reﬁnance in two years of origination. In 
unfavorable economic circumstances, such as a housing market 
slowdown or job loss, ceteris paribus, one would expect a borrower to 
default on rather than reﬁnance a mortgage with little equity.
The more expensive a property was at origination, the more likely 
there will be a reﬁnancing/prepayment of the mortgage associated with it. 
A larger origination amount is associated with larger mortgage monthly 
payments. Among the possible reasons for greater incentives to reﬁnance 
more expensive properties are a desire to lower monthly payments or a 
need extract cash to cope with the (larger) monthly payments.
Default
The marginal effects of individual factors on the probability of 
default (delinquency, foreclosure, REO, and default) are documented 
in column 2 of the Table 1. There are four major factors that seem to 
most affect the probability of default two years after origination: post-
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origination house price appreciation, the FICO credit score, the combined 
loan-to-value ratio, and the mortgage interest rate. This ﬁnding is 
consistent with the results obtained by Demyanyk and Van Hemert 
(2008), who estimated the effects of those factors on the probability of 
serious delinquency one year after origination.
According to the estimates, one standard deviation increase in 
the FICO credit score, ceteris paribus, is associated with a decrease in 
a probability of default by 3.3 percentage points. Note that the credit 
score has almost no explanatory power for prepayment, but is a very 
important factor explaining defaults.
An one standard deviation increase in house value appreciation 
- measured at the MSA-level - is, according to the estimates, associated 
with a decrease in the likelihood of default by 4.3 percentage points; 
the effect is about three times smaller than the effect of this factor on 
prepayments and reﬁnancing and is of opposite sign, as expected. The 
difference in the absolute values of the marginal effects reﬂects an 
asymmetry of an impact of the equity in the house on options taken 
by borrowers. An increase in appreciation results in a much larger 
increase in the probability of a prepayment compared to a decrease of 
the probability of default.
Pre-origination house price appreciation, even though it has an 
economically signiﬁcant impact on prepayments, has almost no effect 
on defaults.
The combined loan-to-value ratio has an effect of the same order 
of magnitude on defaults as on prepayments, but of the opposite sign. 
Less equity in the house, or a larger loan-to-value ratio, is associated 
with an increased probability of default but decreased probability of 
prepayment. In both cases, the marginal effect is in the order of 4.3 
percentage points.
The mortgage interest rate has a marginal effect on the probability 
of default of 2.3 percentage points; recall that in the case of reﬁnancing it 
is about double that number. This evidence seems to indicate that a high 
mortgage rate gives incentives for borrowers to exercise any options available 
to them to exit the mortgage, through either prepayment or default.
Exit
Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) and Pennington-Cross 
and Chomsisengphet (2007) analyze the determinants of mortgage 
termination empirically, using a maximum likelihood framework 
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analogous to the one used in the current study. However, a simpler 
approach has been undertaken here. Instead of a multinomial logit 
model (as in Pennington-Cross and Chomsisengphet (2007)) or hazard 
functions (as in Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000)), a simple logit 
function is being estimated in this study for each of the outcomes of 
a loan termination. In the analysis described above, prepayments and 
defaults have been analyzed separately. Column 3 of Table 1 reports 
the estimates of the logit regression with the `exit’ being a dependent 
variable; that is each factor is being analyzed for its impact on either 
prepayment or default, combined.
According to the estimates, those factors that have a signiﬁcant 
effect on either prepayment or default have a signiﬁcant impact on both 
of these options combined. The only exception is a combined loan-to-
value ratio, where the effects on prepayment and default cancel each 
other out in a joint regression.
3.3. Annual Factor Contribution to Explaining Prepayment and 
Default
Through the boom and the subsequent bust of the subprime 
mortgage era, almost every other subprime loan in the sample terminated 
their original mortgages via either prepayment or default.
The shares of prepayment and default among the terminated 
loans, however, varied by the vintage of those loans. For example, as 
shown in Figure 2, the largest rates of prepayment were observed for 
loans originated in 2002-2004, two years after origination. This section 
attempts to empirically answer the following question: What observable 
factors, individually or in a combination, are capable of explaining 
changes in prepayment and default ratios?
To measure how the values of each explanatory factor in different 
years contribute toward explaining the likelihood of a loan to either 
prepay or default, this study uses a method similar to the one developed 
by Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008). Speciﬁcally, for each year Y in 
the sample, an impact of each explanatory variable i is calculated as 
the difference between the logit function     where, for one variable i, the 
overall mean was substituted by its mean value in year Y (the values 
of all other variables remain at their overall mean values) and the logit 
function where all variables are at their overall mean values. More 
formally, the annual factor contribution                       for each variable i 
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and year Y is calculated by the Equation (2) below.
(2)
As shown in Figure 2, within two years of origination, loans 
originated in 2001 had delinquency and default rates almost as high as 
loans originated in 2005. Column 1 of Table 2 reports the contribution of 
each factor for this origination year plus a prior and subsequent house 
price appreciation.
Table 2
Annual Factor Contribution for Default: 2001-2006
Annual Factor Contribution,                                                                                     where for 
each year Y in the sample, the impact of each explanatory variable i, listed in the ﬁrst 
column of the table, is calculated as the difference between the logit function     , where, for 
one variable i, the overall mean was substituted by its mean value in year Y (the values 
of all other variables remain at their overall mean values) and the logit function where all 
variables are at their overall mean values.                                   Z is default of a subprime 
mortgage loan within 24 months since origination;                                                 is the 
logit function;                              is the vector of explanatory variables;        is the vector 
of regression coefﬁcients. A mortgage loan is labeled as in “default” if a borrower has 
defaulted on a loan or has missed more than two mortgage payments, property is in the 
process of foreclosure or is real estate owned (i.e., is likely to default).
Explanatory Factor 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
FICO Credit Score 1.03 0.52 -0.15 -0.14 -0.32 -0.09
If Full Documentation Provided (dummy) -0.31 -0.11 -0.03 0.02 0.10 0.13
If Prepayment Penalty is Present (dummy) 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03
Debt-to-Income Ratio (back-end) -0.18 -0.23 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.30
If Debt-to-Income is not provided (dummy) 0.10 0.17 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 -0.19
Mortgage Rate 2.77 1.07 -0.40 -0.87 -0.58 0.66
If Investor (dummy) 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
If a mortgage a reﬁnance at origination (dummy) -0.09 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 0.06 0.10
Origination Amount -0.30 -0.20 -0.07 0.01 0.14 0.19
Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio -0.96 -0.79 -0.31 0.10 0.46 0.69
Margin for Hybrid Loans -0.17 0.01 -0.12 0.02 0.08 0.09
If a Hybrid (dummy) -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.08
If an ARM (dummy) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
If a Balloon (dummy) 0.04 -0.06 -0.09 -0.11 -0.02 0.40
Post-Origination House Price Appreciation 2.07 -0.20 -3.00 -2.22 2.63 7.51
Pre-origination House Price Appreciation 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.05 -0.19 -0.20
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As shown in Table 2, low FICO credit scores, high mortgage 
interest rates, and relatively low house price appreciation two years 
after origination contributed to high default rates for the 2001 vintage 
loans. The contribution from the mortgage rate remained in effect for 
the vintage 2002 loans, but was of a much smaller magnitude.
For loans originated in 2003 and 2004, only post-origination 
house price appreciation (fast and positive) contributed to low default 
rates; defaults were substituted by prepayment and reﬁnancing options 
exercised by borrowers, as discussed below in greater details.
For loans originated in 2005 and 2006, again, the only factor 
contributed to higher default rates than those in all other years in the 
sample: post-origination house price appreciation (housing market 
slowdown when appreciation became negative, i.e. depreciation).
Note, however, that house price appreciation indeed was the most 
contributing factor to higher than average default rates. In 2005 and 
2006 it contributed 2.6 and 7.5 percentage points, respectively, to the 
increase in the default rates. The default rates for 2005 and 2006 vintage 
are about 20-30 percent, much more than house price appreciation is 
explaining.
As shown in Table 3, column 1, the main contributing factor 
for high reﬁnance rates within two years of origination for the 2001 
vintage loans was a high mortgage interest rate; its value accounted 
to 6.3 percentage points of the average prepayment rate. Post- and 
pre-origination house price appreciation contributed to prepayment 
rates negatively, 4 and 3.4 percentage points, respectively. A somewhat 
important factor was the combined loan-to-value ratio prevailing in the 
market. In 2001 Its value at origination contributed to a 1.2 percentage 
points larger probability of prepayment two years later.
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Table 3
Annual Factor Contribution for Prepayment: 2001-2006
Annual Factor Contribution,                                                                                      where 
for each year Y in the sample, the impact of each explanatory variable i, listed in the ﬁrst 
column of the table, is calculated as the difference between the logit function     , where, for 
one variable i, the overall mean was substituted by its mean value in year Y (the values 
of all other variables remain at their overall mean values) and the logit function where 
all variables are at their overall mean values.                                   Z is prepayment of a 
subprime mortgage loan within 24 months since origination;
is the logit function;                              is the vector of explanatory variables;      is the vector 
of regression coefﬁcients. A mortgage loan is labeled as in “default” if a borrower has 
defaulted on a loan or has missed more than two mortgage payments, property is in the 
process of foreclosure or is real estate owned (i.e., is likely to default). A mortgage loan is 
labeled as “prepaid” if a borrower has either prepaid or reﬁnanced a mortgage loan within 
24 months of origination.
Explanatory Factor 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
FICO Credit Score -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
If Full Documentation Provided (dummy) 0.09 0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03
If Prepayment Penalty is Present (dummy) -0.53 -0.39 -0.14 -0.00 0.12 0.28
Debt-to-Income Ratio (back-end) -0.25 -0.30 -0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.39
If Debt-to-Income is not provided (dummy) 0.12 0.20 -0.01 -0.07 0.04 -0.24
Mortgage Rate 6.26 2.57 -1.02 -2.24 -1.48 1.60
If Investor (dummy) -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
If a mortgage a reﬁnance at origination (dummy) 0.21 0.13 0.16 0.08 -0.13 -0.24
Origination Amount -1.26 -0.82 -0.31 0.05 0.56 0.77
Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio 1.21 0.99 0.37 -0.12 -0.54 -0.79
Margin for Hybrid Loans -0.09 0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.05
If a Hybrid (dummy) -1.10 -0.19 -0.59 0.65 0.78 -1.28
If an ARM (dummy) 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.00
If a Balloon (dummy) 0.05 -0.08 -0.14 -0.16 -0.02 0.57
Post-Origination House Price Appreciation -4.12 0.45 8.32 5.79 -5.09 -11.66
Pre-origination House Price Appreciation -3.39 -3.27 -3.30 -0.81 2.88 3.15
The value of the prevailing mortgage interest rate for the 
loans originated in 2002 was again the most important contributor to 
explaining prepayment rates; the impact, however, of this factor (as 
shown in column 2 of the Table) is much smaller compared to it effect on 
the loans originated in 2001. The contribution of post-origination house 
price appreciation is no longer there, compared to the 2001 vintage loans 
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and the contribution of the CLTV has decreased.
For vintages 2003 and 2004, the primary contributing factor to 
high prepayment rates was the house price appreciation that had taken 
place between the origination period and the subsequent two years. For 
2003 vintage loans, a diminishing factor was the pre-origination house 
price appreciation, that contributed to the prepayment rates negatively. 
For the 2004 vintage, the mortgage interest rate was also diminishing 
the prepayment incentives for subprime borrowers.
For vintages 2005 and 2006, the sole contributing factor for the 
prepayment and reﬁnance rate, again, was house price appreciation. 
However, because the housing market slowdown resulted in a reverse 
trend in housing prices, the contribution was of the opposite sign 
compared to the earlier vintages. All else equal, pre-origination house 
price appreciation contributed positively, tending to increase reﬁnance 
rates; however, the magnitude of the current, post-origination, housing 
values declined adn the lower reﬁnance rates prevailed. In other words, 
the door to a reﬁnance opportunity was closed with declining housing 
prices and reﬁnancing were were largely taken over by by defaults in 
the termination rates of subprime mortgages.
4. Concluding Remarks
The subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 resulted in a massive 
wave of foreclosures. A large proportion of foreclosures and serious 
delinquencies in this wave consisted of mortgages originated in 2006 
and 2007. This phenomenon is also known as early default. Much of 
the debate among researchers and policy makers involves causes, 
consequences and remedies for these early defaults and foreclosures. 
What was left unexplained, however, is the temporary nature of subprime 
loans. This study shows that loans originated in any year from 2001 to 
2006 generally had a life of less than three years. In fact, almost half of 
these loans exited the market - through either prepayment or default 
- within the ﬁrst two years of origination; about 80 percent of them did 
so within the ﬁrst three years.
Even though mortgage termination rates have been remarkably 
similar for all origination years evaluated one, two, or three years after 
origination, the split between default and prepayment rates varied. 
There seems to be a J-shape in default rates calculated from 2001 to 
2006 origination years. The trough of the pattern corresponds to the 
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years 2003 and 2004, when the housing market was booming. When 
default rates are small, reﬁnancing rates are high. When the trend 
in the housing market reversed, reﬁnancing became impossible and 
defaults took their place.
The evidence presented in this paper is consistent with Demyanyk 
and Van Hemert (2008), who explain that the crisis - the unusually high 
default rates among 2006 and 2007 vintage loans - did not occur because 
these loans were in some respects much worse than all loans originated 
earlier. Subprime mortgages were very risky all along; however, their 
true riskiness was hidden by rapid house price appreciation, allowing 
mortgage termination by reﬁnancing/prepayment to take place. When 
prepayment became very costly (zero or negative equity in the house 
would increase closing costs of a reﬁnanceing), defaults took their place.
The results in this paper also suggest that subprime lending did not 
increase homeownership, as the number of defaults in a limited sample 
(the data used covers about 50 percent of all subprime mortgages) of the 
purchase-money mortgages is almost equal to the estimated number 
of ﬁrst-time home buyers. Had the data for the rest of the market been 
available, the number of defaults would no doubt be even greater.
There are several questions that remain unanswered and 
may require further attention. First of all, the available data do not 
allow us to determine what happened to those loans that terminated 
but did not default (terminated through prepayment or reﬁnancing). 
Mortgages originated as a reﬁnance tend to reﬁnance again within a 
couple of years after origination and they tend to default as well. If 
more comprehensive data become available, this may be an issue worth 
investigating from the perspective of the affects on homeownership 
policy discussion. Foote, Gerardi, Goette, and Willen (2008) raise the 
same question and explain the di±culty associated with answering it. 
Second, several studies indicate that the materialized risks associated 
with subprime mortgage lending had a nature beyond observable and 
measurable factors, such as the credit score, for example (Demyanyk 
and Van Hemert (2008) and Haughwout, Peach, and Tracy (2008)). We 
do not know much about this risk apart from it existing and increasing 
over time. More sophisticated models and more comprehensive data are 
needed to answer this question.
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Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis
Yuliya Demyanyk and Otto Van Hemert have produced a ﬁrst-rate 
paper carefully documenting delinquency rates in the US securitized 
subprime market. Their analysis is based upon available empirical 
evidence from 2001 through 2007. I enjoyed reading the paper, especially 
since the unfolding global ﬁnancial meltdown was providing me with a 
deep sense of its relevance for us today.
I found the paper topical, comprehensive and ambitious. First, 
the authors demonstrate the important point that, despite its apparent 
rise between 2003 and 2005, the subprime mortgage market was in fact 
hiding a continual deterioration in the underlying quality of loans, which 
in fact could have been detected long before the crisis erupted. Second, 
the loan-level database they use (about 7.5 millions loans) is enormous 
and covers 85 percent of all securitized and about half of al US subprime 
mortgages. I marvel at their being able to come to grips with the difﬁcult 
problems presented by a random sample of one million. They mention, for 
example, that the data is of poor quality in the ﬂexible hybrid segment. 
Third, they are looking for explanations of the crisis and to this effect 
bring their data to bear on existing models of lending cycles and banks’ 
underwriting standards. This is certainly a difﬁcult task.
The paper provides many insights into the US subprime market 
and its main points are exposed with craftsmanship. Most importantly, 
the deterioration in “adjusted” delinquency rates, i.e., the residuals one 
obtains after rates have been purged of their usual determinants, is both 
monotonic and predictable. This is interpreted as a standard lending 
boom-bust cycle. Somewhat surprisingly, the poor performance is not 
conﬁned to any particular segment, and robustness tests conﬁrm that 
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it is uniform across the types, characteristics and purposes of mortgage 
loans. The higher deterioration associated with high LTV ratios only 
reinforces the importance of low house price appreciation among 
determinants of delinquencies. Finally, the evidence on risk premiums 
is consistent with the idea that investors are well aware of the risks but 
simply tend to disregard them in their quest for high yields.
Although I concur with the main thrust of the argument, I think 
there are a few caveats that make it only plausible and yet not certain. 
My ﬁrst quibble has to do with the extent to which one should draw 
inferences from a model that is likely to be misspeciﬁed. The results can 
be viewed as a joint test of a deterioration hypothesis and a model of 
credit delinquencies. When you dig deeper in the econometrics, you ﬁnd 
that correlation between delinquencies, non-stationarity in parameter 
estimates, trends in prediction errors altogether suggest that there 
might be alternative ways to tackle the issue.
I also wonder whether one could better disentangle demand effects 
(i.e., investors’ willingness to increase exposure to subprimeMBSs, 
thereby causing deterioration in credit quality) from supply effects 
(i.e., originators’ decision to securitize subprime loans and buy credit 
protection, as a substitute for collateralization). After all, Wenying has 
just shown this morning that securitization could go hand in hand with 
lower insolvency risks (lower time deposit premiums). I believe that 
these demand and supply effects could be at the origin of a potential 
selectivity bias.
Finally, I’d like to suggest a change in the title. Yuliya and Otto 
claim to have written a paper on understanding the subprime mortgage 
crisis. But regarding the underlying causes of the crisis, what is speciﬁc 
about securitization as opposed to underwriting decisions? Is this an 
adverse selection problem, stemming from poor incentives to screen 
loans at origination, or rather a moral hazard problem, with poor 
incentives to monitor loans once they have been securitized? What about 
the recommended policy given our understanding? For these reasons I 
think the paper is really about measuring the subprime mortgage crisis. 
Here my quarrel is with the title, not the content.
1. Correlation issues
The paper isn’t quite explicit about the underlying distribution 
of delinquency “events,” and apparently treats them as independent 
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indicator variables. I assume the logit model is estimated under maximum 
likelihood, where the log-likelihood is simply the sum of the likelihood of 
independent binary variables. In models of multi-name credit, however, 
underlying assets are typically assumed to be correlated. This is indeed 
how CDO tranches are quoted in credit derivatives markets, where 
base correlations play the same role as implied volatilities from equity 
options.
To show this in the context of the present model one can use a 
one-factor model with logit copula. A delinquency event will be deﬁned 
as                  with
where Xi stands for the independent variables in the paper, asset 
i belongs to year t, vt is a common factor, and         an idiosyncratic shock 
with the logit distribution. (The threshold is normalized to zero because 
X includes a constant.) It is easy to see that the conditional likelihood 
takes the form
where vt is the “vintage” factor inducing correlation among 
delinquencies in a given year.
How should the common vintage factor vt be treated in the 
analysis? If it is reasonably quantiﬁed by some macroeconomic aggregate 
(such as the change in unemployment considered in the paper), one 
should obviously include it in the columns of X. If it is an unobserved 
factor, the likelihood of the sample shoud be averaged across all possible 
states given the assumed factor distribution. In contrast, the paper 
takes an alternative view: the latent factor vt is a vintage dummy (ﬁxed 
as opposed to random effect) reﬂecting the underlying quality of the 
pool given banks’ underwriting standards at origination. The punch line 
of the interpretation is that (i) any relationship between loan quality 
and (say) unemployment is spurious, (i) a monotically increasing vt 
indicates a deterioration in loan quality and (iii) the vintage dummy vt 
can be estimated at any time using information up to that time.
The paper offers three speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst (baseline case) 
without vintage dummy produces the residuals which are then 
interpreted as “adjusted” delinquency rates. The other two include 
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a vintage dummy, ﬁrst constrained to be a time trend and then 
unconstrained. Treating v as a ﬁxed effect in these regressions implies 
that no correlation should be left among individual probability of 
delinquencies. What do the data say about the underlying correlation in 
a given year? Perhaps some kind of principal component analysis would 
give some hints. More importantly, the adjusted delinquency rate in the 
baseline case is associated with the error term                           which 
must be uncorrelated with the columns of X. This naturally gives rise 
to Hausman-like speciﬁcation tests. Results reported in Section 4 are a 
good case in point: the assumption of constant regression coefﬁcients is 
strongly rejected across different periods and across different groups of 
loans. This casts some doubts about the chosen speciﬁcation.
2. Selectivity bias
Evidence from mortgage rate equations (in level or in subprime-
prime spreads) raises questions about whether credit risk was properly 
priced. The main themes are that securitizers were aware of the overall 
riskiness in the subprime market – as mortgage rates became more 
sensitive to LTV ratios – but that their appetite for debt couldn’t be 
curbed in light of the search for high yields – as shown by the downward 
trend in the spread prediction error.
Securitization is an endogenous decision. The decision of 
originators who commit to lending and that of securitizers that dictate 
the mortgage rate are determined jointly. As a result, the characteristics 
of those who beneﬁt from a securitized mortgage loan are likely to be 
different from those that do not. The paper concentrates on borrowers 
whose loans were securitized. Correcting for selectivity bias requires in 
principle a probit equation which distinguishes securitized from non-
securitized debt. Ideally, one would want to create a set of observations 
that would match the spread equation in the paper – the demand 
by investors for exposure on subprime MBSs – with a corresponding 
selection equation – the supply of originators willing to securitize 
subprime mortgages. Following Heckman, such system can be identiﬁed 
by the non-linearity of the ﬁtted probability and by the inclusion of 
independent variables in the selection equation that are not included 
in the spread equation.
Although the current data doesn’t allow to do this, it should be 
recognized that the results so far may fail to be robust to the selectivity 
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bias. Consider for example a rise in the prime rate. Equation (7) in the 
paper shows that there is a shift in the spread equation, as default 
probability on subprime loans is affected. (The direction and magnitude 
of the shift will of course depend on the unreported       .) But there may 
be a shift in the securitization share also, as a higher prime rate may 
lock the bank into higher ﬁxed-rate mortgage rates. Whether or not the 
spread prediction error will maintain its downward trend in this setting 
is less clear.
3. Causes of the subprime crisis
If the paper successfully links the deterioration of quality in the 
subprime market to the classic lending boom-bust cycle, the link with 
the literature quoted is loose. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (JF, 2006) for 
example show that when the mass of unknown borrowers reach a critical 
point, banks are better off not collateralizing loans. This is interpreted as 
a reduction in asymmetries across banks. But there is no theory of how 
information asymmetries change over time. Although the data is broadly 
consistent with Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, it cannot be considered as 
a direct test of the implications of their model. The case is somewhat 
more problematic with Ruckes (RFS, 2004). Ruckes’ model starts from 
the premise that average default probabilities decline as the economic 
outlook improves. The latter improved in the ﬁrst period of the sample, 
yet the performance of mortgage loans continued to deteriorate. Berger 
and Udell (JFI, 2004) have attrition in the ranks of loan ofﬁcers. This is 
clearly an aspect that is overlooked in the analysis. The paper has in fact 
little to say about existing theories of the lending boom-bust cycle.
Finally one would expect that a paper highlighting the causes of 
the subprime crisis would somehow help looking for a cure. For example, 
on whom does the paper put the blame for the disease, and what should 
be done about it? Should one focus on the originators of subprime 
loans with loosening underwriting standards? Or securitizers who 
package them into opaque marketable securities? Or investors showing 
insatiable appetite for risk, to say nothing about policy makers or central 
banks? Let me at this stage point out another plausible (admittedly 
non substantiated) interpretation. There isn’t any deterioration of 
underwriting standards at play. Rather, the problem lies in the poor 
monitoring of outstanding loans. Banks monitor only if their payoff 
under monitoring exceeds the private beneﬁts of shirking. But actual 
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securitization contracts such as CDOs may not be incentive-compatible. 
The equity tranche they hold becomes ineffective once it is exhausted, 
and the fees they collect help them partake in the recoveries even when 
the delinquency rates are high.
In sum, Yuliya and Otto have written a very stimulating paper. 
They provide clear evidence based on new and comprehensive data that 
the rise and fall of subprime mortgage market masked a continual and 
predictable deterioration in loan performance. Their ﬁnding is quite 
consistent with the standard lending boom-bust scenario, although I 
ﬁnd not quite compelling whether the deterioration was indeed the 
reﬂection of loosening underwriting standards, of poor monitoring 
once mortgages were in place, of industrial organization at work (e.g., 
competition), of poor macroeconomic management or an ill-designed 
regulatory framework. In any event, the paper provides the right 
empirical backdrop against which more accurate theories of delegated 
monitoring of risky and imperfectly correlated loans might unravel the 
true story behind the current dramatic developments.
Abstract
This paper aims to provide an overview of sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs) with regards to the sources of their funding, investment 
patterns and growth in size in recent times. Furthermore, it provides 
insights into the role of these funds during the subprime crisis and the 
implications of this on our global ﬁnancial markets.
Following an assessment of the beneﬁts against the risks of 
these funds, it is evident that they do not pose a signiﬁcant threat to 
their recipient countries and to the ﬁnancial stability of the markets. 
Furthermore, any concerns regarding lack of transparency and 
non-commercial motives are best addressed through adherence to 
international guidelines developed by the OECD and the IMF for both 
the SWFs themselves as well as the recipient countries. At the same 
time, regional and global ﬁnancial integration could reduce the political 
risk associated with some strategic investments made by SWFs in 
certain parts of the world.
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1. Introduction
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have attracted considerable 
public attention due to their recent emergence as an important investor 
class. Initially their growth was driven by oil and commodity revenues, 
but recently the large budget surpluses experienced by Asian countries 
have also contributed to the increase in SWFs. 
Since the inception of the ﬁrst SWF, the Kuwait Investment 
Authority, in 1953, these funds have been known to pursue long-term 
investment strategies. Whilst they traditionally invested in US Treasury 
bonds, there has been an increasing shift towards risky investment 
classes such as equities. However it was not until the subprime crisis 
in 2007 that SWFs became the focus of public attention, following the 
purchases of stakes in major ﬁnancial corporations. During this period, 
SWFs asserted their ability to act as a stabilising force in the ﬁnancial 
markets through their capital injections.
The investments made in ﬁnancial institutions during the 
subprime crisis, coupled with the rapid growth of SWFs in developing 
countries, have raised concerns regarding ﬁnancial market stability, 
lack of transparency and poor governance structures. If not addressed, 
these concerns may lead to a protectionist backlash amongst recipient 
countries.
Establishing international standards and guidelines for both SWFs 
and their recipient countries can reduce the risk of a backlash against 
SWF investments. To date, the newly established SWF International 
Working Group sponsored by the IMF aims to develop a set of self-
regulating guidelines for SWFs, while the OECD is aims to develop 
guidelines for countries who are recipients of SWF investments.
The remaining parts of this paper are structured as follows:  section 
2 provides an overview of the SWF, section 3 discusses SWF investments 
in different parts of the world, Section 4 provides information about 
the size of SWF by country, Section 5 discusses SWF in the light of 
sub-prime credit problems, Section 6 deals with strategic and political 
objectives of SWFs, section 7 presents the current discussion by the 
IMF, the EU and the OCED regarding the code of conduct for SWFs and 
section 8 concludes. 
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2. An overview of Sovereign Wealth Funds
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are state-controlled investment 
vehicles which own and manage public funds. Although there is no 
commonly accepted deﬁnition of SWFs, they tend to be state-owned and 
have no explicit liabilities. They are also likely to have a substantial 
exposure to foreign investments. There are a number of justiﬁcations 
of outsourcing public funds to SWFs, including revenue stabilisation, 
diversiﬁcation, optimising returns on reserves and saving for future 
generations. 
2.1. Sources of sovereign wealth 
The ﬁrst source of sovereign wealth is the commodity revenue 
from resource-rich countries, as stated by OCED ( 2008). This could be 
either as a result of the revenue generated from the actual sales of the 
natural resources or could be due to tax revenue generated from private 
corporation’s activities in some primary commodities ( as argued by 
OECD, 2008). In these countries, SWFs have been operating for decades, 
since the Kuwait Investment Authority was established in 1953. Other 
notable examples of oil-exporting countries that operate SWFs include 
Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. In countries such as 
Chile, Botswana and Kiribati, SWFs are funded by alternative natural 
resources such as copper, diamonds or minerals. Today, the largest 
commodity-based SWF is the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, with 
over USD 700 billion in estimated assets under management. 
A second group of countries establishes SWFs as a result of large 
current account surpluses. This is prevalent in export-oriented economies 
within Asia, where ‘excess’ foreign exchange reserves are accumulated to 
manage inﬂexible exchange rate regimes. Conventionally, these reserves 
have been invested by the central banks in liquid sovereign debt as 
well as precious metals such as gold. More recently, the investment of 
reserves into SWFs allow countries to earn a higher return on reserves, 
which is discussed in further detail in Section 2.2. 
2.2. Rationale for outsourcing to SWFs
Revenue stabilisation
For countries whose SWFs are funded by oil and commodity 
revenues, SWFs serve the purpose of stabilising export revenues which 
would otherwise mirror the volatility of oil or commodity prices. In this 
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case, the SWF serves as a liquidity pool which is replenished at times 
of favourable commodity price inﬂows, and which can be drawn upon in 
cases of low asset prices or shortages of reserves.
Risk-return optimisation
As mentioned above, SWFs also allow for countries to earn a 
higher return on reserves. Based on conventional reserves management 
as undertaken by central banks, portfolios are typically invested 
in short-duration, high-grade government securities and money 
market instruments. The real return on such investments has been 
approximately 1% in the past 60 years. In contrast, the equivalent real 
return on typical pension fund portfolio is almost 6%, as highlighted in 
Table 1.
 Table 1
Annualised risk and return of investment portfolios
Portfolio Average 
real return 
% p.a.
Annualised 
standard deviation 
of return %
Probability of negative 
real return for 10Y 
holding period %
Typical central-bank portfolio 0.98 1.24 37.0
Typical pension fund portfolio 5.75 12.45 12.5
All-US-stocks portfolio 7.11 19.37 13.3
Source: Kern, 2007
Intergenerational savings
Furthermore, with the high and sustained oil and commodity 
prices in recent times, commodity-based SWFs have gradually evolved 
into intergenerational savings funds. The accumulation of savings for 
future generations is based on the assumption that natural resources 
are non-renewable and will be exhausted after a period of time. A notable 
example is Norway’s Government Pension Fund. A second rationale for 
creating a savings fund is that superior international competitiveness 
of domestic industries can be a transitory phenomenon, which may 
substantially change over the course of time. 
Diversiﬁcation and reducing excess concentration
The revenues from oil and other commodity exporting countries 
are exposed to substantial concentration risk. This is due to their 
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dependence on the natural resource sold on international markets. 
Additional risks include an appreciation of the real exchange rate due to 
the sale of natural resources, which in turn reduces the competitiveness 
of other sectors in the economy. Establishing SWFs allows for national 
wealth to be invested internationally and thus diversiﬁes revenues and 
reduces concentration risk. 
Even for countries that do not rely on commodity exports, SWFs 
provide mechanisms for breaking up concentrations of portfolios that 
increase risk. For example, China currently has USD 1.5 trillion of 
Chinese reserves, invested mainly in the US Treasury market. This not 
only distorts the yield curve in the US, but yield effects could potentially 
hurt both China and the USA. Shifting assets to SWFs allow for the 
reduction of foreign exchange reserve concentration. 
3. Investments of sovereign wealth funds
3.1. Long-term focus
The fact that SWFs have no explicit liabilities allows them to 
pursue long-term investment strategies and this has been the case 
for most SWFs to date. In particular, the savings funds established to 
provide for future generations will be more likely to have a long term 
investment horizon. 
3.2. Level of risk
In addition, the absence of liabilities also has a bearing on their 
willingness to take on risk. As such, the share of risky assets in a SWF 
portfolio is often substantial and accounts for more than half of total 
assets. Traditionally, SWFs invested in US Treasury bonds but have 
gradually shifted to a more diversiﬁed investment portfolio and have 
accepted a higher level of risk to access higher returns.
3.3. Asset allocation
In recent times, there has also been a shift in asset class allocation 
by SWFs. A trend of increased allocation to equities has been observed, 
as well as an increased exposure to high-yield alternative assets such as 
private equity and real estate.
Figure 1 shows the ofﬁcial holdings of US Treasury securities by 
foreign governments. The increased trend of foreign holdings reﬂects 
Japanese and Chinese foreign exchange intervention policies. Singapore 
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and OPEC are both associated with the largest SWFs, yet have very 
little holdings of US Treasury securities. This is evidence that SWFs 
follow a diversiﬁed investment strategy and do not concentrate their 
holdings on Treasury securities alone.
Figure 1
Foreign holdings of US Treasury securities
 
Source: OECD, 2008
Table 2 presents a summary of some of the largest sovereign 
wealth funds and reﬂects the trend of high levels of foreign investment 
as well as medium to high levels of risky assets such as equity by the 
majority of SWFs.
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Table 2
Characteristics of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds
Country Fund Assets 
(USD bn)
Foreign 
investment
Equity 
investment
Oil exporters
UAE Abu Dhabi Investment Council 400-800 High High
Norway Government Pension Fund – Global 373 High Medium
Saudi Arabia SAMA 300 High Low
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 213 High High
UAE Investment Corporation of Dubai 20-80 High High
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 20-60 High High
Libya Libya Investment Authority 20-60 High High
Brunei Brunei Investment Authority 10-50 High High
Norway Government Pension Fund – Norway ~20 Low Medium
Russia Future Generations Fund ~24 High High
East Asia
China China Investment Corporation ~200 High High
Singapore Government Investment Company ~130 High High
Hong Kong Exchange Fund Investment Portfolio ~112 High Low
Singapore Temasek Holdings ~108 Medium High
Korea Korea Investment Corporation ~20 High High
Source: European Central Bank, 2008
Notes: ﬁgures are only rough approximations. “High” and “Low” refer to shares above two-
thirds and below one-third respectively.
3.4. Investment activity
With regards to the level of investment activity, Figure 2 shows 
that since 2003, there has been a rapid increase in the investment 
activity of SWFs, both in terms of the number of deals and their size. 
This is due to a number of factors in recent years. One of these factors 
is the massive trade imbalance between China and the US which led 
to a signiﬁcant increase in China’s foreign reserve in recent years. The 
strong economic activities in China and some other emerging countries 
have also been important in this process. The rise in the price of oil and 
the massive increase in the income of some oil exporting countries have 
also contributed to an increase in the foreign reserve assets of certain 
countries. At the same time, involvement of SWFs in rescuing some 
of the ﬁnancial institutions that have been affected by the sub-prime 
problems could be another factor in this process. Strategic acquisitions of 
some mining resources or high tech companies in certain countries such 
as Australia or the US by some of these SWFs could be another factor in 
the signiﬁcant increase in the number of deals and deal volumes.  
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Figure 2
Investment activity of SWFs by number of deals and deal volume
 
Source: Marchick, 2008
4. Size of sovereign wealth funds
Due to the opaque nature of SWFs, the exact size of the funds is 
uncertain. OECD estimates that the total pool of assets lies between 
USD 2 to 3 trillion, a ﬁgure which has already surpassed the total value 
of hedge funds. Also, based on their current growth, this ﬁgure could 
reach USD 12 trillion by 2015 according to private sector estimates 
(Jen, 2007). In a very recent report by  the IMF, it is estimated that 
SWFs could increase to 5-6 trillion USD over the next ﬁve years.
4.1. Size of SWFs by country
Figure 3 provides a comparison of the largest SWFs by country. 
It is evident that asset holdings are relatively concentrated in a small 
number of funds, with the top ﬁve funds accounting for approximately 
70% of total assets (Johnson, 2007). Oil exporters from the Middle East, 
as well as Norway’s sizeable Government Pension Fund, account for 
the largest portion of total assets managed by SWFs. A smaller fraction 
in the order of USD 600 million is accounted for by Asian emerging 
economies such as Singapore and China.
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Figure 3
Size of sovereign wealth funds by country
Source: OECD, 2008
4.2. Comparative size of SWFs
The 2 to 3 trillion USD managed by SWFs is relatively small 
when compared to other assets under management. Figure 4 shows that 
although the size of the top ﬁve SWFs has exceeded that of hedge funds, 
they are still relatively small compared to the USD 50 trillion managed 
in total by private asset managers, in particular mutual funds (Beck, 
2008).
Figure 4
Sovereign wealth funds in comparison
Source: European Central Bank, 2008
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In addition, Figure 5.1 shows, as reported by Kern ( 2007), the 
esimated total assets under management of SWFs compared to other 
asset classes. Although the SWF market is more than twice the size of 
the hedge fund industry, they are relatively small compared to other 
institutional investors. For example, they represent only a seventh of 
the global investment fund industry (USD 21 trillion in assets under 
management) and less than 5% of bank assets worldwide. 
Figure 5.1
Sovereign wealth funds in comparison
Source: Kern, 2007
4.2. Size of SWFs and foreign exchange reserves
The levels of foreign exchange reserves are a signiﬁcant factor 
in determining future SWF growth. Foreign exchange reserve levels 
are likely to increase rapidly in the future if high commodity prices are 
sustained and if the US dollar remains weak. 
Figure 5.2 presents estimates of foreign exchange reserves by 
country. Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council such as the UAE and 
Kuwait have been accumulating foreign assets in SWFs for decades; 
hence have relatively modest levels of foreign exchange reserves. 
On the other hand, some emerging countries like China that 
initiated their SWFs in recent times, they are holding well above the 
required amount of foreign exchange reserves. However, over time, this 
imbalance may well be addressed. 
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Figure 5.2
Estimates of foreign exchange reserve and SWFs (by country)
Source: European Central Bank, 2008
Global reserves have been growing since the late 1990’s, with 
Japan being the main driver of this growth. This is especially during 
periods of a weak US dollar, where Japan carried out large interventions. 
Since their currency devaluation in the mid 1990s, China has surpassed 
Japan as the major holder of foreign reserves, with over USD 1.5 trillion 
in total. More recently, this growth has accelerated further, and China 
accumulated USD 446 billion in the year to September 2007, compared 
with only USD 247 billion in the year to December 2006 (IMF, 2007). It 
is expected that the process of transferring these accumulated reserves 
to its SWFs will result in continued growth in the total size of SWF 
assets. 
The growth of global reserves alongside China’s stock market 
is shown in Figure 6. It is evident that there is a strong relationship 
between growth of global reserves and China’s stock market growth. As 
OCED (2008) stated, the reason for this trend is that investors invest in 
emerging countries as a way of diversifying their risk. As capital moves 
to countries like China where there is a ﬁxed exchange regime in place, 
the interest rate remains low. This in turn would assist the local stock 
market to grow rapidly.
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Figure 6
Global reserves and China’s stock market
Source: OCED, 2008.
Figure 7 shows the growth rates of private equity deals and global 
reserves over time. Between 2001 and 2003, both global reserves and 
global private equity have experienced phenomenal growth. However in 
recent times, the private equity bubble has ﬁnally burst whilst global 
reserves levels have continued to increase.
Figure 7
Global reserves and global private equity
 
Source: OECD, 2008
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Figure 8 shows the growth rates of global reserves alongside a 
commodity price index constructed by the Reserve Bank of Australia. 
This index has a heavy weighting to materials used by China, including 
energy, base metals and bulks and constitutes one of the bubbles that 
SWFs invested in. Between mid-1998 and early 2006, it appears that 
the growth of global reserves mirrors the increase in commodity prices. 
However in recent times, global reserves have continued to grow despite 
the fall in commodity prices. 
Figure 8
Global reserves and commodity prices
Source: OECD, 2008
5. SWFs and the Subprime Crisis
5.1. Investments made by SWFs during Subprime crisis
Considerable public attention has been cast on SWFs recently, 
in particular on their investments made during the subprime crisis in 
2007. Last year, the majority of major SWF investments that were made 
public were placed in ﬁnancial institutions and SWFs have contributed 
about $41 billion of the $105 billion of capital injected into major 
ﬁnancial institutions since November 2007 (IMF, 2008). Their injections 
of capital into the markets came at a critical time, when risk-taking 
capital was scarce and market sentiment was pessimistic.
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Table 3
Recent investments by SWFs (2007-2008 Q1)
Sovereign Wealth Fund Acquired Company Transaction Value
(In USD Billion) ( % of ﬁrm value)
GIC of Singapore UBS 9.8 8.6
Abu Dhabi Investment Council Citigroup 7.6 4.9
GIC of Singapore Citigroup 6.9 4.4
Investment Corporation of Dubai MGM Mirage 5.1 9.5
China Investment Company Morgan Stanley 5.0 9.9
Temasek (Singapore) Merrill Lynch 5.0 11.3
Qatar Investment Authority Sainsbury 3.7 25.0
KIA (Kuwait) Merrill Lynch 3.4 7.0
China Development Bank Barclays 3.0 3.1
China Investment Company Blackstone 3.0 10.0
Investment Corporation of Dubai London Stock Exchange 3.0 28.0
Temasek (Singapore) China Eastern Air 2.8 8.3
SAFE (China) Total 2.8 1.6
SAFE (China) British Petroleum 2.0 1.0
KIC (Korea) Merrill Lynch 2.0 4.3
Temasek (Singapore) Barclays 2.0 1.8
Qatar Investment Authority London Stock Exchange 2.0 20.0
Temasek (Singapore) Standard Chartered 2.0 5.4
Undisclosed “Middle East  investor” UBS 1.8 1.6
Abu Dhabi Investment Council Carlyle Group 1.4 7.5
Investment Corporation of Dubai Och-Ziff Capital Management 1.3 9.9
Investment Corporation of Dubai Mauser Group 1.2 100.0
Investment Corporation of Dubai Alliance Medical 1.2 100.0
GIC of Singapore Myer Melbourne 1.0 100.0
China Citic Securities Bear Stearns 1.0 6.0
Borse Dubai Nasdaq 1.0 19.9
Investment Corporation of Dubai Standard Chartered 1.0 2.7
Investment Corporation of Dubai Almatis 1.0 100.0
GIC of Singapore Merrill Lynch Financial Centre 1.0 100.0
Source: European Central Bank, 2008
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Table 3 provides details of major investments by SWFs between 
2007 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2008. Many of these transactions were in 
the ﬁnancial sector and while they were signiﬁcant in size, usually only 
a minority stake is purchased on the company. Also, a common feature 
of these transactions is that they are privately negotiated as opposed 
to being executed in the public markets. Finally, the transactions often 
involved convertible bonds, high-yielding bonds that are to be converted 
into equity stakes in the future (IMF, 2008).
It may be premature to draw strong conclusions, given the short-
term nature of the data, added to the fact that these investment patterns 
may be simply due to the high weight of the ﬁnancial sector in global 
capital markets. However, it does support the view that SWFs acted as 
a stabilising force in the ﬁnancial markets during the subprime crisis, 
abating short-term market volatility.  
This is especially since stakes in global banks were purchased 
when their credit default swap (CDS) spreads were negatively affected 
and their stock prices at their lowest levels (Beck, 2008). Figure 9 shows 
the CDS spreads of selected ﬁnancial institutions between the 2007 and 
2008 period. The vertical lines represent capital injections at a point in 
time, and it is evident that stakes were purchased when CDS spreads 
were at a record high. Some examples of prominent investments made 
by SWFs during the subprime crisis include stakes purchased in UBS, 
Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse and Morgan Stanley.
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Figure 9
Credit Default Swap spreads of selected ﬁnancial institutions
(1) Morgan Stanley, (2) Merrill Lynch, (3) Citigroup, (4) Credit Suisse, (5) UBS
Source: IMF, 2008
For these banks, the capital injections by SWFs provided an 
increased capital buffer. This made is easy for banks to continue their 
business without attempting to reduce the size of their assets. Table 
4 examines these purchased stakes and suggests that the share 
prices and elevated CDS spreads have been stabilised as a result of 
the capital injection. In most cases the initial share price reactions to 
SWF investments were positive, since announcements of an asset write 
down usually went hand-in-hand with a capital injection from SWFs. 
In addition, the share price volatility also declined following the capital 
injection, supporting the view that SWFs could have a volatility-reducing 
impact on markets. However, it is important to keep in mind that these 
are short-term results and further study is required to determine long-
term impacts of the stabilising role of SWFs in ﬁnancial markets.
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Table 4
Capital injections into ﬁnancial institutions and market response
Date of 
Announcement
Financial 
Institution
Writedown Investors Amount (USD b) / 
% total stake 
Immediate market 
response*
SWFs Other SWFs Other Stock 
price (%)
CDS (%)
26 Nov 2007 Citigroup $6b Q32007 Abu Dhabi 
Investment 
Authority
$7.5 /4.9% -1.2 -6
10 Dec 2007 UBS $18b 2007 GIC of 
Singapore
Unknown 
Middle 
Eastern 
investor
$9.7 / 10.0% $1.8 / 
2.0%
1.4 -9
19 Dec 2007 Morgan 
Stanley
$9.4b 
Q42007
China 
Investment 
Corporation
$5 / 9.9% 4.2 0
21 Dec 2007 Merrill 
Lynch
$8.4b Q3 
2007
Temasek 
Holdings
Davis 
Selected 
Advisors, 
L.P.
$4.4 / 9.4% $1.2 / 
2.6%
1.9 0
15 Jan 2008 Citigroup $18.1b 
Q42007
GIC of 
Singapore, 
Kuwait 
Investment 
Authority
Sanford 
Weill, Saudi 
Prince 
Alwaleed 
bin Talal, 
Capital 
Research 
Global 
Investors, 
Capital 
World 
Investors, 
New Jersey 
Investment 
Division
$6.8 
from GIC 
Singapore / 
3.7%,
$3 from 
Kuwait 
Investment 
Authority / 
1.6%
$2.7 / 
1.5%
-7.3 -5
15 Jan 2008 Merrill 
Lynch
$14.1b Q4 
2007
Korea 
Investment 
Corporation, 
Kuwait 
Investment 
Authority
Mizuho 
Financial 
Group Inc.
$2 / 3.2% 
from Korea 
Investment 
Corporation 
and Kuwait 
Investment 
Authority
$2.6 / 
4.1%
-5.3 -12
18 Feb 2008 Credit 
Suisse
$2.85b Qatar 
Investment 
Authority
~0.5 / 
1-2% open 
market 
purchase
3.2 2
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*Immediate response refers to the change after announcement compared to the previous 
transaction day
Note: The stock price of Citigroup rose 6.5 percent on November 28, 2007, the third day 
after the announcement of the ﬁrst capital injection. The stock price declines of Citigroup 
and Merrill Lynch on January 15, 2008 were confounded owing to the simultaneous 
announcement of huge writedowns and dilution of the claims of existing shareholders.
Source: IMF, 2008
5.2. Implications
Liquidity
Inﬂows from SWFs into a range of asset classes can be expected. 
Given their tendency to pursue risky investments (see Table 2); equity 
markets are likely to beneﬁt from such inﬂows, which will create 
increased liquidity and subsequently market efﬁciency (Devlin et al, 
2007).
Financial stability 
The large investments made by SWFs during the subprime crisis 
also led to concerns regarding the implications on ﬁnancial stability. 
In particular, concerns relate to portfolio adjustments creating sudden 
reversals in capital ﬂows and abrupt price changes. This in turn could 
potentially result in destabilising effects on both asset markets and 
whole economies. 
However, such concerns are largely unjustiﬁed and in fact, a 
number of factors highlight the ability of SWFs to act as a stabilising 
force in the ﬁnancial markets. As a group, SWFs are considered to be 
relatively conservative investors with a long-term investment horizon. 
With this in mind, they are more likely to be able to withstand short 
term volatility, with an expectation of higher returns in the long-term. 
Secondly, the funding base of SWFs is relatively stable. They are unlike 
hedge funds in that they are not restricted by capital requirements or 
investor withdrawals, hence are unlikely to liquidate their positions 
rapidly. In addition, they are not subject to capital adequacy or prudential 
regulatory requirements that need to be met (Kern, 2007).   
Market opportunities and demand for asset management services
The asset management function of SWFs is similar to that of 
investment, pension and hedge funds. A number of market opportunities 
may also arise given that SWFs demand asset management and 
137Fariborz Moshirian
investment services. Some SWFs outsource their funds to external fund 
managers, a notable example being the Korea Investment Corporation, 
which is estimated to have outsourced around three-quarters its 
investment portfolio (Kern, 2007).
Impacts on exchange rates and asset prices
Given the large size of some SWFs, as Kern (2007) and OCED ( 
2008) stated, shifts in asset allocation could have signiﬁcant impacts on 
the relative prices of the asset classes involved. For example, if it switches 
out of dollars into another currency, there will be an exchange rate impact. 
Similarly, switching out of one asset like a Treasury security to another 
such as equity stock will result in signiﬁcant price impacts. Depending on 
the nature of the capital ﬂow or allocation, the effects on price will vary. 
For instance, one would consider effects of changes on the portfolio due to 
signiﬁcant increase in assets or as a result of sale of existing assets. 
In addition, SWFs may cause a distortion of asset prices through 
non-commercially motivated purchases or sales of securities. This 
however, is unlikely given that most SWF portfolios are managed 
by a stand-alone investment manager or a well-regarded private 
fund manager. Due to this, they are no different from other market 
participants in their actions and investment goals.
Home country beneﬁts
Despite the concerns associated with the risks SWF investment 
detailed below, an additional beneﬁt of SWFs is that they contribute to 
the economic development of their home countries, providing a shield 
against the volatility of commodity prices. There are also diversiﬁcation 
beneﬁts associated with SWFs, and they can improve the risk-return 
proﬁle of government-controlled portfolios. This in turn may boost 
ﬁnancial and ﬁscal management capacities. 
Recent Financial Crisis
The international ﬁnancial crisis in late September and early October 
2008 has discouraged SWFs to further expand their business activities in 
banking sector or any other sector that may not have strong short term 
positive performance prospect. This new episode is indicating that SWFs 
are not willing to simply own partially some of the US or European banks 
or other assets without considering the ﬁnancial reality of the market. We 
are seeing less SWFs willing to partially own the US or European banks. 
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6. Risks and Concerns 
6.1. Strategic & Political objectives
The state-owned nature of SWFs raises concerns for the 
recipient country, especially when controlling stakes are purchased in 
strategic industries such as energy, technology and infrastructure, or 
iconic domestic companies. The main concern is that their governance, 
investment objectives and asset allocations may reﬂect strategic and 
political objectives. 
This may in turn aggravate protectionist pressures. For example, 
some developed countries are considering strengthening regulatory 
frameworks to screen potential acquisitions of domestic companies by 
SWFs. In addition, the US recently revised legislation governing its 
Committee on Foreign Investment (Truman, 2007). In Australia, the 
Federal Government moved to block Chinese companies from acquiring 
a large proportion of resource rich companies such as BHP or Rio Tinto, 
as a way of protecting “national security” in the wake of intense pressure 
from China to increase her foreign resources in  iron and ore and other 
resources. In most cases, regulatory responses against SWFs are 
unjustiﬁed, given that most SWF investments are portfolio investments 
and do not involve a controlling stake in the company. Moreover, SWFs 
have had a track record of being passive long-term investors and there 
have been no instances where strategic assets have been purchased or 
political leverage exerted against recipient countries.
6.2. Lack of transparency and governance
The lack of transparency of such funds is also a concern. In fact, 
the seven least transparent sovereign wealth funds are estimated 
to account for almost half of all SWFs’ holdings. These funds tend 
to originate from countries with relatively low levels of institutional 
development.
The extent to which SWFs are transparent, as well as whether 
low disclosure is related to other institutional factors is examined in 
Figure 10. A corporate governance index for SWFs proposed by Truman 
(2007) is used as a measure of transparency, which is then compared 
to two indicators of institutional development including (i) an index 
of the quality of the legal system and ii) an index of the democratic 
accountability of the government. 
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Figure 10(i)
Transparency and legal system
Source: European Central Bank, 2008
Figure 10(ii)
Transparency and democracy accountability 
Source: European Central Bank, 2008
It is evident that a large degree of heterogeneity in transparency 
exists. In addition, there is a systematic pattern whereby SWFs with low 
transparency are associated with economies with low scores in quality of 
the legal system and/or democratic accountability. This combination of low 
corporate governance standards with low levels of democratic accountability is 
likely to raise concerns and in turn, may aggravate protectionist pressures.
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However, there may be valid reasons as to why SWFs do not 
disclose details of their investment activities. Given their size, SWFs 
have the ability to materially inﬂuence the prices of particular securities. 
Disclosure of their investments may result in large price impacts, as 
well as increasing the risk of investors who may ‘shadow’ their portfolio 
adjustments to earn windfall proﬁts.
7. International standards for SWFs
Developing an international consensus around standards and 
guidelines for SWFs may be helpful in improving the governance 
structures of SWFs and reduce the risk of a protectionist backlash 
against SWF investments. 
7.1. IMF response
In response to a spate of investments made by SWFs, the G7 
requested that the IMF and OECD develop best practices for both 
recipient countries and on the investor side of SWFs. As a result, the 
IMF-sponsored ‘SWF International Working Group’ was established 
in May 2008 and its members represent SWFs from 23 nations. In its 
recent meetings in July, the SWF International Working Group has 
been focused on developing a set of self-regulating industry guidelines, 
also known as ‘Generally Accepted Principles and Practices’ (GAPP). In 
particular, the GAPP will address issues of increased transparency and 
voluntary disclosure for SWFs. The group will meet again in September, 
with an aim to develop a set of guidelines by October (IMF, 2008).
7.2. OECD response
In April 2008, the OECD released a report of guidelines for 
recipient countries and their policies towards investments by SWFs. 
These guidelines are based on existing investment instruments 
which call for the fair treatment of investors, with a commitment to 
non-discrimination, transparency, progressive liberalisation and 
undertakings not to introduce new restrictions. 
A process of regular ‘peer review’ among recipient countries is 
also encouraged, to monitor observance of the above principles.
7.3. EU response
In addition to the development of international guidelines, the 
141Fariborz Moshirian
European Commission is also proposing a common EU approach to 
deal with issues of transparency, predictability and accountability. It 
is expected that a voluntary code of conduct will be developed, with 
standards in areas of transparency and governance. 
In the area of governance, the standards will deal with issues 
such as:
• Clear allocation and separation of responsibilities
• Issuing of an investment policy that deﬁnes the overall objectives of 
SWF investment
• Operational autonomy for the entity to achieve these objectives
• Public disclosure of the general principles of a SWF’s relationship 
with government authorities
• Disclosure of general principles of internal governance that provide 
assurances of integrity
• Issuing of risk management policies.
Similarly, in the area of transparency, the standards will address: 
• Annual disclosure of investment positions and asset allocation
• Exercise of ownership rights
• Disclosure of the use of leverage and of the currency composition
• Size and source of an entity’s resources
• Disclosure of the home country regulation and oversight governing 
the SWF
8. Conclusion
If SWFs continue to grow as they have been to date, the implications 
are a shift in asset allocations and the emergence of a new investor class 
in the market. At the same time, concerns arise regarding their threats to 
ﬁnancial stability, lack of transparency and non-commercial objectives. It 
is important when dealing with SWFs to consider their many beneﬁts over 
the risks. Furthermore, there exists scope for improving the transparency 
and accountability of SWFs through the development of international 
standards for both SWFs themselves and their recipient countries.
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is important when dealing with SWFs to consider their many beneﬁts over 
the risks. Furthermore, there exists scope for improving the transparency 
and accountability of SWFs through the development of international 
standards for both SWFs themselves and their recipient countries.
The success of China, India as well as an increase in the income 
of oil exporting countries as well as resource rich countries such as 
Australia and Chile are going to increase the amount of capital ﬂowing 
into different parts of the world in the form of the SWFs. Some of 
the investment opportunities such as access to mines in iron ore and 
other resources by Chinese companies in Australia would be treated 
as national security in Australia. Similarly, attempts by Chinese 
companies, supported by their SWF to acquire some of the strategic 
companies in the US or in Europe where China would get access to 
military technology would be seen as national security issues.
Financial globalisation is removing many national barriers for 
foreign investment. Capial is more mobile than ever before. At the same 
time, the growth in SWFs has created an interesting dynamic in the 
process of ﬁnancial globalisation. 
It should also be noted that the voluntary codes of conduct for 
SWFs proposed by the IMF and others may not necessarily reduce the 
fear raised by some countries or groups, as some of these SWFs could 
still operate in a less transparent way. However, such challenges could be 
similar to some other capital ﬂowing to offshore centres and tax havens. 
At the same time, the process of regional and global ﬁnancial integration, 
as extensively discussed by Li, Moshirian, Pham and Zein (2006) and 
Moshirian (2007), could lead to better international codes of conduct for 
all investors around the world which in turn could ensure that SWFs 
would also become more transparent in their reporting activities.
In the Asia Paciﬁc region, discussion on an Asian Union by 2020, 
similar to the EU model, could reduce tension between China and other 
countries that are currently the recipients of capital from China. In the 
same way that Germany and France or Spain are able to work closely 
together and not see the acquisition of resources as a national security 
threat, it is possible, subject to realistic progress towards an Economic 
Union in Asia, that China owning mines in Australia may no longer be 
an issue of national Security. However, as long as some political tension 
remains amongst major countries such as China, Russia and the US, 
aspects of SWFs could remain a controversial issue for the 21st century.
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Fariborz Moshirian has written a very interesting analysis of 
sovereign wealth funds. After providing an overview of sovereign wealth 
funds, Moshirian discusses their implications for ﬁnancial stability and 
in particular their investments during the subprime crisis. The paper is 
informative. I will suggest that it is less convincing, though, about the 
issue of risks and concerns than about the other topics covered.
Moshirian is adding to a very new research area. A search on 
SSRN in early September 2008 turned up 20 distinct papers on sovereign 
wealth funds. All of them have 2008 dates for completion of the working 
papers. The papers themselves cover a variety of topics relating to 
sovereign wealth funds, including papers on law and suggested practices 
for sovereign wealth funds1. 
What is a sovereign wealth fund? As Moshirian indicates, sovereign 
wealth funds are government-controlled investment vehicles that own 
and manage government assets.  Maybe partly because of the speciﬁc 
issues that I will raise, I will use the name “government investment 
funds” sometimes to mean the same thing as “sovereign wealth funds.” 
The name “sovereign wealth fund” is less obvious than it might be, at 
least in terms of American uses of the words. “Sovereign” is seldom used; 
“wealth” is all-encompassing and therefore somewhat vague. From one 
point of view, deﬁnitions don’t matter as long as they are clear. Sovereign 
wealth funds could just as well be called “RRR” and, if “RRR” is deﬁned 
the same as “sovereign wealth fund” is deﬁned, then the analysis would 
be identical. While logically correct, names can affect thinking.
Comments and Observations on the Paper
by Fariborz Moshirian Sovereign Wealth Funds and 
Subprime Credit Problems
Gerald P. Dwyer Jr.
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
University of Carlos III, Madrid
1 A search for related words did not turn up papers on SSRN, so it is not just a matter of a 
new name being used for an old research topic.
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What are the concerns about government investment funds? 
Government investment funds invest in other countries. It seems to 
me that there basically are two concerns. First, a foreign government 
might take actions that destabilize ﬁnancial markets. Second, a foreign 
government might affect the military technology available to a country. 
This effect can occur if a foreign government gets access to military 
secrets. A foreign government also might restrict a country’s access to 
military assets in the country or take actions that make military assets 
in the country vulnerable.
The issue concerning ﬁnancial stability is whether a sovereign 
wealth fund might take ﬁnancial actions that destabilize markets in 
a way that makes residents of another country worse off. Stated this 
way, my immediate answer is “Yes.” There is no reason to think that 
governments have the well-being of foreigners in mind when making 
choices. The predominance of stabilizing actions in markets is due to 
agents’ self-interested attempts to maximize their wealth. Governments 
are not generally motivated by maximization of their wealth.
A more pertinent question is whether sovereign wealth funds’ 
actions that adversely affect ﬁnancial stability are likely to be rare or 
relatively common. The investments made by sovereign wealth funds 
since the onset of the subprime crisis suggest they can make stabilizing 
investments, although this is limited and equivocal evidence2. 
The evidence in Moshirian’s paper in another context suggests 
that the returns on government investment funds typically are lower 
than returns on mutual funds and other investments. This generally is 
interpreted as evidence of incompetence.
The lower returns also can be interpreted as evidence of sacriﬁcing 
returns to pursue other goals. And indeed, it does not take much of a 
search to ﬁnd evidence of investments made for reasons other than 
maximization of the value of the fund’s assets. For example, the People’s 
Republic of China agreed to use $300 million of its foreign exchange 
reserves to buy Costa Rican government bonds and to provide additional 
2 In fact, the losses on the investments could be interpreted as evidence that the investments 
were destabilizing. At the time of the investments, the subsequent losses were not so 
obvious.
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annual aid to Costa Rica. These actions were in exchange for Costa Rica 
switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic 
of China (Bowley, New York Times, September 12, 2008.)
Nonetheless, my supposition is that sovereign wealth funds 
probably do not take actions that destabilize ﬁnancial markets much more 
often than other investors. Why? The government with an investment 
fund generally has to be willing to make people in its country worse off 
to make people in other countries worse off3. On the other hand, it is 
improbable that a general statement can be made that countries will 
not take actions merely to make others worse off. Governments do take 
actions that make people in other countries worse off even though they 
make people in their own countries worse off – think of war. In fact, 
government sometimes engage in wars with other countries with the 
express purpose of making citizens of other countries worse off.
This brings up the general issue of sovereign wealth funds and 
national security. When a foreign government buys assets in a country, 
it is possible for the country’s national security to be compromised. In 
some ways, this is a tough topic to analyze.  People often say that national 
security is improved by some government action that just happens to 
beneﬁt them personally. This suggests skepticism, although it does not 
make the issue bogus. For example, it would make little sense for the 
U.S. government to allow the Russian government investment fund to 
buy a defense contractor in the U.S.
It is hard to get beyond either the obvious or mere assertions 
concerning government investment funds and other countries’ national 
security. This issue deserves a serious analysis. Restrictions on sovereign 
wealth funds’ investments in foreign countries are inevitable.
Overall, this paper is an informative, early summary of sovereign 
wealth funds’ characteristics. It also does a nice job of summarizing the 
investments by those funds during the subprime crisis.
The paper ends by saying “[A]s long as some political tension 
remains amongst major countries such as China, Russia and the US, 
3  This is generally correct if the investment fund is small relative to other countries, but not 
all investment funds are small and it is not the small ones that raise concerns.
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aspects of SWFs (sovereign wealth funds) could remain a controversial 
issue for the 21st century.” I would turn both clauses into unconditional 
predictions: Political tension will continue amongst major countries 
such as China, Russia and the U.S. Related aspects of sovereign wealth 
funds will continue to be controversial for the 21st century.
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Part I
I.1. - The original sin: subprime policies
Economists of the world over have inundated the media and 
scholarly publications with essays explaining the causes of the turbulence 
provoked by the subprime mortgage loan crisis. Few had foreseen, well in 
advance, that the possible outcome if this high-powered lending business 
was combined with the explosive growth of the ﬁnancial derivatives 
market1. Their warnings went unheeded, both by the mainstream of the 
profession  (most economists viewd to produce “proofs” of the excellent 
properties of derivatives), by policymakers (whose sole aim, for reasons 
we shall see, was to bolster the real economic growth rate) and by market 
operators, who wallowed happily in the risk they were creating.
The explicit cost of this situation is estimated at around one 
trillion dollars, half already recorded and the rest still to be written 
off as bad debts. This already substantial cost has been followed by 
astronomical stock exchange losses – which may possibly be recouped 
– and incalculable losses in real economic activity and in credibility.
Yet again, we are faced with a dual failure: market  and government 
failures. The ﬁrst part of the present work does not aspire to treat this 
highly philosophical and intensely polemical topic but instead to go to 
the roots of the crisis, which are not in fact those that most post-crisis 
analyses have examined. In Part II, we will argue that those analyses 
have not provided an exhaustive explanation and offer a synthesis with 
some suggested supplements. The Appendices formally presents and 
brieﬂy discusses our reference model. The model does not consider the 
role of the ﬁxed exchange rates applied by some of the leading trading 
powers, though this is a key aspect of the diagnosis set out in Part I.
The weakness of the explanations that have been suggested is 
that they depict the subprime crisis as a sort of parthenogenesis of the 
institutional order in being (consisting of both ﬁnancial instruments and 
regulations). True, some reference has been made to the pathological 
behaviour of the markets, along the lines of the “irrational exuberance” 
of the “dot.com” boom, but very little attention has been paid to proper 
pathology, i.e. the violation of the existing rules, and less still to the far 
more pernicious market pathology of ignorance. In fact, this ignorance 
1 See Paolo Savona, “Derivatives, Money and Real Growth”, in Review of Financial Risk 
Management, Vol. 3, no. 4, Dec. 2007 (but submitted on Feb. 1, 1996).
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was fed in part by the rush of economists to demonstrate empirically that 
derivatives were enhancing the efﬁciency of individual choices and the 
rationality of market performance. Since its inception in 1996, I must say, 
the AssCarli-Cesiﬁn Colloquia have raised valid objections, but without 
denying the invaluable function of the market – if, of course, it is well 
managed2. 
Our approach is to go back to the policy origins as the ﬁrst 
cause of the problem. We reject the parthenogenetic explanation, 
i.e. the argument that the crisis was endogenous to the institutional 
arrangements of the ﬁnancial markets; that thesis, in our view, can 
explain the markets’ overreaction in the face of the initial dimensions of 
the problem and its rapid spread across the globe.
The real genesis of the crisis lies in the legacy of the defunct 
Bretton Woods system. The legacy was claimed chieﬂy by the United 
States and accepted passively by the rest of the world (Britain and 
Europe, and especially its core, the euro area). “En route”, let is be said, 
that legacy was shorn of the convertibility of the dollar into gold and 
the control of international capital movements. America continued to 
create dollars, because the rest of the world was willing to hold them, so 
it could continue to sustain domestic demand in excess of own resources. 
American economists have advanced two mirror-image explanations: 
Kindleberger, Despres and Salant contend that the US payments deﬁcit 
reﬂects differing liquidity preferences between global areas – higher in 
the rest of the world than in the United States. Bernanke and others 
have argued instead that in some countries the propensity to save is 
greater than the propensity to invest, and accordingly that the United 
States performs a precious service for the rest of the world by investing 
this excess saving. The validity of this thesis could be tested only if 
the United States had in place an economic policy designed  to stop 
domestic demand from outrunning America’s internal resources, once 
it has been recognized that the ﬂexible exchange rates suggested by 
the abandonment of Bretton Woods have not worked as expected; and if 
America were to forgo the dollar’s dual role as domestic and international 
2 The AssCarli-Cesiﬁn Colloquia began at the initiative of prof. Alberto Predieri who 
suggested analyzing the economic and legal impacts of the uncontrolled diffusion of 
ﬁnancial innovations on international markets. A group of experts met six times in Italy 
(in Florence, Venice, Foligno and, this year, in Lucca) to exchange views on the behavior of 
international monetary system and derivatives markets. The proceedings of the last four 
gatherings have been published by the two institutions.
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currency and accept an global standard of value (whether you call it 
“bancor” or SDR is a matter of indifference)3. 
As I have been arguing for some time now, with the derivatives 
boom the problem of dollar creation via the balance-of-payments 
deﬁcit no longer consisted solely in excessive domestic demand. The 
spot demand for dollars, large though it was, paled into insigniﬁcance 
if compared with the forward demand generated by derivatives, as 
reality has now made clear. Chasing spot demand and ignoring forward 
demand, central banks lost control of the potential money supply and 
of money and ﬁnancial market stability. And the world is now paying 
the price of a multifaceted crisis – with banking and ﬁnance in severe 
difﬁculties, economic activity slackening and inﬂation resurgent -
- because monetary policymakers’ hands are tied: they are obliged to 
pump liquidity into the market to ward off systemic crisis.
This problem, imposing enough in itself, has been compounded by 
the weakness of the formulas used to value derivative contracts, which 
– whether out of negligence or bad faith is hard to tell – misled the 
markets and the rating agencies. 
Another serious error was permitting the trade liberalization 
agreements reached under the WTO to be applied à la carte as regards 
the exchange rate regime. This accorded with the US desire to bolster 
its economic growth rate while running an external payments deﬁcit 
but clashed with the need for exchange rates to reﬂect the terms of 
trade between economies, i.e. for global competition to be based on 
the economic fundamentals and not on the ability of governments to 
maintain exchange rates incompatible with equilibrium and so generate 
mounting ofﬁcial reserves4.  The oil producing countries, and even more 
3 I have been insisting on this thesis in a number of articles and books (the last one in 
L’esprit d’Europe, Rubbettino, Soneria Mannelli 2007). Lawrence Summers recognizes 
this need but thinks it is impossible for the United States to deliberately seek such an 
adjustment. However, the adjustment could stem from the nature of things; that is, if the 
American economy goes into recession, provoking a “market” adjustment that economic 
policy as such would never be able to achieve [see La centralità perduta degli Usa (The US 
lost their world centrality), in Il Sole-24 Ore, August 31, 2008].
4 Elsewhere (“Global Development and the Dollar: a Conﬂict to Be Solved”, in Financing 
Development. The G8 and UN Contribution, edited by Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona and 
John J. Kirton, Ashgate, Adelshot 2007)  I have argued that the economic side of this reality, 
though casting worrying shadows over world growth, is less important than the geopolitical 
side, given that ofﬁcial reserves are being converted into euros – thus producing an appreciation 
of the European currency not justiﬁed by the area’s balance of payments – or used to create 
sovereign wealth funds – made, that is, into an instrument for altering the world socio-political 
equilibrium. The problem arose as a geo-economic issue but has now become geopolitical.
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importantly China, have in fact recouped the discarded part of the 
Bretton Woods legacy – ﬁxed exchange rates and capital controls – and 
reaped the obvious beneﬁts.
This is the reason why we believe that the current crisis, which 
was manifested in the subprime mortgage market, actually originated 
in “subprime” policies. That is where economists must direct their 
attention: to devising solutions that get at the causes, not just patching 
up the effects. Albeit with our reservations concerning geo-economic 
and geopolitical behaviour, we share the profession’s generally positive 
judgment of the way monetary and ﬁscal policymakers have coped with 
the crisis. But we cannot refrain from pointing out that in the name of 
realpolitik they have had to retract the incessant preachings of rigour 
that they had inﬂicted upon public opinion for so long and all the lessons 
they had so grandly dispensed around the globe.
In conclusion, the “original sin,” i.e. the genesis of the crisis, can 
be traced to:
(a) the economic policy of the United States (which, when it comes 
down to it, is simply politics), with its traditional ﬁscal and monetary 
support to domestic aggregate demand, joined more recently by the 
innovative forms made available by the market (the dot.com and real 
estate bubbles), with the corollary that the dollar is their currency and 
our problem5;  
(b) the possibility of trade being conducted under diverse exchange 
rate regimes and the free exploitation of ofﬁcial reserves for purposes 
other than dealing with adverse balance-of-payments situations. 
The parthenogenesis of the crisis, then, stemmed from: 
(c) allowing the derivatives market to develop in the unregulated 
over-the-counter sector6; 
(d) permitting the banks to dispose of their entire risk (inevitably 
the worst  assets) by shifting from the originate-to-hold model of credit to 
5 In Part II and in Appendix A.1 the emphasis is on the excesses of money creation by the 
Fed during the 24 months before the crisis, followed by a sudden rise in ofﬁcial rates, which 
led to an explosive acceleration of defaults on subprime mortgage loans. In my analysis 
these two aspects are considered the effect of the original sin: the pegging of the real growth 
rate for the US economy beyond domestic resources.     
6 A leading Italian expert of ﬁnancial innovations, Renato Maino, has produced a more 
detailed list of the impact of this development including the expansion of trading activity 
by new ﬁnancial intermediaries, an abnormal lowering of the risk premia, the fateful 
attraction of institutional investors in search of new investment opportunities, the new 
IFRS accounting rules.
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the “originate-to-distribute” system and thereby, de facto, circumventing 
the capital adequacy requirements;
(e) permitting trade in innovative ﬁnancial instruments to be 
founded upon valuations generated by probabilistic formulas based on 
unacceptable assumptions, calculations that some scholars have called 
“nonsense”7. 
We must act also on these system features, not only on policies, 
if we are to avoid the large-scale replication of the effects of the 
parthenogenetic component of the crisis. It has been estimated that 
subprime mortgage loans accounted for a mere 2 per cent of the entire 
stock of ﬁnancial liabilities in the United States, but the entire world 
economy went into crisis.
I.2. - The real estate bubble and the direct investment strategy
 
Since the 1970s an idea that has been gathering adherents within 
the economics profession and coming to inﬂuence policy choices is that 
the ﬁscal policy of deﬁcit spending had been overdone, crowding out 
economic activity. The consensus was that monetary policy is ineffective 
in providing real stimulus, partly effective in curbing inﬂation, but 
important in shaping expectations. There was a reversal from demand-
side to supply-side policies, concentrating on monetary and ﬁscal rigour, 
privatization and liberalization.
Bereft of Keynesian stimulus but spurred by  the need for 
growth, the market developed its own policies. At ﬁrst, these consisted 
in exploitation of the new information and communications technology 
and foreign direct investment. Later, when the dot.com surge was played 
out, the instrument became credit-ﬁnanced construction activity. The 
effect of the twofold economic policy rigour, then, was to call forth a new 
model of endogenous (market) growth, and in fact people began to talk 
about the “new economy”.
Economists may be divided into those who trace the business cycle 
to monetary instability (in particular the Chicago school) and those who 
see the cause in the instability of the real economy (the Keynesian school). 
A closer look at economic history suggests an alternation between cycles 
7 See James R. Thompson, L. Scott Bagget, William C. Wojciechowski, and Edward E. 
Williams, “Nobel for Nonsense”, in Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 29, no. 1, 
Fall 2006.
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that originate in money and ﬁnancial market disequilibria and others 
that are provoked by real economic disequilibria. This means that 
markets, of whatever type, are intrinsically instable and need careful 
policy designed to regulate their activities in the interests of stability.
The “new economy” manifested its instability in outbursts of 
what was rightly called “irrational exuberance,” but policymakers did 
little to render it rational. Instead, they worked for a “soft landing” to re-
enter into stability. With a market correction that involved plummeting 
stock exchanges, the “dot.com” cycle ceased to be the engine of American 
growth. Once again, however, the market, in conjunction with the 
desires of the Administration backed by the Fed, found the solution: a 
massive construction boom fueled by a mortgage market in which the 
originators of the loans transferred them to other investors in the form 
of derivatives.
The Bretton Woods-style American model was preserved (less 
ﬁxed exchange rates and capital controls), and with it the growth of 
the world economy. But as it entailed a massive balance-of-payments 
deﬁcit (5 to 6 per cent of GDP), the model also had to work for other 
countries if they were to be disposed to fund America’s excess domestic 
demand with their own savings. Foreign direct investment, which 
expanded enormously and in some periods actually exceeded exports, 
was the market’s tool for “squaring the circle” of global growth. Further, 
as the real estate bubble and direct investment nevertheless both 
require public policies to limit their undesirable effects – the former, to 
be sure, more strongly than the latter – in markets that are less than 
perfectly competitive; and as these initiatives came in an environment 
in which American monetary policy was one of benign neglect; and as 
the diversity of foreign exchange regimes altered the terms of trade, the 
mounting imbalances led to a crisis for global economic development.
This is not the place for a treatment of the complex geo-economic 
system within which world trade is conducted, which needs to be 
radically reformed by the great powers. All we want to do here is to 
emphasize the innovative vitality of the market, ever seeking growth, 
and the dire necessity for economic policy, or rather geo-economic policy, 
to move coherently to curb the market’s excesses and bring out its 
potential. It can also be observed, naturally, that this is easy to say but 
hard to do. Yet it has to be said; and above all, heeded.
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Part II
II.1. - Over-reaction and ﬁnancial distress
The pursuit of price and ﬁnancial stability is the aim of monetary 
management in a world where the importance of traditional paper 
money has lowered. In February 2007 large mortgage lenders started to 
report relevant losses, and credit spreads were affected; on August 9th 
BNP Paribas questioned the value of assets backed by US sub-prime 
mortgage debt held in its own funds (Cecchetti, 2008, p. 6). Short-term 
spreads increased fast, all market participants started looking at each 
others’ balance sheets and the supply of inter-bank lending dried up. 
The resulting higher ﬁnancial volatility reﬂected in the entire European 
and American yield curves, and forced central banks of G7 countries to 
intervene in order to sustain the inter-bank market liquidity and avoid 
a credit crunch.
The credit spreads increased thanks to the substantial mis-
pricing of risks and prices, allowed by ﬁnancial deregulation. The 
collateralization of ﬁnancial and real estate assets has fuelled credit 
supply. The result has been the fallacy of composition in the balance 
sheets of operators, as explained in greater details in the appendices 
by Masera and Mazzoni. In order to achieve a greater soundness, 
the correct valuation of assets and pricing should be put in the ﬁrst 
place of the agenda of G7 central banks and ﬁnancial ministers, and 
international authorities (IMF and BIS, among the others). The fallacy 
cannot be solved but at the balance sheet level.
The volatility and the drying up of liquidity and credit negatively 
inﬂuenced operators’ expectations, which hit their lowest value in 
Summer 2008. The combined negative effects of soaring inﬂation 
induced central banks to revise their action in the second half of 2008, 
from expansionary to restrictive. Nevertheless, the original sins and the 
roots of ﬁnancial distress have not been yet addressed and solved, and 
then the probability of success for central banks is quite low, resulting in 
the very negative growth forecasts for the world economy in 2008-09.  
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Graph.1
US Federal Fund and European Euribor Rates (Monthly, %)
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
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Graph.2
US Treasury Bond 10 Years Yield (Monthly, %)
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
Moving from this complex background, we argue that the hypothesis 
of agents’ rationality in ﬁnancial markets does not hold up. In particular, 
agents showed to have limited rationality (mis-pricing), while opaque and 
not-so-liquid OTC derivatives markets (especially credit derivatives) had 
negative monetary effects. This is supported by the results of the Appendix 
A.2, where we present an analytical model to price ﬁxed-income securities 
whose payoff depend on cash or derivatives underlying. In particular, we 
show how the convexity of the underlying affects both the pricing and the 
rating of these instruments. Closed form results are in fact presented for the 
derivation of PDs (i.e. the rating) and their time evolution and variance. 
 On the other hand, the problem of counterparty risk, deriving 
from OTC transaction, is analyzed in Appendix A.3, where we argue 
that this risk, which is generally underestimated in current models, can 
be assessed by considering the potential credit exposure as an exchange 
option between two portfolios of derivatives. 
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8 Savona, 2003; Savona et al. 2000; Violi 2000. 
9 This paragraph is synthesized from Oldani, 2008.
10 This is quite straightforward if considering standardized, liquid and marketable 
derivatives contracts (e.g. written on Treasury Bills, Bonds or stock indices). 
11 See the Lancaster utility model applied to money demand and ﬁnancial innovation 
(1971). 
The deregulation allowed the growth and spread of OTC 
derivatives, which exacerbated the ﬁnancial volatility, thanks to the 
leverage effect. At the present, risks produced in the ﬁnancial market 
are not counter-balanced (i.e. produce losses) and central banks are 
ﬁne-tuning their action (Cecchetti, 2008) under still small disclosure 
requirements. What deserves more investigation in the next future is 
the structural modiﬁcation of risk exposure, and moral hazard.
II.2. - The role of derivatives
Derivatives have a monetary nature, fairly close to the Keynesian 
speculative motive for money (L2)8, which has been ignored by the 
literature9.
The substitution of monetary assets by derivatives (and many 
other innovative ﬁnancial securities) can also work the other way round, 
since in the presence of low interest rates and abundant liquidity, the 
last is used to purchase innovative securities, fuelling the demand for 
monetary assets10. This process aliments itself, except when risks and 
credit spreads change, or inﬂation arises and modiﬁes the preferences of 
central banks. Unfortunately over 2007-08 both events took place. 
Derivatives have certain effects on the monetary transmission 
mechanism, in particular on monetary aggregates, on the portfolio 
substitution, on the interest rate channel, on the expectations setting. 
1. Effects on monetary aggregates
In the presence of portfolio substitutions, ﬁnancial operators 
substitute monetary assets with liquid derivatives (e.g. rolled over T-Bill 
futures). This modiﬁes the information content of aggregates; aggregates 
are measured and deﬁned on the basis of the monetary function of their 
constituents, and on their relationship with the underlying economic 
activity. When ﬁnancial substitution takes place, assets loose relevance 
in the transmission mechanism, and are crowded out11. The crowding 
out is due to improvements in the system of payments, where there are 
160 SUBPRIME CREDITS OR SUBPRIME POLICIES? THE DERIVATIVES CONUNDRUM
better tools for the payment of debt, and to ﬁnancial substitution. In 
consumer-portfolio theory individual preferences are set toward special 
characteristics, like liquidity, proﬁt (or costs) and risk. Introducing more 
attractive ﬁnancial assets in the market crowds out less efﬁcient and 
less attractive securities, improving the liquidity and pricing process of 
the innovative assets. This process is demand driven, in the sense that 
the ﬁnance industry introduces innovative instruments on a daily basis 
to satisfy customers needs; the market decides which innovation is going 
to survive, and “kills” other securities, by eliminating the demand. By 
looking at American non-M2 components of M3, we observe that there 
are efﬁcient substitutes in derivatives market, both Exchange Traded 
and OTC. US M3 consists of M2 plus institutional money funds (IMFs), 
certain managed liabilities of depositories, namely large time deposits 
(LTD), repurchase agreements (RA), and Eurodollars (EU$). The 
Eurodollar futures and options contracts involve relevant resources, are 
traded since the Seventies, and are liquid and deep. The same risk-return 
proﬁle of a time deposit and repurchase agreement can be obtained by 
means of rolled over Treasury Bills (and Bonds) futures and options. 
The result of the prolonged substitution of monetary assets on 
wide monetary aggregates is the decision took by the US Federal Reserve 
to cease the measurement and disclosure of M3, after Bernanke took 
his ofﬁce, because such monetary aggregate does not provide signiﬁcant 
information on the underlying economic activity. The European Central 
Bank, on the contrary, considers the wide money aggregate M3 in its 
monetary strategy, but has never matched its desired growth rate. 
Since 2006 the US Fed relies on a new measure of wide money: 
Money Zero Maturity (MZM). It is composed of M2 less small-
denomination time deposits plus institutional money funds. These 
monetary assets provide useful information on the American economic 
activity, and indirectly conﬁrm the lack of information provided by 
the Eurodollar, large time deposits (LTD), and repurchase agreements 
(RA). 
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Graph.3
US Money (Monthly, $ Billion)
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
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Graph.4
EMU Money Growth Rate (Monthly, %)
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
2. Effects on the portfolio substitution
Portfolio substitution is inﬂuenced by ﬁnancial innovation. A 
very basic example is the time deposit, which is ﬁnancially equivalent 
to a portfolio with a short future on bond, and a long position on the 
underlying bond12. The spread of derivatives in portfolios is the result 
of the evolution of the payment system and can modify the dynamic of 
money and monetary base, on the basis of the degree of substitution. 
Moreover, the Goodhart law, which, after observing the evolution process 
of money, states that once you ﬁnd statistical evidence or a rule the 
market circumvents it, offers a powerful explanation of the behavior of 
ﬁnancial markets, when a deﬁnition of money is taken.
12 The underlying bond can be deﬁned by the cheapest to deliver strategy. See Hull (2002) 
for details, and Angeloni and Massa (1998) on the economic equivalence.
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13 We are not alone: see Pablo Triana, 2006. 
Financial derivatives increase the speed of adjustment of ﬁnancial 
markets, but at the same time introduce opaque market correlations. The 
efﬁciency of ﬁnancial derivatives shorten the time necessary to respond 
to sudden changes in yields, spread and risks; this is a sign of pricing 
efﬁciency and market liquidity, but is also the effect of the leverage and 
the collateralization. The higher speed in the adjustment process has to be 
managed in a different way from the past, and, as underlined by Cecchetti 
(2008), over the recent months the US Fed “improvised”. The pricing 
rules of derivatives rely on restrictive hypotheses, such as the existence 
of complete market, of the risk free rate, and the log-normal distribution 
of returns (Hull, 2002). We have doubts on the effective reliance on these 
hypotheses13, and if our doubts were true, the spread of derivatives 
would modify the markets’ and portfolio correlations coefﬁcients, altering 
hedging strategies and dramatically reducing their effectiveness.
The economic consequence of ﬁnancial replication is the selective 
replacement of inefﬁcient assets. This structural process is not costless, 
and needs a funded balancing system, and, most of all, a reliable 
regulation and monitoring system to avoid herding. 
3. The interest rate channel
The interest rate channel of monetary policy is heavily affected 
by derivatives (Savona et al., 2000, Violi 2000, Fan et al 2007). The 
structure of the banking system and ﬁnancial markets determine both 
the speed and magnitude of the response of interest rates to monetary 
actions. Since markets and operators are very mature, the response of 
bank lending rates to monetary actions is relatively small, and longer 
policy actions are required to achieve the desired effect (Sellon 2002). 
The possibility to hedge allows ﬁrms to soften the blow if interest rates 
unexpectedly rise, weakening the impact of the maneuver (Fan et al 
2007). The changes in ﬁnancial structure have modiﬁed the working 
of the interest rate channel of monetary policy, and it can now work 
through the capital market as well as the banking system. 
Monetary policy is concerned with ﬁnancial innovation because 
it modiﬁes the effectiveness of policy implementation and its ability to 
achieve targets. Monetary policy in most G7 countries relies on interest 
rate management, to achieve price and ﬁnancial stability, employment, 
or to support an exchange rate target. Some central banks rely on the so 
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called Taylor rule, where the central bank short term interest rate reacts 
to deviation of the output from its potential level and to deviation of the 
inﬂation rate to the desired level. The literature investigated different 
speciﬁcations of the rule (Carare, 2005) on the basis of different periods, 
which altered coefﬁcients and reactions. 
A fully speciﬁed Keynesian model can be solved in the presence 
of a modiﬁed Taylor rule to explicitly consider the target of ﬁnancial 
stability, other than output and inﬂation (Oldani, 2008). The modiﬁed 
Taylor rule can be speciﬁed as:
 
    (1)
where t denotes time, e is the expected value, r the interest rate, 
y is the output,      is the inﬂation rate,    is the exogenous value of 
the natural rate of interest,      is the ﬁnancial volatility and u is the 
error term. Empirical evidences (Oldani, 2008) support the statistical 
relevance of ﬁnancial volatility in the Taylor rule on US data. The lack 
of a long time series for Europe makes not possible the investigation, but 
the role of ﬁnancial derivatives on the European credit system has been 
already accepted and the Bank monitors futures and options markets to 
extract markets sentiment.  
4. The expectation setting
Financial markets inﬂuence the entire economic system via investors 
conﬁdence, and the wealth effect. The recent experience tough us that 
expectations inﬂuence the central bank interest rate setting; or is the other 
way round? Bidirectional effects cannot be ruled out. As a matter of fact, 
the ECB (2000) explicitly acknowledges the information content provided 
by interest rate derivatives; derivatives prices incorporate information on 
different characteristics associated with market expectations.
Soderlind and Svensson (1997) survey most applied techniques to 
extract market expectations from ﬁnancial securities for monetary policy 
purposes. In particular, they underline the importance of implied forward 
interest rates and options prices to extract future time paths, or even the 
entire probability distribution (in the presence of very deep markets). An 
investigation of Japanese data (Nakamura and Shiratsuka 1999) conﬁrms 
their theory. The econometric exercise on the ECB interest rate movements 
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(Vahamaa 2005) adds that market expectations are asymmetric around 
monetary policy actions14, and that they change around policy maneuvers. 
The slope of the yield curve is usually viewed as a useful indicator 
of expectations about economic activity and inﬂation. Financial markets 
anticipate and “price in” changes in the ofﬁcial rates in determining the 
prices of assets. Derivatives contain information on different aspects 
of uncertainty, e.g. swap spreads, or the implied volatility of options. 
The implied volatility of German Bund future options increased 
during 1999–2000 while the implied volatility of three-month Euribor 
future options (the most important European banking rate) decreased 
steadily over the same period. The increase in uncertainty on German 
bonds failed to have a negative inﬂuence on the Euribor, while short-
term uncertainty diminished. The information coming from ﬁnancial 
markets, including the derivatives market, is taken into account in 
the way the ECB conducts monetary policy, but “Market expectations 
extracted from ﬁnancial asset prices cannot be a substitute of future 
economic conditions.” (ECB, 2000) This seemingly simple statement is 
in fact a strong statement on the role of expectations. Those coming from 
ﬁnancial markets cannot substitute those referring to future economic 
conditions. Financial rumors, or temporary deviations in asset prices, 
cannot inﬂuence monetary policy. 
Moving further from the monetary nature of single contracts, a 
pioneering study (Upper 2006) looks at the existence of a statistically 
signiﬁcant relationship between derivatives activity and the perception 
of monetary policy—the perception is captured by the unanticipated 
variation of the interest rate. The hypothesis is that derivatives are 
able to anticipate future ﬂuctuations in monetary policy. Up to now, the 
literature has investigated it on the other way round, i.e. how monetary 
policy inﬂuences future prices. The exercise is run on monthly data 
(February 1999–June 2006) to abstract from day-to-day ﬂuctuations 
on G3 countries, the US, Canada and Japan, characterized by highly 
liquid and developed ﬁnancial systems. Derivatives considered in the 
analysis are exchange traded futures contracts written on Federal 
Funds, Eurodollar, Euribor, and Euroyen, which are the most traded and 
liquid contracts in these countries. Derivatives activity is represented 
by the turnover of futures contracts. The limit of the exercise is the 
14  Vahamaa (2005) shows that market participants attach higher probabilities for sharp yield 
increases than for decreases around policy tightening. This conﬁrms that expectations change 
around policy actions, and that they return to normal only after the change has taken place. 
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use of Exchange Traded contracts, which have various good substitutes 
in OTC contracts15. The relationship between derivatives activity and 
changes in the interest rates is positive and visible in the G3 countries 
and Europe. Empirical results conﬁrm that all variables are statistically 
signiﬁcant except for the anticipated changes, which have no effect on 
turnover for any contract. Changes in expected interest rates rather 
than actual changes affect trading in derivatives on short-term interest 
rates16.  Upper’s study, although limited to three countries, shed light 
over a reverse causation among monetary policy and ﬁnancial markets 
that merits further research. 
Financial global governance is missing, but allowing free access 
to all operators to powerful ﬁnancial securities has not eliminated global 
risks. Financial derivatives are one of the most interesting expressions of 
animal spirits, but since we are not sure that markets can automatically 
reach equilibrium, nor that all market players are fully rational, we 
support a certain degree of monitoring over these securities. Derivatives 
have been referred to by practitioners in the ﬁeld as being very similar 
to hell: easy to enter and almost impossible to get rid of.
To sum up, working like the turbo in the engine, derivatives 
exacerbated losses, fuel turbulence, and alimented panic after August 
2007. The fault of authorities has been ﬁrst to deny their role since the 
last ten years, regardless of huge resources allocated in the business, 
and not to consider their economic effects after.
II.3. Soaring inﬂation and global slowdown
A concrete source of danger for the stability of the world prosperity 
is the sharp rise in inﬂation; according to the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics (2008), global consumer price inﬂation is running 
at an annual pace of nearly 51⁄2 percent, compared with less than 4 
percent average in recent years. This acceleration in headline inﬂation 
in large part reﬂects the impact of higher energy and commodity prices, 
but is also the result of benign neglect on commodities, and ﬁnancial 
15 Data referring to OTC contracts cannot be employed for estimates, because they are not 
sufﬁciently detailed, and the breakdown is too rough. 
16 Upper (2006) admits that using higher frequency data might change these results, and 
that the econometric tests on stationarity provide contrasting evidence, suggesting that the 
robustness check might not support the evidence univocally.
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markets. The seeds of inﬂation have been thrown on the global market 
since year 2000; in that year the US Federal Reserve reverted the policy 
stance, from restrictive to expansionary, and reduced Federal Fund 
rates to help the US economy to land softly. The cheap money ﬁnanced 
US consumption and the real estate market. Another relevant mistake 
in the global architecture has been to allow emerging economies to 
unilaterally peg their currencies to the US dollar, regardless of their 
trade structure; this pushed for excessive foreign exchange reserves 
accumulation, which have been invested in the G7 ﬁnancial markets. 
The monetary expansion pushed down the short time segment of 
the yield curve; the long-term segment of the curve has been inﬂuenced 
by the excess supply of US bonds, to ﬁnance increasing public and war 
spending, and this supply has been happily purchased by China and 
other emerging economies. At the present currency reserves exceed 
US$3 trillion, and US debt exceeds US$ 5 trillion. This expansion came 
with a strong deregulation of credit, banking and ﬁnancial systems. 
An interesting interpretation of the dynamics of commodity prices 
is that by Jeffrey Frankel (Harvard University, 2008) who explains that 
the sudden increase in commodity prices is due to carry trade strategies 
by speculators, especially Over The Counter. Very low interest rates 
registered in the last ﬁve years in the US, Japan and Europe increase 
the demand for storable commodities, or decrease their supply, through 
3 channels. The ﬁrst is the decreased incentive for extraction today 
rather than tomorrow; the reason lies in the opportunity cost of 
extraction of oil, exploration of gold, or breeding of cattle. The second 
is the increasing ﬁrms’ desire to carry inventories (especially those 
strategic and particularly expensive, like oil or natural gas inventories 
held in tanks). The third is the growing speculation, which shifts in 
spot commodity contracts, and out of Treasury Bills; by looking at US 
data, it comes out that there is a strong negative covariance between 
commodity price index, and Federal Fund rate (Graph 5).
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Graph. 5
Frankel view: carry trade strategy
Source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
Exit way is trough increasing liquidity injections to avoid a 
systemic crunch.
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Appendix *
by Rainer Masera and Giancarlo Mazzoni
Valuation, Capital Requirements, Accounting Standards and 
the Role of  Derivatives
Valuation problems represented one of the key issues highlighted 
by the recent crisis. The ﬁnancial crisis that began in late July 2007 
represented the ﬁrst test of the new complex (derivative-based) 
structured-ﬁnance products, markets, and business models that had 
developed over the past decade. The absence of liquid markets, and 
the interaction of credit , funding and liquidity risk drove market 
valuations down to levels below theoretical assumptions: occasions of 
market failure emerged.
The absence of active markets for complex CDS credit products 
and the observed sales at prices below the theoretical value of 
their underlying cash ﬂows have presented challenges to ﬁnancial 
institutions. 
The abnormally tight market liquidity conditions during the crisis 
intensiﬁed discussions on the role of fair value. While many view fair 
value as the best indicator of asset value at the time of measurement, 
taken on its own it may not be the best measure for making long-term, 
value-maximizing decisions. This arises because fair value reﬂects a 
single, point-in-time exit value for the sum of all the risks the market 
assigns to the asset, including credit and liquidity risks. If the market 
overreacts in its assessment of any risk component, then fair value will 
reﬂect this.
Some of the key assumptions and inputs used in valuation models 
of derivative-based assets proved inadequate, especially assumptions of 
single common factors and of independence between default probabilities 
and recovery rates. Practitioners relied on relatively limited datasets 
to estimate default probabilities, especially in the case of subprime 
mortgages. 
During the upturn, the booming demand for derivative structured 
products boosted valuations and banks’ proﬁts and equity. Conversely, 
during the downturn, valuations became depressed as demand and 
* The authors take joint responsibility for this Appendix.
A.1 was mainly prepared by R. Masera; A.2 and A.3 were mainly written by G. Mazzoni.
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liquidity evaporated. It is thus arguable that fair value accounting 
did not provide accurate information about the banks’ true risk proﬁle 
through the cycle. The frequent incremental revisions in bank write-
downs after the onset of the turmoil further reduced market conﬁdence. 
When ﬁrms use fair value levels to implement decision rules, such as 
asset sales, scenarios are triggered that both generate unnecessary 
realized losses for the individual ﬁrm and contribute to a downward 
spiral of the asset price, thus compounding market illiquidity. 
The recent crisis has also illustrated signiﬁcant problems in 
the use (and usefulness of) credit ratings of structured products. In 
particular, the methodologies used by credit rating agencies were not 
able to capture the complexity of these instruments, given their multiple 
tranches and their susceptibility to rapid, multiple-notch downgrades. 
The complexity of these instruments led to an over-reliance on credit 
ratings by market participants.
Credit ratings have been a key input for many investors in the 
valuation of structured credit products because they have been perceived 
to provide a common credit risk metric for all ﬁxed-income instruments. 
In particular, when reliable price quotations were unavailable, the price 
of structured credit products often was inferred from prices and credit 
spreads of similarly rated comparable products  for which quotations 
were available.
Although credit rating agencies insist that ratings measure only 
default risk, and not the likelihood or intensity of downgrades or mark 
to-market losses, many investors were seemingly unaware of these 
warnings and disclaimers. In any event, major mistakes were detected 
in agencies’ models.
This ﬁnancial market crisis also revealed important implications 
deriving from the new capital adequacy framework.
The increased risk sensitivity of Based II raised  concerns about 
procyclicality, especially in a situation of market turmoil. Undercapitalized 
banks, because of large write downs,  tend to make abrupt decisions 
to cut lending when there is evidence of a slowdown. Increased risk 
sensitivity under Basel II may help  dampen some of these procyclical 
effects by increasing risk awareness and early detection of emerging 
problems, but any risk-sensitive capital framework will cause capital 
requirements to ﬂuctuate non-linearly if a borrower’s creditworthiness 
strengthens or weakens.
In the internal-ratings-based approaches, the potential for 
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procyclicality is enhanced, and  supervisors’ demand to increase capital 
buffers exacerbated this situation.
The intensity of cyclicality is increased by the application of the 
new accounting standards, which led in many instances to equating fair 
value with mark-to-market and/or mark-to-model, even in situations of 
evident market failure.
In the ﬁrst section of this appendix (A.1) all these aspects are 
analysed by trying to assess the risk of a possible fallacy of composition: 
what holds for the individual, may not hold for the group as a whole. 
The risk that the hardened application of the capital and accounting 
standards may amplify the slowdown in economic activity, possibly 
leading to a recession, is assessed.
In the second section (A.2) we present an analytical model to 
price ﬁxed-income securities whose payoff depend on cash or derivatives 
underlying. In particular, we will show how the convexity of the 
underlying affects both the pricing and the rating of these instruments. 
Closed form results are in fact presented for the derivation of PDs (i.e. 
the rating) and their time evolution and variance. 
In the last section (A.3) we argue that the counterparty risk 
deriving from OTC derivatives, which is generally underestimated in 
current models, can be assessed by considering the potential credit 
exposure as an exchange option between two portfolios of derivatives.
A.1 FALLACY OF COMPOSITION
Valuation, liquidity and capital in the ﬁnancial industry: micro and 
macro perspectives in the light of the new accounting principles, 
the revised capital standard and the derivatives explosion.
by Rainer Masera
A.1.1 SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this note is to examine the challenges posed by 
the new dimension of the ﬁnancial turmoil as of mid 2008.
The current phase of turbulence is a sequel to the original 
shocks which emerged in the spring of 2007. But the character of the 
new environment is different and more complex. Liquidity and capital 
management come at the forefront, with micro and macro drivers. More 
speciﬁcally, there is now an interaction of monetary and regulatory 
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policies with the workings of the capital standard and the accounting 
principles. The paradox is that accommodating monetary policies - as 
synthesised by monetary base growth and negative real interest rates 
- may go hand in hand with the onset of a credit crunch. The issue of 
a potential fallacy of composition is explored. Investors fear that the 
period of ﬁnancial turmoil may be prolonged and deep with recessionary 
developments and continuing inﬂation, defaults of corporations and 
delinquencies by households and hence further writedowns for ﬁnancial 
intermediaries, in respect of non-performing loans, with the need to 
raise more capital. The dilemma for monetary policy is compounded by 
the complex impacts of derivatives and by the fact that base interest 
rates are low when confronted with headline inﬂation, but households 
and companies have to pay high risk premia to offset the anticipated 
risks of illiquidity and default. Hence effective interest rates are much 
higher. This is especially so when real interest rates are measured by 
deﬂating for core inﬂation rather than headline inﬂation.
The note is structured as follows. This introduction offers and 
overview of the real and ﬁnancial sides of the crisis which erupted in 
2007 (a more comprehensive interpretation and analysis is offered in 
Masera (2007) and (2008).
The second paragraph addresses the issue of the various facets 
of the notion of liquidity. The third paragraph examines the reasons 
of the crisis in valuation models of derivatives structures - the heart 
of the crisis -, and the implications for ﬁnancial institutions through 
the working of new accounting standards. The credit channels are then 
examined in paragraph IV, in the light of the Basel II capital regime. The 
risk of a fallacy of composition leading to a self-feeding credit crunch is 
ﬁnally analyzed and some concluding remarks are offered, also with 
reference to regulatory policies.
The main features of the 2007 ﬁnancial crisis are summarized in 
Chart 1 and outlined in this ﬁrst paragraph. 
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The new Basel II framework more closely aligns regulatory 
capital requirements with actual risks, which should lead institutions 
to make better decisions about extending credit, mitigating risks, and 
determining overall capital needs. 
More speciﬁcally, if we focus our attention on asset classes 
affected by the turmoil we note that according to the new rules the 
risk weights applied to residential mortgages will be subject to a much 
more reﬁned differentiation depending both on the credit worthiness of 
the borrower and on the potential for loss on the exposure. Similarly, 
Basel II attempts to more fully capture risks in securitized assets held 
both in the banking and in the trading books. For example, under the 
securitization approach of Basel II, capital charges are based on explicit 
assessments of the credit quality of the instrument. In contrast, under 
Basel I, capital charges had little relationship to underlying risk, being 
based instead, for example, on an instrument’s maturity and whether 
it was on- or off- balance sheet. In particular this tended to create 
regulatory arbitrage incentives.
However to gain a better understanding of this market turmoil 
it is important to recognize that the ﬁnancial system has been deeply 
reshaped by three relevant structural changes which have seriously 
affected its soundness:
- the insufﬁcient/ineffective monitoring performed by banking 
intermediaries handling structured products;
 - the shift from the Buy-and-Hold (B&H) to the Originate-to-
Distribute (OtD) intermediation model;
- the explosion in the use of complex derivatives structures, without 
proper understanding of their liquidity, funding and credit risks.
The growth of the Originate-to-Distribute approach in the 
mortgage market played an important role in the rapid expansion of 
mortgage lending (especially in US) until the recent market turbulence. 
That expansion was concentrated in the subprime and alt A segments 
of the mortgage market, where underwriting deteriorated at the point 
of origination. To an ever-increasing extent from around the middle of 
2005 until about mid 2007, originators made loans that layered multiple 
sources of credit risk, including low documentation of borrower income, 
very high combined loan-to-value ratios, and loans with nontraditional 
payment schedules that sometimes allowed principal and interest 
payments to be deferred. In an environment of compressed risk spreads, 
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investors have more difﬁculty signaling concerns about credit risk, 
which may have reduced the incentives for originators to maintain 
strict underwriting principles.
On the other hand, the Originate-to-Distribute model of 
securitization created severe agency problems in which the agent (the 
originator of the loans) did not have the incentives to act fully in the 
interest of the principal (the ultimate holder of the loan). Notably, the 
incentive structures often tied originator revenue to loan volume rather 
than to the quality of the loans being passed up the chain. These agency 
problems resulted in lower underwriting standards, giving borrowers 
with weaker ﬁnancial positions access to larger loans than they should 
have had. Investors in mortgage-backed securities apparently ignored 
the importance of these agency problems and did not adequately 
understand the risk characteristics of the securities they were holding.
The legal structure of structured products’ contracts behind 
credit derivatives represents another factor which can deteriorate the 
stability of the system by making more convenient for creditors to push 
the defaulting counterparties to bankruptcy rather than trying to rescue 
them. 
Evidence emerges both from market practitioners and academic 
research (Hu and Black, 2008), that the incentives to avoid bankruptcy 
may have changed substantially. In fact, creditors who buy protection 
have developed a strong legal and economic incentive to push companies 
experiencing repayment difﬁculties into bankruptcy, rather than help to 
rescue them.
A crucial instance of the weaknesses in the infrastructure of 
ﬁnancial markets was represented by the collapse of Bear Stearns.
During the week of March 10, 2008 rumors spread about liquidity 
problems at Bear Sterns, which eroded conﬁdence. Its counterparties on 
thousands of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives contracts would likely 
have had serious difﬁculty promptly determining their vulnerability to 
counterparty losses. Furthermore, their efforts to replace the hedges 
provided by those contracts would have placed additional pressures on 
markets that already were quite stressed. Likewise, providers of short-
term secured funding through repurchase agreements (repos) and other 
forms of secured funding, including money market mutual funds and 
other conservative investors, could have unexpectedly found themselves 
holding various forms of collateral rather than the liquid funds they were 
expecting. These investors would probably have been hard-pressed to 
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dispose of this collateral and to manage their liquidity needs in a highly 
stressed environment. In light of potentially systemic consequences of 
a failure of Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve took emergency action in 
the bailing out of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan - Chase. 
The shift of banking model from B&H to OtD determined 
important changes also for the role played by credit rating mechanism 
that, in some sense, has become an indicator of liquidity. 
The credit rating mechanism showed major weaknesses, and 
attention has been paid more to the rating itself than to its stability. 
Transition matrixes should indicate how likely it is that an instrument 
becomes illiquid within a short time, but conﬂicting indications arose 
notably with respect to CDSs. The stability of transition matrixes can, 
in any event, be questioned because of the shift from B&H to OtT.
Credit rating modelling rests on the assumption that transition 
matrixes would be fundamentally stable and can be therefore relied 
upon to estimate credit risks also from a forward looking point of view. 
The problem which arises is similar to that identiﬁed by New Classical 
Macroeconomics with respect to the use of macro-econometric models: 
expectations and market behaviour can bring forth instabilities in 
estimated parameters and relationships.
In retrospect, it is clear that investors were too reliant on credit 
ratings: because many of the securities were rated very highly by the 
credit rating agencies, investors did not understand the underlying 
risk and had a false sense of safety. Many structured ﬁnance products 
experienced multiple downgrades. The credit ratings agencies’ failure 
to correctly assess these underlying risks further undermined investor 
conﬁdence and worsened market worries about future movements in 
the market.
When these problems came to light, investors--including leveraged 
ﬁnancial institutions--took large losses as the values of mortgage-
related assets were marked down in anticipation of higher defaults on 
the underlying collateral. The market for newly issued subprime and 
alt-A mortgage-backed securities virtually closed, and the availability of 
jumbo mortgages dried up. Banks were caught with assets they couldn’t 
securitize, which put further pressure on their capital positions.
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A.1.2. BASE MONEY, ASSET LIQUIDITY/ILLIQUIDITY, 
EXTERNAL LIQUIDITY (FUNDING)
Before examining the linkages between liquidity, valuation 
and capital management in the current ﬁnancial crisis, it is useful to 
address brieﬂy the various facets of the notion of liquidity. The term 
liquidity is in fact often used loosely to refer to different concepts. This 
has been so for quite a long time. Going back to Keynes, in the Treatise, 
he deﬁned as more liquid an asset than another if it is “More certainly 
realizable at short notice without loss”. In the simpliﬁed portfolio of the 
General Theory – where bond stands for a bundle of securities in general 
-, money is “the liquid asset” , all other assets are non-liquid. 
Drawing on Keynes, Hicks (1967) marked the distinction between 
different concepts by referring to money as the (i) fully liquid asset. He 
then drew the line between: (ii) more or less liquid assets, i.e. assets 
that have some degree of liquidity and (iii) quite illiquid assets, which 
have no degree of liquidity being unsellable without notice, or having no 
prospect of being sellable without notice in any probable emergency. 
This analytical approach is still useful: I have simply made a 
further distinction by separating base money from broader moneys, 
and by considering the liabilities of the Central Bank as the only fully 
liquid asset in the spectrum. Recall in this respect the common notion 
of central banks injecting liquidity into the banking system. The set of 
liquid/illiquid assets is not deﬁned on an a priori basis. A lesson of the 
2007/2008 ﬁnancial turmoil is precisely that apparently liquid assets 
can become quite unsellable in conditions of stress. 
In general terms, therefore, we can identify three distinct facets 
of the concept “liquidity”.
The ﬁrst one is precisely that of central banks injecting or 
absorbing liquidity from the system. We refer here to base money and 
the dual concept of very short term interest rates;
The second phenomenon refers to the possibility of buying or 
selling assets in the market without causing signiﬁcant movements 
in prices, and therefore generating limited losses in value (often this 
is also deﬁned as “market liquidity”). Before the summer 2007, many 
intermediaries relied on complex ﬁnancial structures in order to 
liquidize more and more large categories of assets. 
The presence of guarantors, the security-like nature of  products 
(with the absence of direct links to the underlying asset, i.e. the collateral), 
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the extensive use of regulatory arbitrage and a favorable monetary policy 
context created the illusion that ABS and other structured securities as 
CDO notes could allow aggressive leverage policies. 
A more analytic deﬁnition of liquidity, as the one presented here, 
shows that the sole always-liquid asset is base money, while every other 
instrument’s liquidity depends on several external conditions, such 
as opportunity costs and the existence of an efﬁcient market. When 
external conditions change (increasing interest rates, a rise in expected 
default rates, rating agencies’ errors, information problems and so on) 
investors’ conﬁdence may fall and markets become less liquid (high 
spreads required), or totally illiquid, enlightening the poor ﬂexibility of 
hypotheses behind valuation models.
There is, ﬁnally, a third concept of liquidity which must be indentiﬁed: 
this refers to the difﬁculty that ﬁnancial institutions (and other entities) 
can meet in “external funding”: this is the notion which is often referred 
to when reference is made to “banks facing a liquidity crisis”. Funding 
as a source of external liquidity is clearly intimately related to the two 
notions of liquidity previously examined: the principal link is related to the 
impairment of market liquidity of assets which can be used as collateral. 
The revolution in central banking reﬁnancing techniques in 2007-2008 
shows, in particular, the links between “funding” and “base liquidity”.
The three concepts outlined here are summarized in Chart 2.
 
Chart 2
Base money, asset liquidity/illiquidity, external liquidity (funding)
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A.1.3. VALUATION MODELS IN CRISIS AND THE ACCOUNTING 
PRINCIPLES
Financial innovation and use of complex and sophisticated 
derivative structures (OTC products) posed important challenges in 
terms of valuation.  The analytical implications of evaluating complex 
derivative-based ﬁnancial assets are explored in Dufﬁe and Garleanu 
(2001), Gordy (2005), Masera (2008). Two points may be underlined here: 
(i) the lack of robustness of many valuation models, which effectively 
broke down when the recognition of counterparty risk ignited illiquidity 
and funding problems, and (ii) the intrinsic weakness of OTC customized 
derivatives (especially CDS based) under stress.
The recent market turmoil revealed important weaknesses in 
banks’ risk management systems. It raised at the same time a number 
of issues regarding both the valuation of complex or illiquid ﬁnancial 
instruments and the degree of transparency on those positions (Chart 3).
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The valuation of assets and liabilities has implications for an 
institution’s ﬁnancial position and the reading of its performance by 
users of ﬁnancial statements. It inﬂuences measures that are of key 
importance for banking supervisors in carrying out their responsibilities, 
such as regulatory capital and risk weighted assets. 
The main challenges posed by the market turmoil in terms of 
valuation of complex or illiquid ﬁnancial instruments can be summarized 
as follows: 
- Fair value pricing and accounting (according to IAS/IFRS) and the 
existence of an active market.
 - Practices and governance surrounding the use of modelling 
techniques.
 - Appropriate risk factors to be considered when determining a fair 
value.
 - Implications for risk management in banks.
 - Complexity of accounting designations (Chart 4).
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Prior to the market turmoil, complex structured and bespoke 
credit products were often valued on the basis of a variety of inputs as 
there was little secondary market activity. Valuation models included 
the pricing of instruments on the basis of new originations for similar 
products or the use of consensus pricing services (including market 
indices). 
The drying up of liquidity in some markets took many ﬁnancial 
institutions by surprise. The sudden disappearance of pricing inputs 
that were deemed observable prior to the crisis necessitated the quick 
development of new modelling techniques. The complexity of products 
to which the models had to apply was compounded by governance issues 
arising from the need to develop and verify these methodologies under 
signiﬁcant market, resource and time pressures. 
In this environment, signiﬁcant differences and inconsistencies 
were observed between and within institutions as regards the process 
of resorting to modelling techniques.
On the whole, valuation difﬁculties were more acute for institutions 
which, prior to the crisis, relied only on few pricing sources. This is 
especially true when such pricing sources were deemed observable in 
markets with thin liquidity and when institutions did not have a clear 
assessment of the underlying risks and components of a transaction.
These difﬁculties were often ampliﬁed by the lack of appropriate 
resources (both in terms of quality and quantity) dedicated to model 
approval and review, independent price veriﬁcation and stress testing, 
as well as internal control units. 
As a result, signiﬁcant heterogeneity was initially observed 
between institutions with respect to the modelling techniques and 
input factors considered for the valuation of similar instruments. 
While differences between modelling techniques are not a cause of 
concern as such, there have been doubts as to whether the modelling 
techniques and the related input factors were in all cases adequate for 
the determination of reliable fair values. 
The market turmoil demonstrated that institutions were not 
always fully aware of the risks that they were incurring with respect 
not only to sub-prime but also to other exposures affected by the crisis. 
It can be questioned whether institutions carried out the necessary due 
diligence analyses before engaging in activities that involved the issuing 
of or the investing in structured products. 
This applies in particular to the criteria that have been applied to 
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select the investments and the relevance of such criteria for the valuation 
of the products. Institutions should not solely rely on external ratings to 
guide them in their investment decision. External ratings should only 
be one factor or criterion that they use in their decision. It is crucial 
in that context that institutions obtain sufﬁciently detailed disclosure 
on the assets underlying securitised or structured products and their 
performance. Such information is key not only for investment decisions 
but also for the capacity to produce sufﬁciently reliable valuations in 
times of stress. More generally, the characteristics of the information 
sets available to market participants represent the main determinants 
of the form and the efﬁciency of the market.
The breaking down of valuation models has profound effects 
on ﬁnancial institutions through the workings of the new accounting 
standards.
Fair value accounting, under stress conditions, led to mark-to-
market evaluations of all credit portfolios in trading books, and hence 
had immediate repercussions on P&Ls and balance sheets.
There are here two questionable steps (1). The ﬁrst is to assume 
that the fair value of an asset is the same as its true value. This is not 
the case, especially when markets are incomplete and when relevant 
asymmetries of information are present.
The second step is to assume that the marginal market price is 
the same as the fair/average price of an asset. This  is also incorrect. In 
general, marginal pricing determines equilibrium of ﬂow demand and 
supply, and can therefore differ from shadow average pricing for stock 
transactions.
The dichotomy is especially profound when conditions of stress 
prevail and instances of market failure occur. In these occasions markets 
are ultimately unable to deliver prices. The bid price is so low and the 
ask price so high as to preclude trade.
If (i) the quality of the assets is uncertain and heterogeneous, 
(ii) there are intrinsic difﬁculties in evaluating non-standardised 
assets while asymmetries of information prevail, and (iii) traders are 
occasional, the market is more prone to such market failures.
This is the situation originally described by Akerlof (1970) to 
interpret the market for “lemons”. Clear analogies can be drawn with 
the valuation of complex, synthetic CDO’s.
The relevance of instances of market failure in the current crisis is 
fully recognised by the Supervisory Authorities. Reference can be made, 
in this respect, to the explanation given in the US by the SEC to take 
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action to restrict (naked) short sales, with a view to avoid substantial 
disruption of securities markets. “Loss of conﬁdence can lead to panic 
selling, which may be further exacerbated by “naked” short selling. As a 
result, the prices of securities may artiﬁcially and unnecessarily decline 
well below a price level that would have resulted from the normal price 
discovery process.  If signiﬁcant ﬁnancial institutions are involved, 
this chain of events can threaten disruption of our markets”. Similar 
considerations had been expressed by the Fed, when emergency action 
was taken in the Bear Stearns case. 
Market exuberance implies that success is self-reinforcing, with 
ample liquidity and neglected risk factors. When the situation changes, 
a vicious circle can set in: higher spreads, fewer trades, loss of conﬁdence, 
even higher spreads, growing distance between marginal prices and 
intrinsic values.
The difference between mark-to-market and to mark-to-model 
widens, while liquidity disappears.
Mark to market accounting becomes, in this critical situation, 
a powerful engine of cyclical ampliﬁcation. If “moral suasion” of the 
authorities and of the accountants leads to forced sales in order to 
clean the books, the spiral is unavoidable. Distressed sales occur: this is 
inconsistent with the very principles of the new accounting standards. 
Fair value can be an exit price, but cannot be a price resulting from 
distressed sales or liquidations.
According to the FAS 157 wording “Fair value must represent the 
price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability 
in an orderly transaction between market participants”.
The combination of “forced sales” and “fair value equal mark-to-
market” exacerbates the negative swing of the cycle: even banks which 
do not need to sell  or transfer have to register the hypothetical proceeds 
of a disequilibrium transaction. Inefﬁcient prices are registered in their 
accounts.
Beyond these general considerations, more speciﬁc critical 
features of fair value accounting can be identiﬁed (see Bini (2008) 
and Rayman (2008)). In particular the banking industry is critically 
dependent on Principle 39, which by admission of the IAS Board, is 
one of worst accounting principles, because it is hard to understand by 
investors, difﬁcult to apply by banks and difﬁcult to monitor and audit, 
by supervisors and auditors alike. 
Additionally, the system is not based on a full goodwill principle. 
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For instance, an increase in interest rate implies a fall in asset values, 
but the corresponding increase in the goodwill of the liability side is not 
captured.
As Bini (2008) noted, had the current fair value accounting been 
applied during the 1982 Latin American crisis, all nine New York money-
center banks would have failed.
The principal element so far of mark-to-market accounting is 
related to the write-downs of subprime structured assets held on the 
banking and trading books of the banks. To recall, total write-downs 
recorded by banks since the onset of the ﬁnancial turmoil a year ago 
(Chart 5) amount to over $ 400 bln.
Chart 5
Estimates for Total Global Write-downs Continue to Increase
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Now, a new element has to be taken into account: impairment 
charges on goodwill.
As is known, the principal novelty of the revised accounting 
principles in this area, is that  total goodwill is no longer subject to 
amortization. Rather, when a permanent impairment takes place, the 
management of the company has to make the appropriate charges. 
These charges do not impact on current cash ﬂows and on proﬁt and 
loss accounts, instead they go directly to the balance sheet.
According to Zion (2008), as of June 30th 2008 aggregate 
impairment charges for S&P 1500 companies can be estimated in the 
order of $ 280 bln, with the bulk affecting the banking sector: Bank 
of America, Wachovia and Citigroup were mentioned, with estimated 
impairment amounts of $ 50,43 and 43 bln respectively. 
To recall,  the goodwill of S&P 1500 amounts to some $ 2 trillion. 
A different line can be taken to underscore the importance of goodwill 
and the likely impairment pressures. If adjusted book value is currently 
measured for many large banks, and then goodwill is subtracted, only 
a few banks have a positive, tangible, adjusted book. In many instances 
goodwill is a multiple of book. 
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A.1.4. LIQUIDITY AND THE CREDIT CHANNEL: TRADITIONAL 
AND NEW ELEMENTS
Combining the traditional credit channel view, the three-fold 
concept of liquidity, the new valuation paradigms and the revised capital 
standard it is possible to re-design the credit channel as in Chart 6. 
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The three traditional Mishkin channels are renamed as: “bank 
liquidity and credit”, “cash ﬂow and disposable income” and “net worth”. 
Three new relevant  channels can be identiﬁed: (i) the impaired bank 
funding, (ii) the new regulations on capital and accounting, (iii) the 
drying-up of securities markets. Looking ex-post at the dynamics of the 
2007-2008 crisis, the initial shock had a double nature: in part it was 
due to the end of a long period of accommodating monetary policy, and in 
part it came from a fall  in the value of real estate (collateral assets). The 
defaults and the consequent ﬂow of  real estate into banks’ balance sheets 
suddenly posed a funding problem, worsened by higher interest rates.
Other important linkages  came into play. First and foremost 
the complex interaction between derivatives markets and monetary 
aggregates and monetary policies created new paradigms in the 
relationships between monetary instruments, interest rates and 
economic activities, as has been demonstrated by Savona and Oldani 
(2008). Additionally, the perception that valuation models developed 
in connection to very complex ﬁnancial structures were inadequate 
created a conﬁdence shock. As a consequence, the O&T model, which 
had allowed banks to originate assets on a continuous basis and to 
operate on larger scales was no longer viable. Furthermore, as conﬁdence 
declined, securities markets experienced a severe excess of supply and 
dried-up, leaving on banks’ balance sheets a large number of assets that 
were no more liquid, thus posing on the one hand a valuation / net worth 
problem[1], and on the other hand aggravating funding problems. All 
that turned into a broad liquidity shock.
In such troubled scenario, a major role has been played by monetary 
policy and supervisory authorities. The coincidence of the ﬁnancial 
market turmoil, culminating with the liquidity crisis, and of the deadline 
for the enforcement of the new capital standard represented a challenge 
for central banks, both on a short-run and a long-run perspective. In the 
short-run, in fact, central banks had to avoid any “synthetic” negative 
event (like a second “Bear Stearns case”). Both the FED and the ECB 
have thus implemented more aggressive policies with respect to repo 
agreements and to monetary policy decisions (new collateral accepted, 
allowance of broker-dealer banks to the facilities in the care of the FED, 
the postposition of a restrictive cycle of ofﬁcial rates). At the same time, 
concern has risen with respect to the sustainability of new reﬁnancing 
policies in the mid-long term
196 SUBPRIME CREDITS OR SUBPRIME POLICIES? THE DERIVATIVES CONUNDRUM
A.1.5. CONCLUSION: BANKS AND CAPITAL IN 2008, A FALLACY 
OF COMPOSITION?
The acute phase of liquidity difﬁculties, the external funding 
crisis and the asset illiquidity which followed the subprime turmoil 
have been largely overcome with prompt and decisive actions by the 
FED and the ECB. They are however, for the ﬁrst time ever, taking 
huge amounts of collateral with uncertain valuation and rating. It is 
commonly accepted that these policies represent a temporary solution 
and a contingent facility to avoid systemic shocks on banks. Moreover, 
the present interest rate policy, in particular the FED’s one, may not 
be sustainable. Real interest rates, due to the combined effect of low 
nominal rates and high inﬂation rates, are again negative, adding to 
inﬂation pressures on a world wide basis in spite of a slow down in real 
economic activity.
Stylized facts in mid 2008:
 • Banks must maintain risk on their books: the originate-and-
transfer model is in structural crisis;
 • Overall credit ﬂows to the economy (households, corporations, 
foreign entities, public agencies) are re-intermediated through 
banks: securities markets have dried up;
 • New regulatory capital standard plus explicit pressure from 
the supervisory authorities to banks/investment houses to de-
leverage require banks to hold more capital as a ratio to risk-
weighted assets (plus 2% points in terms of Tier I), in spite of 
write-offs amounting to some $ 400bn, with the ensuing need to 
recapitalize in order to offset such losses;
 • Widespread rating downgrades;
 • Capital absorption requirements under Basel II are inherently 
procyclical.
 • Mark-to-market accounting has also procyclical features, which 
interact with the capital standard. 
All the above factors create pressures on cost and availability 
of credit for companies and households alike. The weakness in stock 
markets is partly a cause and partly an effect of the above mentioned 
developments. Financial institutions are especially hit, which leads to 
their difﬁculties of recapitalization. 
197Paolo Savona, Chiara Oldani, Rainer Masera, Giancarlo Mazzoni
The risk is now that corporate defaults and household delinquencies 
may rise beyond the path implicit in the cycle, whose difﬁculties are, in 
any event, compounded by oil prices, commodity and food inﬂation and 
wage demands.
Recent studies (Adrian and Shin, 2008) show that there is strong 
evidence of banks’ leverage procyclicality when assets and liabilities are 
marked to market. Self-feeding asset price processes take place during 
booms and busts.  Active balance sheet management is the fundamental 
cause of this phenomenon. Beyond such spontaneous policies of the 
individual banks, the procyclical inﬂuence of Supervisory Authorities’ 
recommendations to the whole banking system must be underlined. 
Through Moral Suasion they currently ask supervised institutions to 
de-leverage (de-risk), adding procyclicality to capital adequacy. These 
consequences are particularly relevant in the case of investment banks, 
whose liabilities are obtained from wholesale markets. 
In sum, the question can be reasonably put whether there is a risk 
of fallacy of composition (Chart 7): what holds for the individual, may 
not hold for the group as a whole. As Keynes indicated in the aftermath 
of the Great Depression, the attempt of every person to save more may 
result in lower aggregate income and saving by all the people.
Chart 7
A possible fallacy of composition
198 SUBPRIME CREDITS OR SUBPRIME POLICIES? THE DERIVATIVES CONUNDRUM
Mutatis mutandis, could the attempt of every bank to increase 
capital cushions to de-lever and to improve the solidity of its balance 
sheet result in lower capital held by all banks and lower aggregate 
income, if the credit crunch (Chart 8) were to imply higher defaults in 
the economic system?
Chart 8
Evidence of a Credit Crunch in the USA
Put it otherwise: the enactment of Basel II, the application of 
IASB fair value (mark-to-market) standards, the moral suasion by 
supervisory authorities to seek capital cushions even higher than those 
required by Basel II and to clean books, the sudden rigor of rating 
agencies, after the lapses and mistakes of the past, should require care 
to avoid the pitfalls of composition. 
In conclusion, major mistakes are at the original of the current 
crisis: too lax policies, exuberant (incompetent) utilization of complex 
derivatives structures and underpriced risks can be  pinpointed.
Also the signiﬁcant dangers of procyclicality inherent in the 
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interplay of the new capital standard and the  IFRS  and US GAAP 
principles were neglected.
These weaknesses had been recognized and underlined by a 
number of analysts, operators and policy makers, but with no relevant 
impact.
The hard lessons from the 2007/2008 experience must be fully 
absorbed, but the sudden rigor and hardened application of capital and 
accounting rules, coupled with disorderly de-levering, heightens the 
likelihood of a generalized credit crunch and a prolonged downturn. 
We must not throw the bab(ies) with the dirty water, but a pragmatic 
application of the standards is necessary, as well as a correction of 
certain inappropriate features. Application ﬁlters can be enacted for 
both standards. Banks must be empowered to respond of the ﬁnancial 
needs of the economy, whose fundamentals are still, in general, solid and 
merit support, as indicated for instance by the ratios of non-performing 
assets to total loans and to total capital (Tier I + Tier II). But they may 
be unable to continue to raise – in the markets and through SWFs  – 
the capital currently required to sustain lending and to avoid recession. 
Government capital injections will be necessary.
A.2
The pricing and the rating of ﬁxed income and structured 
products: cash vs. derivatives underlying
In this section (A.2) we present a simple analytical model to price 
ﬁxed-income securities whose payoff depend on cash or derivatives 
underlying. In particular, we will show how the convexity of the 
underlying affects both the pricing and the rating of these instruments. 
Closed form results are in fact presented for the derivation of PDs 
(i.e. the rating) and their time evolution and variance. To obtain clear 
results we use the simplifying assumption of an underlying portfolio 
characterized by an inﬁnite granularity.   
We assume that a portfolio, L, underlying a ﬁxed-income and or a 
structured security follows a stochastic behaviour:
[1]
For pricing purposes we must consider the equivalent risk-
neutral process:
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[2]
A security, V, whose payoff depends on underlying portfolio L 
must satisfy the following Partial Differential Equation (PDE):
[3]
To simplify our model we limit our analysis to securities with no
explicit time dependence,               . Time independence allows to obtain
easy results without affecting the main ﬁndings of the analysis. We can 
therefore rewrite [3] as an Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE):
[4]
We guess a solution of the form                . In this case we have:
    and
By using these results we can rewrite equation [4] as:
[5]
We therefore have:
                                             
    and
The general solution for the ODE is given by:
[6]
a and b must be determined by boundary conditions. We suppose 
that the derivative portfolio, V, written on L is continuously rebalanced 
to obtain a target delta,     ,  and a target gamma,    . The two boundary 
conditions are the following:
[7]                                          and
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From equation [6] we are able to derive:
[8]
[9]
Now we can obtain explicit solution for a and b:
[10]
[11] 
By substituting these last two equations in [6] we have:
[12]
We easily showed that a derivative security written on a given 
underlying portfolio L can be considered as a portfolio with both a linear 
and a quadratic exposure on L. 
By exploiting Ito’s Lemma and deﬁning:
                               
    and
we can derive the actual process followed by      and consequently by V:
[13]
[14]          =
  =
      can be considered as a coefﬁcient representing the “rate of linearity” of 
the derivatives portfolio/product. For example for     = 1 we have a linear 
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derivative products following the same dynamics of the underlying:
[15]
Lower values of     increase the “convexity” of the portfolio.    can 
assume also negative values, meaning that the linear exposure has been, 
at least in part, “shorted”, by increasing in this way both the expected 
return and the variance of the underlying portfolio. 
To keep the analysis as simple as possible we consider perpetuities 
BL and BV written respectively on the cash, L, and derivatives, V, 
underlying. In both cases we assume that the securities continuously pay 
a ﬁxed coupon C. Default arrives when portfolio values are respectively 
under LD
 and VD.  
In this framework it is easy to show that the prices of BL and BV 
are given respectively by:
[16]
[17]
RRL and RRV are the recovery rates while the risk neutral default 
probabilities are represented by:
[18]
[19]
We can therefore rewrite [16] and [17] as:
[20]
[21]
This framework allows an analysis of the pricing problems of ﬁxed 
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income products with cash or derivative (synthetic) underlying. Therefore 
we have an analytic tool allowing to analyze the main issues highlighted 
by the recent crisis. For example we can analytically derive the dynamics 
followed by the PDs and their volatility. The volatility of ratings represented 
in fact one of the main issues of the recent ﬁnancial turmoil.
To simplify the notation we deﬁne                   . By using Ito’s lemma 
the dynamics of the  is given by: 
[22]
while its variance is represented by:
[23]
By deﬁning                                 we can obtain in a similar way 
PDV and its variance:
[24]
[25]                
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A.3.  Counterparty risk and exchange options
Let’s suppose that we have simultaneously a long and a short 
position on two different portfolios of derivatives with the same 
counterparty. If we consider a given time horizon T the potential credit 
exposure deriving from these position can be simply considered as an 
exchange option, expiring at T, between the two portfolios, respectively 
S1 and S2. 
Therefore, the value of the counterparty risk can be assessed by 
pricing the corresponding exchange option. The analytical derivation of 
the value of an exchange option is summarized in the following.    
Under the risk-neutral measure two portfolio of derivatives are 
characterized by these two stochastic processes:
 
 
For
 
we derive immediately from the Ito’s lemma
 
we note that
 
it follows that
 
where                                  and                              . 
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By using again Ito’s lemma we obtain
 
we can also write
 
we may therefore conclude that under the risk neutral measure P   has 
the following distribution
We deﬁne
 
to verify that it is a martingale we note that
 
we can therefore see that
A new probability measure P* is deﬁned by setting
 
The value of an exchange option can be written as
 
where E[] is the expectation taken under the risk-neutral measure P. 
We can rewrite the previous expression as
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where E*[] is the expectation taken under the above-deﬁned P* measure. 
We already know the distribution of XT under P. To value the exchange 
option we have to determine its distribution under P*. According to the 
Girsanov’s Theorem 
 
is a standard brownian motion under P*. We can therefore infer that
 
By remembering that
 
and using the last two results we immediately see that:
 
we can therefore conclude that under the measure P* ln XT has the 
following distribution
 
Now we have all the elements to use a procedure similar to the 
one used to value European options to value this exchange option
 
where Z = ln XT. If we deﬁne         we
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n o t e  t h a t                                        a n d  Z  >  0  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o
.
We can therefore write
   
For                                          ,                is equivalent to
                                                         . We can therefore conclude that the 
value of the exchange option is equal to 

The Damage
“A company for carrying out an undertaking of great advantage, 
but nobody to know what it is.” This lure for the South Sea Company, 
published in 1720, has a whiff of the 21st century about it. Modern 
ﬁnance has promised miracles, seduced the brilliant and the greedy -
and wrought destruction.
Alan Greenspan, formerly chairman of the Federal Reserve, said in 
2005 that “increasingly complex ﬁnancial instruments have contributed 
to the development of a far more ﬂexible, efﬁcient, and hence resilient 
ﬁnancial system than the one that existed just a quarter-century ago.” 
Tell that to Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, AIG and 
Northern Rock. These are some of the most spectacular corporate 
casualties so far of the credit crisis.
The Money Machine
The industry has deﬁed gravity by using debt, securitization and 
proprietary trading to boost fee income and proﬁts. Investors hungry for 
yield have willingly gone along. Since 2000, the value of assets held in 
hedge funds, with their high fees and higher leverage, has quintupled. 
In addition, the industry has combined computing power and leverage 
to create a burst of innovation. The value of outstanding credit-default 
swaps, for instance, has climbed to a staggering $45 trillion. In 1980 
ﬁnancial-sector debt was only a tenth of the size of non-ﬁnancial debt. 
Now it is half as big.
Comments and Observations on the Paper
by Savona, Oldani, Masera, Mazzoni Subprime Credits 
or Subprime Policies? The Derivatives Conundrum
Bill B. Francis
Lally School of Management and Technology
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This process has turned investment banks into debt machines 
that trade heavily on their own accounts. Goldman Sachs is using about 
$40 billion of equity as the foundation for $1.1 trillion of assets. At 
Merrill Lynch, the most leveraged, $1 trillion of assets is teetering on 
around $30 billion of equity. In rising markets, gearing like that creates 
stellar returns on equity. When markets are in peril, a small fall in asset 
values can wipe shareholders out.
The Source of the Crisis  
• Cheap Money – I agree that it played a signiﬁcant role – perhaps the 
most important factor.
• It is not a sufﬁcient condition. Interests rates were lower in Japan 
and predated the lower rates in the U.S.
• Suggests that other factors were also at the root of the problem.
• Nevertheless one should not underestimate the crucial role that low 
interest rates have played in the current crisis.
The Source of the Crisis Contd.
It is always useful to start with the macroeconomic environment. 
In a sense, this is a crisis borne out of previous crises. 
An important difference between the recent period of sustained 
growth and previous periods is the low level of both short and long term 
real interest rates over the last 5 years, certainly relative to the last two 
decades.
The low short rates resulted from extremely accommodative 
monetary policy as industrial country central banks cut rates sharply 
to stave off deﬂation after the recession of 2001, and were not equally 
quick to raise rates as economies improved.
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Role of Low Rates
The U.S. was not by any means the highest in terms of price 
growth. Housing prices have reached higher values relative to rent or 
incomes in Ireland, Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and 
New Zealand for example, though not in Germany or Japan. 
The authors need to discuss why the crisis ﬁrst manifested itself 
in the U.S. One possibly explanation is that  it happened because the 
U.S. went further on ﬁnancial innovation, thus drawing marginal buyers 
into the market.
This begs the next question as to why ﬁnancial innovation went 
further here? 
Other Relevant Issues
Greed - Something that we are all very familiar with and has 
always been with us and will continue to be with us.
 So why are low Interest rates important - they occurred at a time 
when there were changes in the structure of incentives and resulting 
behavior of investment managers-managers of ﬁnancial assets ranging 
from those running insurance companies to those running venture 
capital and hedge funds.   
With lower interest rates and the changes in the structure of 
incentives there was a substantial increase in managerial incentives to 
take on more risk.
Two types are particularly important here.
Mechanism of Impact of Low Interest Rates
The ﬁrst, is well known and is traditionally known as “risk shifting”. 
When an insurance company has promised premium holders returns of 
6 percent, while the typical matching long-term bond rate is 4 percent, 
it has no option if it thinks low interest rates are likely to persist, or if it 
worries about quarterly earnings, but to take on risk, either directly or 
through investments in alternative assets like hedge funds.
The second type, is that of hedge funds themselves where a form 
of induced “risk shifting” can be seen. When risk free returns are low 
the fund may not even exceed the minimum required return if it takes 
little risk. Thus low rates will increase fund manager incentives to take 
on risk. Furthermore, since the cost of borrowing can also be low at such 
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times, fund managers can boost returns by adding leverage.  In doing so, 
they further add to risk.
The Search for Alpha
In other words, managers of these funds are rewarded for 
their ability to generate abnormal returns or in investment parlance 
“ALPHA”.
Managers of  “other ﬁnancial institutions” generate alpha through 
ﬁnancial engineering-investing in exotic ﬁnancial securities that are not 
easily available to the ordinary investor, or creating securities or cash 
ﬂow streams that appeal to particular investors or tastes. Of course, if 
enough of these securities or streams are created, they cease to have 
scarcity or diversiﬁcation value, and are valued like everything else. 
Thus this source of alpha depends on the manager constantly innovating 
and staying ahead of the competition.
Finally, alpha can also stem from liquidity provision. For instance, 
investment managers, having relatively easy access to ﬁnance, can hold 
illiquid or arbitrage positions to maturity. 
With increased liquidity, it becomes ever harder to generate more 
alpha? Put another way, as market inefﬁciencies are narrowed by the 
ﬂood of money, what can managers do to earn their keep? 
One option is to hide risk-that is, pass off returns generated 
through taking on systematic risk as alpha by hiding the extent of 
systematic risk. Since additional risks will generally imply higher 
returns, managers may take risks that are typically not in their 
comparison benchmark (and hidden from investors) so as to generate 
the higher returns to distinguish themselves.
For example, a number of insurance companies and pension 
funds have entered the credit derivative market to sell guarantees 
against a company defaulting.  Essentially, these investment managers 
collect premia in ordinary times from people buying the guarantees. 
With very small probability, however, the company will default, forcing 
the guarantor to pay out a large amount. 
Prudent man laws usually restrict the instruments that these 
ﬁrms can invest in - it begs the question how were they able to invest in 
these assets  -  that is  “how do you convert a pig - the Ninja loan - into a 
princess - the AAA bond the investors wanted?”  You securitize it. 
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 The ﬁnancial engineers were not content in providing the “plain 
vanilla” securitization. They created more complicated pools, bundling 
the securities sold by the mortgage pools into securities pools, and 
selling tranched claims against them. 
The following chart shows how $ 100 of sub-prime mortgages 
were converted into a large number of AAA bonds and sundry lesser 
quality securities. 
Thus were born the CDO, the CDO squared and so on. Over 95 
percent of securities thus generated were rated A and above, and 80 
percent rated AAA.
Note that this was facilitated by the rating agencies which certiﬁed 
securities and even advised issuers on how to dress their securities up 
so that they would just meet the rating agencies’ hurdle. 
Distribution of Subprime Loans
Year
All 
Subprime 
100%
AAA
80.8%
AA
9.6%
A
5.0%
BBB
3.5%
BB/Other
1.1%
2005 625 505 60 31 22 7
1Q06 140 113 13 7 5 2
2Q06 165 133 16 8 6 2
3Q06 160 129 15 8 6 2
4Q06 135 109 13 7 5 1
1Q07 95 7 9 5 3 1
2Q07 56 45 5 3 2 1
3Q07 28 23 3 1 1 0
Total: 2005
1Q07 1,402 1,133 135 70 49 15
Source: Inside Mortagage Finance, Morgan Stanley.
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Subprime Exposures
Total reported
subprime exposure
Percent of reported 
exposure
US Investment Banks 75 5%
US Commercial Banks 250 18%
US GSEs 112 8%
US Hedge Funds 233 17%
Foreign Banks 167 12%
Foreign Hedge Funds 58 4%
Insurance Companies 319 23%
Finance Companies 95 7%
Mutual and Pension 57 4%
US Leveraged Sector 671 49%
Other 697 51%
Total 1.368 100%
Note: The total for U.S. commercial banks includes $95 billion of mortgage exposures 
by Household Finance, the U.S. subprime subsidiary of HSBC. Moreover, the calculation 
assumes that that US hedge funds account for four-ﬁfths of all hedge fund exposures to 
subprime mortgages.
Source: Goldman Sachs. Authors’ calculations.
Greelaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008)
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Total Assent and Leverage
Source: SHIN (2008)
Implications for Monetary Policy
Rajan (2008) points out that this suggests an additional 
“behavioral” channel for the transmission of monetary policy than the 
ones we are familiar with, the traditional money channel, the borrower 
balance sheet channel (Bernanke and Gertler (1995)), the bank lending 
channel (see, for example, Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992) or 
Kashyap and Stein (1997)), and the liquidity channel (Diamond and 
Rajan (2006)).
From a policy perspective, this “behavioral” channel introduces new 
dimensions to thinking about monetary policy. Increases the importance 
of ﬁnance companies, insurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds, 
and venture capitalists at the expense of the banking system.
Equally important, it could have wider effects than through 
credit. It will affect asset prices, and could thus also amplify existing 
channels like the balance sheet channel, with the riskiest and most 
illiquid ﬁnancial assets or borrowers affected the most.  
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Currency Markets
The second area that the paper focuses on is that of the role of the 
currency market.   
As pointed out earlier the banks’ course was made possible by 
cheap money, facilitated in turn by low consumer-price inﬂation.  In 
more regulated times, credit controls or the gold standard or the Bretton 
Woods system restricted the creation of credit.  
Recently central banks have in effect conspired (through their 
tremendous reserve holdings) with the banks’ urge to earn fees and 
use leverage.  The resulting glut of liquidity and ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ thirst 
for yield led eventually to the ill-starred boom in American subprime 
mortgages. 
In fact central banks  from around the world have also been 
signiﬁcantly adversely affected by the crisis.
Carry Trade
Another aspect of the problems created by  the failure of the 
current currency system is that of carry trade.  
For e.g., Borrow yen at 1 percent and deposit proceeds in US 
dollars at 5 percent (or any currency with this kind of interest rate 
differential). If the spot exchange rate remains unchanged, proﬁt from 
interest rate differential.
The authors suggest that it is an important contributor to the 
current ﬁnancial crisis.  However, the mechanism  through which this 
occurs needs to be elaborated.   
It should be noted that this is a manifestation of the failure of 
uncovered interest rate parity which speaks to the failure of the current 
exchange rate system, as pointed out in the paper.
China
This brings us to the issue of China which the authors point out 
has beneﬁtted substantially from the ﬂawed currency exchange rate 
system currently in place.
We are currently going through an emerging market boom unlike 
previous cycles where the US was in a sense competing for capital 
with developing countries this time, China and other emerging market 
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recipients of capital ﬂows are not using them to ﬁnance current account 
deﬁcits, but rather to pile up international reserves, most of which are 
US treasury bills - China is ﬁnancing the US.
China needs a ﬂexible exchange rate to attain internal and 
external balance.
A global cooperative deal is a viable option with China, other 
asian countries, and oil exporters. 
This is something that Paolo Savona has been suggesting for 
quite a while. 
Derivatives
As  I pointed out earlier, the increasing difﬁculties in obtaining 
abnormal returns led to an increase in the number of exotic 
instruments.
The authors point out that these instruments are very difﬁcult to 
value and this difﬁculty has resulted in the fallacy of composition which 
has contributed to the present crisis. 
I agree that the pricing of derivatives is difﬁcult but what I 
question is the suggestion that the mis-pricing is due to irrationality. 
I think that it is more a case of lack of transparency in these exotic 
instruments and the accompanying lack of clarity in these prices. Thus 
from a policy perspective one of the goals is to institute policies that will 
lead to clarity in prices.  
Derivatives and Monetary Policy
An important point that the authors make is that with the growing 
importance of derivatives on the balance sheet of ﬁnancial institutions 
then monetary aggregates should account for derivatives.
The implication is that the transmission mechanism is no longer 
the traditional mechanism but also works through other ﬁnancial 
institutions besides banks. Note that this is a point that was made 
earlier in a different context.
Adrian and Shin (2008) also make a similar argument.  Speciﬁcally 
they argue that balance sheets of market-based ﬁnancial intermediaries 
provide a window on the transmission of monetary policy through 
capital market conditions.
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The following tables taken from their paper provides evidence 
consistent with this argument.
Table 1
Broker-Dealer Assets are Signiﬁcant
for Future Macroeconomic Growth
(i)
Consumption
(4Q growth)
(ii)
Durable 
Consumption
(4Q growth)
(iii)
Investment
(4Q growth)
(iv)
Housing
Investment
(4Q growth)
(v)
GDP
(4Q growth)
Broker-Dealer Variables
Asset growth (1Q lag) 0.003 0.048* -0.007 0.062** 0.005
Equity growth (1Q lag) 0.008** 0.013 0.026** 0.055*** 0.006*
Macroeconomic conditions
Lag of left hand side variable 0.746*** 0.468*** 0.873*** 0.829*** 0.812***
PCE core inﬂaction (1Q lag) -0.199 -2.225*** 0.247 0.344 -0.112
Fed Funds Target (1Q lag) 0.066 0.667 -0.342*** -0.253 0.003
Financial Market Conditions
S&P500 Return (1Q lag) 0.008 -0.002 0.039 0.041 0.009
S&P500 implied volatility VIX (1Q lag) 0.018 0.075 0.126** 0.183* 0.026*
10-year/3-month spread (1Q lag) 0.180* 1.456* 0.460 0.972 0.187**
Baa/10-year spread (1Q lag) -0.023 -0.182 -1.492** 0.367 -0.183
Constant 0.252 1.111 1.114 -7.078 0.238
Source: SHIN (2008)
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Table 2
Commercial Bank Assets do not have Additional Explanatory Power
for Real Activity (except for Housing Investment)
(i)
Consumption
(ii)
Durable 
Consumption
(iii)
Investment
(iv)
Housing
Investment
(v)
GDP
Broker-Dealer Variables
Asset growth (1Q lag) 0.002 0.050* -0.007 0.054** 0.001
Equity growth (1Q lag) 0.009** 0.015 0.026** 0.057*** 0.007*
Commercial Bank Variables
(Orthogonalized with respect to Broker-Dealer Variables)
Asset growth (1Q lag) 0.060 0.353 0.038 -0.045 0.027
Equity growth (1Q lag) 0.004 0.047 0.011 0.088*** 0.005
Macroeconomic conditions
Lag of left hand side variable 0.688*** 0.418*** 0.866*** 0.812*** 0.770***
PCE core inﬂaction (1Q lag) -0.199 -2.224*** 0.258 0.395 -0.022
Fed Funds Target (1Q lag) 0.092 0.716 -0.341*** -0.375 0.038
Financial Market Conditions
S&P500 Return (1Q lag) 0.006 -0.011 0.037 0.031 0.011
S&P500 implied volatility VIX (1Q lag) 0.020 0.081 0.125** 0.171* 0.036*
10-year/3-month spread (1Q lag) 0.232* 1.636* 0.452 0.542 0.167
Baa/10-year spread (1Q lag) -0.088 -0.658 -1.576** 0.388 -0.516**
Constant 0.339 1.426 1.315 -5.618 0.944
Source: SHIN (2008)
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Figure 8
Response of Housising Investment to Funds Shock (in units
of standard deviation) Comparison of Nonstructural Models
with and without Broker-Dealer Variables
Source: SHIN (2008)
Possible Extension
A valuable addition to the paper would be if possible to provide 
an analysis similar to this with a breakdown of the assets in terms of 
derivative products to see if most of the explanatory power is coming 
from the derivative holdings.
Of course this is subjected to data availability which may be 
difﬁcult to obtain.  A possible solution would be to use simulation.  This 
way a sensitivity analysis exercise could be done.  It is a lot of work and 
in fact may be a worthwhile paper on its own.
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Suggestions
Governance – The next paper presents preliminary evidence that 
the quality of governance within the particular ﬁnancial institutions 
matter. Several authors most notably   Bertrand and Mullainathan  (QJE, 
2001) show the importance of governance in mitigating managerial mis-
behavior.
There is the need for regulation that will mitigate the adverse 
effects brought about by the structure of the incentives. This regulation 
needs to be thought through much more carefully than the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act which has resulted in a lot of negative consequences.
Also regulation to control the adverse effects of securitization: 
For example, existing rules on capital adequacy require banks to 
put some capital aside for each asset.  If the market leads to losses, the 
chances are they will have enough capital to cope. Yet this rule sets up 
a perverse incentive to create structures free of the capital burden-such 
as credits that last 364 days, and hence do not count as “permanent”. 
The hundreds of billions of dollars in the shadow banking system-the 
notorious SIVs and conduits that have caused the banks so much pain-
have been warehoused there to get round the rules.  Spain’s banking 
regulator prudently said that such vehicles could be created, but only if 
the banks put capital aside. So far the country has escaped the damage 
seen elsewhere. When reformed capital-adequacy rules are introduced, 
this is an area that will need to be monitored rigorously.

Abstract
In this study, we empirically investigate how stock market and bond 
market react to the issuances of asset-backed (ABS) and mortgage-backed 
(MBS) securitizations. We document that securitization is generally 
associated with negative abnormal return in the stock market. This is 
true for both MBS and ABS securitization. However, when we break down 
our sample according the time period, we ﬁnd in the 1988-1997 time span, 
the overall stock market reaction to securitization is insigniﬁcantly from 
zero, while the above negative relation is mainly driven by securitization 
during the 1998-2007 time period. Focusing on a sample of securitization 
issued by banking institutions, we document the banking capitalization 
has important implication for the stock market reaction to securitization. 
In the regression analysis, we identify the size of the sponsor plays an 
important certiﬁcation role and is positively associated with announcement 
return, while frequent market participants have unfavorable market 
reactions on the announcement of securitization. Our results from bond 
market indicate that bondholders of asset sellers generally have positive 
excess return on the announcement of securitizations.
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1. Introduction
In the past three decades, capital markets have experienced an 
explosive growth of securitization and issuances of securitized assets. 
As illustrated in Figure 1 and 2, from 1988 to 2007, the gross proceeds 
of selling asset-backed securities have increased almost 13 folds, and 
reached the peak in 2006 with amount of 1.6 trillion in US dollars. 
Given the importance and prevalence of securitization in the past three 
decades, academic researchers and policy makers are concerned about 
its causes and consequences. More importantly, the recent ﬁnancial 
crisis resulted from the crash of sub-prime mortgage market raises 
a lot of question about securitizations.  In order to better understand 
this phenomenon, we conduct the study to investigate securitization 
through “special purpose vehicles” (SPVs) by different types of issuers. 
Speciﬁcally, we attempt to provide a comprehensive study on the 
wealth effects of securitization to different stakeholders of asset selling 
companies.  
Figure 1
Gross proceeds of securitization
according to types of assets ($millions)
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Figure 2
Gross proceeds of securitization
according to types of issuers ($millions)
The rapid growth of securitization market is due primarily to the 
awareness of certain important features possessed by securitization 
transactions and market acceptance.  The securitization process can 
potentially beneﬁts a wide range of participants in the securitization 
markets including consumers.  By selling the pooled assets to an SPV 
that issues securities and sell them in the market, the asset seller 
is able to replenish those funds from proceeds which are otherwise 
impossible. Asset selling companies can consequently initiate more 
loan originations.  With additional liquidity generated in securitization 
for ﬁnancial institutions, consumers are better of with more access to 
available credit in the form of mortgage, auto, student, home equity 
loans as well as credit cards.  Securitization can be a more efﬁcient 
way for ﬁnancial institutions and other credit providers to obtain 
additional funds in terms of ﬁnancing cost. If the efﬁciencies realized by 
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the marketplace through securitization can be passed on to consumers, 
consumers are better of to have credit with lower interest rates.  Without 
securitization market, it is highly likely that lenders facing high cost to 
raise addition fund are either unable to extend credit to borrowers or 
can only provide capital with higher cost.  
Securitization also beneﬁts investors with more investment 
opportunities. SPVs issues securities to the marketplace typically 
backed by numerous assets.  Investors can diversify their risk by invest 
in a pool of assets.  Moreover, according to the speciﬁc need of investors, 
securitized instruments can be structured accordingly to reach maximum 
ﬂexibility.  Investors then have more choices such as long-term vs. short-
term investment and ﬁxed rate vs. ﬂoat rate investment.  
However, Securitization, as a structured ﬁnance process is not 
free of criticism. Several serious frictions exist in the securitization 
markets (Ashcraft and Schuermann 2007) which can be potentially 
hazardous.  The agency problem and information asymmetry arising 
from these frictions can be detrimental to the markets.  Furthermore, 
securitization is structured to redistribute the credit risk to investors.  In 
reality, many ﬁnancial institutions retained signiﬁcant amounts of MBS 
instead of distributing them to investors, which consequently lead to a 
concentration of credit risk on those entities holding a lot of MBS.  The 
recent ﬁnancial crisis triggered by the failure of those mortgage companies 
and investment ﬁrms that have heavily invested in sub-prime mortgage, 
especially mortgage-backed securitizations (MBS) calls for a closer look 
at the process of securitization and its consequence.  In this paper, we are 
trying to comprehensively examine how stock market and bond market 
react to the securitization backed by different types of assets and issued 
by different types of asset sellers in different time period1.
In general, extending the existing literature (e.g., Thomas, 2001), 
we ﬁnd that stock market reaction to securitization changes over the time. 
Overall, securitization is generally associated with negative abnormal 
return in the stock market.  However, this negative relation is mainly driven 
by securitization in the post-1997 time period.  In the regression analysis, 
we identify the size of the sponsors play an important certiﬁcation role and 
is positively associated with announcement return, while issuing frequency 
1 In a separate study, we further look at whether corporate governance plays a role in the 
process of securitizations as well as whether market reactions to securitization depend how 
well assets sellers are governed.
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is negatively associated with market reactions on the announcement of 
securitizations.  Our results from bond market indicate that bondholders 
of asset sellers generally have positive excess return on the announcement 
of securitizations.  Moreover, our research also shed some light on banking 
regulation as we ﬁnd the high capitalized banks tend to get more favorable 
response from stock market, especially when they are new market entrants 
and issue securitization without agency ratings.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we 
introduce some institutional background of securitization and brieﬂy 
review prior research. Section 3 reports our data collection procedure 
and sample construction.  In section 4, we present our empirical results. 
Section 5 summaries and concludes.  
2. Prior research
2.1. Institutional background of securitization 
In this section, we brieﬂy review some important institutional 
features of securitization to provide a general background for our 
research.  
2.1.1. Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs)
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), also known as Special Purpose 
Entities (SPEs), are legal entities set up for a speciﬁc and particular 
purpose.  SPVs are a crucial component of the securitization process2. 
Without the creation of SPVs, securitizations would not take place 
because of the bankruptcy remote feature of SPVs.  
SPVs serve as depositories for speciﬁc groups of assets3 in a 
securitization.  In setting up a SPV, different types of assets  along with 
payments that borrowers are obligated to make to lenders are deposited. 
The payments received from a speciﬁc group of assets in turn form 
the basis for the SPV to make payments for principal and interests to 
investors who purchase the mortgage and asset-backed securities (MBS 
and ABS).  SPVs are carefully designed in the way that they cannot 
become legally bankrupt.  
2 Gorton, G. and N. S. Souleles (2005). “Special Purpose Vehicle and Securitization.” Working 
paper. 
3 Residential and commercial mortgages, home equity loans, student loans, auto loans and 
student loans with the commitment of borrowers to repay debts are typical assets of the 
lender that can be securitized.  
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Once a sponsor transfers a pool of assets to the SPV, the assets are 
isolated from that sponsor in the sense that even the sponsor enters into 
the bankruptcy procedure, its creditors cannot touch the speciﬁc pool of 
assets.  In order to make the SPV bankruptcy remote, it is necessary to 
constrain the activities of the SPV to incur debt.  SPVs do not have the 
right to conduct any activities other than those rights granted to them 
in the legal ﬁles creating and governing the securitization process and 
the SPVs. The bankruptcy remote feature of SPVs is very important 
in securitization because it prevent investors from taking extra risk 
beyond their expectation.  
2.1.2. Process of securitization and major market participants
Securitization involves necessary steps from setting up an SPV 
to sell securities to the market place.  During the process, there are 
several important participants who assume different roles.  A sponsor 
or originator creates the bankruptcy remote SPV, and transfers a 
pool of assets to the SPV.  An important concern in securitization is 
to determine the credit quality the pool of assets.  Based on publicly 
available rating criteria, credit rating agencies assign credit ratings on 
asset-backed securities.  Depending on the characteristics of the pool of 
underlying assets, credit rating agencies estimate the loss distribution, 
and determine the amount of credit enhancement that a security needs 
to reach a given credit rating.  Since the SPV’s available manual of 
activities is limited, credit enhancer helps to minimize the likelihood of 
lacking enough cash to make payment to investors.  The SPVs operate 
independently and need to employ a servicer who is responsible for 
providing customer service to the originators, making loan payments, 
contacting delinquent borrowers, and supervising foreclosures and 
property dispositions.  
The cash ﬂows backing the securitization are tranched into asset-
backed securities, the most senior of which are rated and issued in the 
market and purchased by different investors.  Investors tend to be large 
and sophisticated institutional investors such as private pension funds, 
credit unions, insurance companies, money market funds, banks and 
thrifts and mutual funds.  The proceeds obtained from issuing ABS or 
MBS are used to purchase the receivables from the sponsor.
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2.2. Related research
Asset securitization is becoming an important vehicle for issuing 
companies to recapitalize their loans, and it also provides important 
investment opportunities for a wide range of investors.  Given the 
importance and prevalence of securitization, a large amount of scholarly 
efforts, both theoretically and empirically, have been put into the 
understanding the causes and consequences. 
Once lenders provide funds to borrowers, the money is no long in 
the hands of lenders.  In essence, securitization provides liquidity to asset 
sellers though the motivations for doing so may vary.  Securitizations 
allow ﬁnancial institutions and non-ﬁnancial companies to sell off a 
large portion of ﬁxed income claims in their portfolios. It is possible that 
asset seller may get fresh capital at a lower cost than through direct 
borrowing, and improve their optimal risk allocation (Benveniste and 
Berger 1987; James 1988). As a consequence, securitization has the 
potential to change the wealth and the risk of the securitizing entity 
(Greenbaum and Thakor 1987).  
As we discuss early, the process of securitization involves many 
participants such as originators, credit rating agencies, assets managers 
and investors.  In the process of securitization, there is a great amount of 
uncertainties and asymmetric information. Focusing on securitization of 
subprime mortgage credit, Ashcraft and Schuermann (2007) detail the 
key frictions existing among different market participants. For instance, 
there is signiﬁcant information gap between subprime borrowers and 
the loan providers. Subprime borrowers consisting of a lot individuals 
with different background, and they may not fully understand their 
ﬁnancing needs and other available alternatives. This is problematic 
because subprime borrowers may over borrow beyond their capacity 
of repayment. For another example, the originators are assumed to 
know the quality of the pool of assets that are subject to securitization, 
while credit rating agencies only have limited incentive to conduct due 
diligence.  Meanwhile, investors rely on rating agencies’ opinion to make 
investment decision and are lacking of information for the true value 
and risk of the pool of assets they are buying.  
Existing literature, drawing from various line of research, 
propose that companies conducting securitization may have different 
motivations. Nonetheless, these different lines of research are, more or 
less, related to the role of ﬁnancial intermediations and the presence 
of asymmetric information in the ﬁnancial markets. Thomas (2001) 
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summarizes three major explanations for securitizations in the literature 
as signaling, avoiding underinvestment, and making use of comparative 
advantage. For example, banks can choose to sell part of their assets 
according to the quality and risk of the projects. Banks know the risk 
of their own projects and can choose the optimal level of securitization, 
thus convey the information to the market to signal the risk of their 
projects (Greenbaum and Thakor 1987).  
Securitization can be a way to avoid underinvestment problem 
(Myers 1977) because securitization can improve risk sharing and 
increase project funding (Benveniste and Berger 1987; James 1988). 
Under the optimal risk allocation framework, companies can obtain 
fresh capital that would otherwise unavailable in the absence of 
securitization to fund their projects.  
Asset sellers may retain a substantial risk of the assets they 
transfer to SPVs.  For example, Chen, Liu and Ryan (2007) conduct 
empirical analysis for bank loan securitizations and ﬁnd bank retain 
more of the risk of their securitized loans when the loans has higher 
risk.  In order to make investor comfortable to purchase securitized 
loans, banks have to retain “a larger ﬁrst-loss position” in the loans. 
Moreover, a recent study by Jiangli, Prisker and Raupach (2007) 
provides a model on motivation for banks to choose securitization to 
obtain liquidity.  Banks can also ﬁnance themselves through debt and 
equity.  They face a tradeoff between tax disadvantage of equity ﬁnancing 
and the ﬁnancial distress costs that are associated with debt ﬁnancing. 
Loan sales and securitization offer two alternative channels for obtain 
new ﬁnancing.  In their model, they focusing on the role of that banks 
play in monitoring the borrowers that they lend to.  Because banks will 
only actively monitor their loan customers in the situation that they also 
hold stakes in those loans. Therefore, loan sales can only be partially 
implemented which impose selling banks with adverse tail events. In 
contrast, banks can sell most of securitized assets to outside investors 
and reduce their insolvency, which will beneﬁt more for bondholders.  
The above explanations are not mutually exclusive, and their 
effects on the shareholders and bondholders for asset selling companies 
are not straightforward. Though certain hypotheses predicate that 
securitization may beneﬁt shareholders and transfer wealth from 
bondholders to shareholders, other explanations have exactly opposite 
prediction, which necessitates empirical examination. However, the 
empirical research examining the consequence of securitization on the 
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wealth of shareholders and bondholders is not abundant.  Among the 
few pieces of research work, Benveniste and Berger (1987) ﬁnd support 
for their hypothesis that riskier banks tend to securitize. A study by 
Beger and Udell (1993) further substantiates Benveniste and Berger’s 
(1987) ﬁndings but is unable to identify a signiﬁcant relation between 
commercial and industrial loan sales and bank risks.  James (1988) and 
Stanton (1998) document that banks with higher risk, more liquidity 
constraints, and higher nonperforming loan ratio, are more likely to 
choose off-balance-sheet activities.  
Lockwood, Rutherford and Herrera (1996) and Thomas (1999; 
2001) both directly examine the wealth effects of securitization on 
different stakeholders, though they reach somewhat conﬂicting 
conclusions. It is possible that they employ different datasets which 
lead to the comparability of their empirical ﬁndings.  Therefore, it is our 
attempt to provide a more updated and comprehensive analysis on the 
consequences of securitization to both shareholders and bondholders of 
asset selling companies.  
3. Data and sample description
3.1. Sample construction
In this paper, we rely on SDC platinum New Issues Database 
to identify asset-backed and mortgage backed issues.  We select the 
time span of 1988 to 2007 to construct our sample.  We exclude agency 
issues and issues without information about issue type.  It is common in 
practice that SDC report multiple same day issues separately because 
they involve issuances of different securities (Thomas 2001) of the 
same SPV.  Consequently, we count multiple same day issues as one 
transaction.  Lastly, we require asset sellers have stock price information 
from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data ﬁle.  We 
end up with 9,407 issues in our sample.
From SDC platinum, we collect information on the identities 
of issuers, issuing date, listing date, types of assets, main SIC codes 
of issuers, issuers public status, gross proceeds and agency rating if 
available. According to the types of issuers, we further categorize our 
sample into three subsamples, namely issuances by banking institutions, 
non-banking ﬁnancial institutions and other issuers.  In addition, 
we make distinction between ABS and MBS. As detailed in previous 
section, ABS securitizations are divided into different subgroups (e.g., 
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credit card, student loan, automobile, home equity and others), while 
MBS securitizations are divided into pass-through MBS, Collateralized 
Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) and others. It is plausible that 
securitizations issued by different asset sellers and backed by different 
types of assets may well possess different risk proﬁles and valuation 
procedures.  Consequently, their issuances may have various implications 
on their sellers’ claimants. Forming subcategories of securitizations 
allow us to investigate differentiated effect of such issuances accordingly. 
Furthermore, according to the issuing history of asset sellers, we group 
them into new market entrants and those with previous securitization 
experience, and calculate their issuing frequency.
3.2. Excess returns for shareholders and bondholders
We mainly use event study to gauge the excess return for the 
issuers surrounding the announcement.  Therefore, issuers in our sample 
must be publicly traded and have stock price information in CRSP data 
ﬁle.  An important issue is that, literally, for securitizations, there is no 
announcement date.  Therefore, we are not able to precisely identify the 
events.  As discussed in prior literature (Lockwood, Rutherford et al. 
1996; Thomas 1999; Thomas 2001), assets securitizations are arranged 
on a book-building basis.  The whole issuing process can start from two 
weeks to several months prior to the listing.  Consequently, there is 
no exact announcement date.  Existing literature uses both issuing 
dates and a combination of issuing dates and ﬁling dates to identify the 
event.  We follow existing literature and use both methods to conduct 
our analysis.  For the sake of brevity, we mainly report results based on 
event studies with issuing dates as event dates.
In the setting of standard event study methodology, security 
returns are assumed to be driven by a single-index market model. 
Therefore, we calculate security returns using the following simply 
linear regression model
  (1)
Where Rit is the return for security i on day t, Rmt is the return on 
a market index on day t, and      and      are market model coefﬁcients. 
Deviations from the expected return for security i on date t, given by the 
market model, are deﬁned as abnormal returns. 
Daily abnormal returns for each ﬁrm in event window are 
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computed as:
  (2)
Where ARit is the abnormal return for ﬁrm i on day t.  We subtract 
46 days from the event date, and the resulting day is the last day of 
the estimation period.  For each ﬁrm i, we estimated the market model 
coefﬁcients using daily returns for the 255-day estimation period.  
As a next step, we turn to Lehman Brothers Fixed Income 
Database to identify those securitizations with full price information 
of bonds issued by the same issuers. Because bond price is reported 
in Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database on the monthly basis, we, 
following exiting study (Thomas 2001), use different time windows in 
our empirical analysis.  We obtain index return from the same data base, 
and subtract index return from monthly return of individual bonds, and 
then sum monthly excess return over different time windows.
3.3. Characteristics of asset sellers
In the regression analysis, we obtain additional information on 
issuers’ characteristics from Compustat.  From Compustat data ﬁle, we 
collect information on total assets, market to book ratio, common equity, 
preferred stocks and credit rating. Consistent with prior research, 
the size of asset sellers is, in most case, the only variable that can 
signiﬁcantly explain the excess return.  It is plausible that an issuer 
with larger size is also more likely to be well capitalized (Thomas 2001). 
We also calculate the capital to assets ratio as tier 1 capital (common 
stock and preferred stock) over total assets.  
4. Empirical results
4.1. Wealth effects of securitization on shareholders of asset sellers
In this section, we mainly examine how stock market reacts to the 
announcement of securitizations using standard event study method. 
We then take excess return as our dependent variable, and regress it on 
different sets of variables that can be potential determinants of excess 
return.  
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4.1.1. Event study on excess returns to stockholders
First, we use issuing date as the event date for a particular 
issuance, and calculate excess return to shareholders over different time 
windows.  While the whole process of securitization can take months to 
complete, Thomas (2001) does not ﬁnd signiﬁcant abnormal return in 
the longer event windows than 30 days.  Though we try different longer 
windows, we only report results from event study for up to 30 days prior 
to the issuing date.  Table 1 reports our basic results.
Table 1
Excess returns on the announcement of securitization
to shareholders of asset sellers: Basic results
Event Windows
Type of 
Issuance
Observations (-30,0) (-20,0) (-10,0) (-5,0) (-3,0) (0,0) (0,30)
Total 9,407 -0.46*** -0.38*** -0.12 -0.14** -0.12*** 0.00 -0.52***
MBS 4,800 -0.40** -0.30* 0.07 -0.05 -0.08** 0.00 -0.59***
Pass through 3,967 -0.56*** -0.40*** 0.03 -0.11* -0.13*** -0.01 -0.63***
CMO 217 1.79** 0.75 0.43 0.20 0.02 -0.05 0.02
Other 616 -0.09 -0.04 0.20 0.27 0.23 0.09 -0.56
ABS 4,607 -0.53** -0.46** -0.32** -0.24** -0.16** -0.01 -0.45**
Credit card 906 -0.57 -0.31 -0.43 -0.12 -0.01 0.05 -0.57*
Auto 533 -0.74 -0.31 -0.47* -0.54* -0.46* 0.17 0.14
Home equity 2,855 -0.49* -0.58** -0.30 -0.23** -0.17** -0.07** -0.57*
Student loan 123 0.55 0.16 0.19 -0.29 -0.12 0.17 -0.73
Others 190 -1.04 -0.36 0.05 -0.20 -0.08 0.01 0.31
Note:  *,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
In general, we ﬁnd that the average excess returns around issuing 
dates appear to be negative, be they MBS or ABS.  We can reject the null 
hypothesis that the excess return equals zero at 1 percent conﬁdence 
level in most cases. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that, in the post-issuance 
period, stock market reacts negatively as well.  This ﬁnding suggests 
that it takes some time for the market to absorb the information and 
evaluate the consequence of securitizations to asset selling companies, 
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and react unfavorably.  For the overall sample, shareholders of issuing 
companies experience 1 percent loss in the (-30, 30) window.  
Since different types of securitizations involve subcategories of 
assets possessing different features, we examine the wealth effects of 
securitization more closely by partitioning our sample.  Two major types 
of mortgage-backed securities are pass-through MBS and Collateralized 
Mortgage Obligations (CMOs). Pass-throughs are designed to pool 
multiple mortgages, which allow investors to reduce their prepayment 
risk through diversiﬁcation rather than a single mortgage investment. 
CMOs are structured to distribute cash ﬂow from the underlying 
collateral over a series of tranches by repackaging pass-through MBS. 
By deﬁnition, CMOs are designed to provide some protection against 
the prepayment risk beyond the protection offered by pass-throughs 
with reasonable credit quality and high yields.  Our ﬁndings are quite 
consistent with the institutional features of these two types of MBS.  The 
negative excess return associated with issuances of MBS is mainly driven 
by pass-throughs MBS in both pre- and post-issuance period.  We do not 
ﬁnd that CMOs and other MBS possess consistent pattern indicating 
non-zero excess return on the announcement of securitizations.
Asset-backed securities are actually backed by different types of 
assets.  In SDC platinum database, we are able to identify underlying 
assets for ABS as credit card receivables, home equity loans, student 
loans and auto loans. We examine them separately, and report our 
results in Table 1.  We ﬁnd that overall ABS securitization is associated 
with negative market reaction, and the negative excess return is mainly 
driven by home equity-backed ABS.  Home equity loan backed ABS is 
one of the major components of ABS market.  Home equity loan literally 
refers to all types of loan secured by residential real estate which is 
subject to more valuation problems compared to other types of ABS.  It 
is plausible that, though asset sellers transfer the securitized assets 
to bankruptcy remote trusts, they still retain a signiﬁcant portion of 
the risk.  Stock market reacts to securitization unfavorably because the 
potential loss associated with securitized assets.
236 SECURITIZATION AND WEALTH EFFECTS
Table 2
Excess returns on the announcement of securitization
to shareholders of asset sellers using alternative event dates
Event Windows
Type of 
Issuance
Observations (-30,0) (-20,0) (-10,0) (-5,0) (-3,0) (0,0) (0,30)
Total 9,577 -0.47*** -0.33*** -0.07*** -0.20*** -0.08*** 0.10** -0.17
MBS 4,931 -0.18 -0.04 -0.07** -0.06 0.17 0.25 0.13
Pass 
through
4,080 -0.30* -0.07 -0.09** -0.08 0.17* 0.30** 0.26
CMO 217 1.91** 0.93* 0.43 0.22 0.13 -0.05 0.13
Other 634 -0.09 -0.20 -0.05 0.00 0.18 0.06 -0.67***
ABS 4,646 -0.79*** -0.65*** -0.06** -0.36*** -0.34*** -0.07*** -0.48*
Credit 
card
946 -0.74*** -0.61*** 0.59 0.00 -0.60*** -0.01** -0.47*
Auto 545 -0.85*** -0.36** 0.63 0.04 0.32 0.32 0.09
Home 
equity
2,841 -0.97*** -0.82*** -0.43*** -0.60*** -0.44*** 0.17** -0.54
Student 
loan
129 -1.39* -1.48** -0.82** -0.27 0.09 -0.05 -0.54
Others 185 2.30*** 1.55*** 0.69 0.32 0.29 0.18 -1.37
Note: *,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
We replicate the same test performed in Table 1 by choosing a 
combination of issuing date and listing date, whenever possible, and 
report our ﬁndings in Table 2 as a robustness check.  In general, we ﬁnd 
qualitatively the same results which validate our prior ﬁndings.  
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Table 3
Excess returns on the announcement of securitization
to shareholders of asset seller in different time periods
Type of Issuance
 
1988-1997 1998-2007
Event Windows Event Windows
(-30,0) (-3,0) (0,30) (-30,0) (-3,0) (0,30)
Total 0.1362 0.0000 0.1002 -0.6633*** -0.1616*** -0.7348***
N=2,377 N=2,377 N=2,377 N=7,030 N=7,030 N=7,030
MBS 0.3779* 0.0948 0.4284** -0.7084*** -0.1492** -1.0009***
N=1,379 N=1,379 N=1,379 N=3,241 N=3,241 N=3,421
Pass through 0.0252 0.0712 0.5501** -0.7433*** -0.1940*** -0.9872***
N=926 N=926 N=926 N=3,041 N=3,041 N=3,041
CMO 1.7891** 0.0201 0.0241 n.a. n.a. n.a.
N=217 N=217 N=217 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other 0.3968 0.4791* -0.1262 0.4007 0.1975 -1.1432**
N=180 N=180 N=180 N=376 N=376 N=376
ABS -0.1977 -0.1264 -0.3532 -0.6205*** -0.1732*** -0.4826**
N=998 N=998 N=998 N=3,609 N=3,609 N=3,609
Credit card -0.0031 0.1212 -0.7309 -0.7967** -0.0562 -0.5075*
N=259 N=259 N=259 N=647 N=647 N=647
Auto -0.8072 -0.5576** 0.7456* -0.6817* -0.3871* -0.3094
N=227 N=227 N=227 N=306 N=306 N=306
Home equity -0.0756 -0.0728 -0.8548 -0.5653** -0.1819** -0.5154**
N=439 N=439 N=439 N=2,416 N=2,416 N=2,416
Student loan 3.6212* -1.3242* -3.2103* 0.1884 0.0181 -0.4406
N=13 N=13 N=13 N=110 N=110 N=110
others
 
-0.4532 0.3081 1.4099* -1.3095 -0.2535 -0.1919
N=60 N=60 N=60 N=130 N=130 N=130
Note: *,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
As illustrated in Figure 1 and 2, there is a sharp increase in 
securitization activities after 1998. We wonder whether stock markets 
will perceive securitization differently at different time periods.  Previous 
research has only examined the phenomenon using pre-1998 data. 
Therefore, our research also extends the line of inquiry by providing 
some up-to-date evidence.  
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It is striking to ﬁnd that the reaction of stock market to 
securitizations displays completely different patterns in the 1988-
1997 and 1998-2007 time periods.  Consistent with Thomas (2001), in 
the 1988-1997 time period, we ﬁnd average announcement effect of 
securitizations on shareholders tend to be neutral.  For securitizations 
backed by certain assets, their wealth effects on shareholders can be 
positive in some cases (e.g., MBS) and negative in some other cases 
(e.g., ABS backed by Auto loans in the pre-issuance time windows). 
However, in the post-1998 period, stock market reacts to securitization 
unfavorably, which drives our main ﬁndings of negative relation between 
securitization and abnormal return on its announcement.  This is true 
for most categories of securitizations in both pre-and post-issuance 
windows.  It appears that stock market changes its assessment on the 
consequences of asset securitizations, and reacts accordingly.
Table 4
Excess returns on the announcement of securitization
to shareholders of asset sellers by types of issuers
 
 
Event Windows
Type of 
Issuance
Observations (-30,0) (-20,0) (-10,0) (-5,0) (-3,0) (0,0) (0,30)
Banks 4,146 -0.53*** -0.45*** -0.10 -0.20*** -0.13*** 0.00 -0.78***
MBS 2,314 -0.57*** -0.48*** -0.04 -0.19** -0.13*** 0.01 -0.89***
ABS 1,832 -0.47 -0.41 -0.18 -0.23 -0.13 -0.01 -0.63***
Non-Bank 
ﬁnancial 
institutions
3,265 -0.43 -0.36 -0.13 -0.11 -0.14 -0.02 -0.58
MBS 1,465 -0.54* -0.21 0.16* 0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.28
ABS 1,800 -0.34 -0.49 -0.36 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.82
Other 
Issues
1,996 -0.38** -0.26* -0.13 -0.07 -0.07 0.02 0.08
MBS 1,021 0.20 -0.02 0.21 0.18 -0.01* -0.01 -0.36*
ABS 975 -0.99*** -0.52** -0.48*** -0.33** -0.14 0.05 0.55
Note: *,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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We further make distinction between different types of issuers 
according to their organizational structures. To be speciﬁc, we identify those 
asset selling companies as banking institutions, non-banking ﬁnancial 
institutions and other asset sellers according to their primary SIC codes. 
We ﬁnd that banks experience signiﬁcantly negative returns surrounding 
announcement of securitizations, and mainly for MBS securitizations. 
For non-banking ﬁnancial institutions, market reacts neutrally to 
securitizations.  For other asset sellers, the excess returns associated with 
securitizations are on average negative but mainly for ABS securitizations. 
We believe that our ﬁndings make a lot of sense. Banks are main providers of 
subprime mortgage loans which contain substantial risk and informational 
frictions in the process of securitizations (Ashcraft and Schuermann 2007). 
Other issuers (e.g. auto manufactures) are mainly originators of asset-
backed securitizations.  As a reulst, banks and other issuers experience 
negative excess returns in stock market on their securitizations for MBS 
and ABS, respectively.  As an issuer of ABS or MBS, non-banking ﬁnancial 
institutions function more as arrangers rather the originators. Therefore, 
we do not ﬁnd evidence that excess returns of securitizations issued by 
non-bank ﬁnancial institutions are signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Table 5
Excess returns to shareholders: Does bank capitalization matter?
 
 
Window (-30,0) Window (-3,0)
Low 
Capitalization
High 
Capitalization
Top 25 
Percentile
Low 
Capitalization
High 
Capitalization
Top 25 
Percentile
Entire sample -0.6647*** -0.4071** -0.2271 -0.1895** -0.0871 0.1064
N=1,924 N=1,981 N=971 N=1,924 N=1,981 N=971
ABS -0.8907*** -0.0000 0.6174* -0.2010** 0.0481 0.2032*
N=844 N=864 N=395 N=844 N=864 N=395
MBS -0.0488* -0.7204** -0.8062** -0.1805* -0.1181 0.0399
N=1,080 N=1,117 N=576 N=1,080 N=1,117 N=576
Securitization 
without rating
-0.3107* -0.5091** 0.4693* -0.4110*** -0.4049*** -0.0308
N=796 N=868 N=404 N=796 N=868 N=404
New market 
entrant
-4.3278** 0.5089 1.7999* -0.0079* 0.0879 0.6571
N=41 N=42 N=25 N=41 N=42 N=25
Note: *,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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There are a lot of debates on the role of banking institutions in the 
subprime mortgage crisis.  We thus turn to a sub-sample of securitizations 
issued by banking institutions, and look at this issue more closely.  Our 
results are reported in table 5.  As we know, banking industry is highly 
regulated, and banking institutions are subject capital requirement. 
The regulation on capital adequacy is to ensure that banks can absorb 
a reasonable amount of risk in the case of adverse events.  Though in 
the process of securitization, assets used to back the securitization are 
transferred to the SPVs, sponsoring bank institutions are still responsible 
for at least part of the risk associated with the securities they issued. 
Consequently, capital adequacy can be one of the main factors that 
investors used to assess the uncertainty associated with securitization.
We divide our subsample into two groups, one group with above median 
capital-to-assets ratio and another group with below media capital-to-assets 
ratio.  We calculate capital-to-assets ratio as tier 1 capital (common stock and 
preferred stock) over total assets.  We ﬁnd the in both event windows (i.e., 
(-30,0) and (-3,0)), assets selling banks are doing better if they have higher 
capital-to-assets ratio.  We further look at those selling banks in the top 25 
percentile in terms of capital adequacy, and ﬁnd that stock market reacts 
positively in the issuance of ABS.  However, in the case of MBS issuances, 
market reacts unfavorably to banks in the top 25 percentile in the (-30,0) 
time window with a higher magnitude, but react insigniﬁcantly positive in 
the (-3,0) time window.  We further exam whether banks with high capital-to-
assets ratio perform well if they issue securitizations without agency rating 
and if they are the ﬁrst time issuers.  Our ﬁndings are consistent with our 
predication.  Assets selling banks in the top 25 percentile receive favorable 
reaction from the stock markets when they issue securitizations without 
agency rating and when they are the ﬁrst time issuers.
Overall, we ﬁnd securitization is associated with sizeable wealth 
loss for asset selling companies, but this wealth loss for shareholders is 
mainly driven by securitization issued in after 1998.  In the pre-1998 
period, we ﬁnd results consistent with Thomas (2001) that on average, 
stock market reacts neutrally to the announcement of securitization.  
4.1.2. Regressions relating excess return to shareholders to issue 
characteristics
Table 6 reports our results on the determinants of excess return to 
shareholders of asset selling companies by regressing abnormal returns 
on a set of explanatory variables. We enter two dummy variables, Banking 
Institutions and Non-banking Financial Institutions to capture the 
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organizational difference of issuers, with other issuers as the base line.  We 
also include the log of proceeds of the issues and log of assets of the issuers. 
In addition, we add issuing frequency and a new market entrant dummy as 
control variables. Across all regression models, we employ year dummies to 
capture the timely trend and economy wide shocks.  Furthermore, we cluster 
the stand errors on issuing entities for all model speciﬁcations because one 
issuer may participate in the securitization market multiple times.  
Table 6
Regressions relating excess returns to shareholders to issue 
characteristics: Full sample
Independent 
variables
 
Dependent variable: excess return to shareholders of for the selling companies
Event window (-30,0) Event window (-3,0) Event window (0,30)
Overall With 
rating
Without 
rating
Overall With 
rating
Without 
rating
Overall With 
rating
Without 
rating
Banking 
institutions
-0.0049 -0.0031 -0.0117*** -0.0019 0.0008 -0.0115*** -0.0094** -0.0127** -0.0036
(0.0034) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0040) (0.0054) (0.0042)
Non-bank 
ﬁnancial 
institutions
-0.0048 0.0052 -0.0085 -0.0008 0.0011 -0.0102*** -0.0076* -0.0108* -0.0004
(0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0048) (0.0058) (0.0052)
Lnproceed -0.0010 0.0010 -0.0044** -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0025
(0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0018) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0018)
Lnassets 0.0021** 0.0012 0.0046*** 0.0016*** 0.0014*** 0.0016*** 0.0025** 0.0030** 0.0028*
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Issuing 
frequency
-0.0004** -0.0005* -0.0004** -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0004** -0.0010** -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002)
New market 
entrant
0.0058 0.0046 0.0004 0.0064 0.0051 0.01923** 0.0007 0.0025 -0.0248
(0.0110) (0.0120) (0.0217) (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0116) (0.0202)
Number of 
managers
-0.0058 -0.0003 -0.0013 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0019
(0.0111) (0.0009) (0.0018) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0014)
Constant -0.0209 0.0367 -0.165*** -0.0288** -0.0376** -0.0234 -0.0233 -0.0290 -0.0755*
(0.0331) (0.0389) (0.0364) (0.0139) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0341) (0.0383) (0.0468)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 8,980 5,781 3,199 8,980 5,781 3,199 8,980 5,781 3,199
F-statistics 13.35*** 7.41*** 5.62*** 15.90*** 5.86*** 4.68*** 23.68*** 12.54*** 7.81***
R-squared 3.53 3.62 4.59 1.53 1.10 5.17 5.54 5.73 6.71
Note: *,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
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Table 7
Regressions relating excess returns to shareholders
to issue characteristics: MBS subsample
Independent 
variables
 
Dependent variable: excess return to shareholders of for the selling companies
Event window (-30,0) Event window (-3,0) Event window (0,30)
Overall With 
rating
Without 
rating
Overall With 
rating
Without 
rating
Overall With 
rating
Without 
rating
Banking 
institutions
-0.0080* -0.0066 -0.0159** -0.0009 0.0046* -0.0144*** 0.0015 -0.0008 -0.0016
(0.0045) (0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0048) (0.0066) (0.0056)
Non-bank 
ﬁnancial 
institutions
-0.0097** -0.009 -0.0160** -0.0001 0.0041 -0.0133*** 0.0032 -0.0014 0.0041
(0.0050) (0.0064) (0.0077) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0055) (0.0069)
Lnproceed 0.0004 0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0021
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0024)
Lnassets 0.0022* 0.0010 0.0051*** 0.0007 0.0004 0.0010 0.0015 0.0001 0.0060***
(0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Issuing 
frequency
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0003** -0.0004*** 0.0001 -0.0198 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002) (00002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0170) (0.0002)
New market 
entrant
-0.0046 -0.0075 0.0255 0.0048 0.0063 -0.0118 -0.0174 -0.0198 0.0227
(0.0187) (0.0200) (0.0392) (0.0082) (0.0089) (0.0091) (0.0157) (0.0170) (0.0258)
Number of 
managers
0.0001 0.0024** -0.0032* 0.0009* 0.0011 0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0021 0.0005
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Constant -0.0468 -0.0587 -0.202*** -0.0172 -0.0274 -0.0241 -0.0056 0.0339 -0.1572***
(0.0332) (0.0392) (0.0488) (0.0176) (0.0203) (0.0234) (0.0267) (0.0402) (0.0431)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 4,593 2,742 1,851 4,593 2,742 1,851 4,593 2,742 1,851
F-statistics 31.62*** 11.58*** 7.52*** 44.95*** 13.11*** 16.45*** 43.06*** 14.26*** 16.78***
R-squared 5.12 5.77 5.29 2.34 2.20 5.472 6.60 7.03 7.81
Note: *,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
Table 6 contains our ﬁndings using the full sample.  We replicate 
our analysis with MBS subsample and ABS subsample, and report our 
empirical results in Table 7 and Table 8, respectively.  
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Table 8
Regressions relating excess returns to shareholders
to issue characteristics: ABS subsample
Independent 
variables
 
Dependent variable: excess return to shareholders of for the selling companies
Event window (-30,0) Event window (-3,0) Event window (0,30)
Overall With 
rating
Without 
rating
Overall With 
rating
Without 
rating
Overall With 
rating
Without 
rating
Banking 
institutions
-0.0014 0.0020 -0.0089 -0.0026* -0.0013 -0.0092*** -0.0190*** -0.0247*** -0.0032
(0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0071) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0046) (0.0064) (0.0067)
Non-bank 
ﬁnancial 
institutions
-0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0018 -0.0009 0.0001 -0.0079** -0.0166** -0.0189** -0.0030
(0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0103) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0071) (0.0080) (0.0088)
Lnproceed -0.0017 0.0014 -0.0061* -0.0001 0.0010 -0.0020* -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0044
(0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0043)
Lnassets 0.0017* 0.0005 0.0051** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0014** 0.0041** 0.0057** 0.0008
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0021) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Issuing 
frequency
-0.0005* -0.0006 -0.0006** -0.0002** -0.0003* -0.0003*** -0.0008*** -0.0014*** -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0047) (0.0003)
New market 
entrant
0.0104 0.0110 -0.0065 0.0087* 0.0067 0.0333** 0.0051 0.0099 -0.0315
(0.0130) (0.0143) (0.0286) (0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0150) (0.0266)
Number of 
managers
-0.0003 -0.0009 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0013* 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0021
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0029) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0019)
Constant 0.0134 -0.0181 0.0902 -0.0507*** -0.0716*** 0.0276 -0.0386 -0.0885 0.1195
(0.0635) (0.0725) (0.0898) (0.0170) (0.0231) (0.0278) (0.0602) (0.0691) (0.1071)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 4,387 3,039 3,199 4,387 3,039 3,199 4,387 3,039 3,199
F-statistics 12.87*** 5.09*** 4.28*** 6.63*** 3.63*** 4.18*** 18.03*** 8.42*** 7.54***
R-squared 3.02 3.04 5.10 1.69 1.56 9.28 5.81 6.20 8.79
Note: *,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
Across the full sample and all subsamples, we ﬁnd the log of 
assets of selling companies is consistently and positively associated with 
excess return in the stock market. It is plausible that large issuers are 
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more likely to be well capitalized, and their size servers as a certiﬁcation 
role. We also ﬁnd that issuing frequency is signiﬁcantly and negatively 
associated with excess returns, especially for the ABS subsample.  This 
ﬁnding suggests that market reacts unfavorably to the announcement 
of securitization of those issuers sponsoring many SPVs.  In the adverse 
tail events, bearing too many asset-backed securities may impose 
substantial loss to the sponsors of SPVs.  
In the regression analysis, we also distinguish issues with or 
without agency ratings.  On average, issuing entities experience wealth 
loss for securitizing assets without agency ratings. It appears that market 
relies heavily on the opinions of rating agencies.  Absence of credit rating, 
a particular issue will be perceived as with high uncertainty.  Banking 
institutions and non-banking ﬁnancial institutions receive even worse 
market response when they originate issuances without credit ratings. 
4.2. Wealth effects of securitization on bondholders of asset 
sellers
In this section, we turn to the bond market and try to investigate 
how bond market reacts to the announcement of securitization by 
different types of sponsors and by different types of issuing securities.
4.2.1. Event study on excess return to bondholders
Table 9
Excess returns on the announcement of securitization
to bondholders of asset sellers
 
Type of issuance
Event window
(-2,0) (-1,0) (0,0) (1,1) (1,2)
Total 0.46*** 0.35*** 0.15*** 0.12 0.14
N=695 N=698 N=698 N=688 N=680
MBS 0.47*** 0.36*** 0.07* 0.20** 0.25
N=424 N=425 N=425 N=422 N=418
Pass through 0.47** 0.28** 0.09** 0.21 0.23
N=271 N=271 N=271 N=268 N=265
CMO 0.43 0.50 0.05 0.19 -0.11
N=96 N=97 N=97 N=97 N=97
Other 0.56 0.51 0.04 0.18 0.97
N=57 N=57 N=57 N=57 N=56
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ABS 0.44** 0.35** 0.27*** -0.01 -0.02
N=271 N=273 N=273 N=266 N=262
Credit card -0.14 -0.05 0.11 -0.39* -0.35
N=103 N=103 N=103 N=100 N=100
Auto 1.94*** 1.21*** 0.61** 0.63* 0.70*
N=53 N=53 N=53 N=53 N=53
Home equity 0.12 0.14 0.09 -0.15 -0.01
N=102 N=103 N=103 N=100 N=97
others
 
2.37 1.60 1.45 0.35 -0.60
N=13 N=14 N=14 N=13 N=12
Note: *,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
Table 10
Excess returns on the announcement of securitization
to bondholders of asset sellers by types of issuers
 
Type of issuance
Event window
(-2,0) (-1,0) (0,0) (1,1) (1,2)
Banking Institutions 0.20 0.23 0.23** -0.19 -0.25
N=131 N=131 N=131 N=132 N=133
MBS 0.44** 0.46** 0.17* 0.10 0.07
N=48 N=48 N=48 N=48 N=48
ABS 0.06 0.09 0.26 -0.37 -0.43
N=83 N=83 N=83 N=83 N=83
Non-banking ﬁnancial 
institutions
0.47 0.37 0.08* 0.19 0.21
N=283 N=284 N=284 N=278 N=273
MBS 0.74** 0.56** 0.08* 0.30 0.32
N=181 N=181 N=181 N=180 N=177
ABS -0.01 0.04 0.08 0.00 -0.01
N=102 N=103 N=103 N=98 N=06
Other issuers 0.57*** 0.41*** 0.17** 0.20*** 0.27**
N=281 N=283 N=283 N=279 N=277
MBS 0.23* 0.15 0.04 0.15 0.23*
N=195 N=196 N=196 N=194 N=193
ABS
 
1.34*** 0.96** 0.50** 0.32 0.37
N=86 N=87 N=87 N=85 N=84
Note: *,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
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We rely on Lehman Brother Fixed Income Database to collect 
monthly bond price and calculate bond return index.  Because the bond 
price is on monthly basis and securitization involves long period, we, 
following existing literature (Thomas, 2001), choose wide time windows 
to compute excess return.  We subtract index return from bond monthly 
return and then sum the monthly excess return over different event 
windows. Only a small number of issuing companies have bonds 
outstanding at the same time of securitizations.  In addition, our bond 
price data end in 1997. As a consequence, our sample size reduces 
signiﬁcantly.  Using this reduced subsample, we report our ﬁndings 
regarding to the excess returns to bondholders in Table 9 and Table 10. 
Table 9 reports excess return of securitization on debt claimants 
according to the types of issuing securities, while Table 10 replicates 
the analysis according to the organizational structures of asset 
sellers. Consistent with existing research (Thomas 2001), we ﬁnd the 
bond market reacts favorably to the announcement of securitization. 
It is plausible that by selling assets to SPVs and obtain new capital 
infusions reduce the insolvency risk of issuing entities which beneﬁts 
bondholders. Both MBS and ABS securitization are associated with 
positive excess return in bond market. For MBS securitizations, the 
positive return is mainly driven by issuing pass-throughs, while, for 
ABS securitizations, the positive return is mainly driven by auto-loan-
backed securitizations. Table 10 is based on different types of issuers 
conﬁrm our ﬁndings.  Both banks and non-banking ﬁnancial institutions 
experience positively excess bond returns, but mainly for issuing MBS 
securities. For other issuers, positive excess bond returns are only 
signiﬁcant for ABS securitizations.  This is not surprising because auto-
manufactures dominate this category. However, we do acknowledge that 
the power of our test is limited because our data from Lehman Brother 
Fixed Income Database end in 1997.  
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4.2.2. Regressions relating excess return to bondholders to issue 
characteristics
Table 11
Regression relating excess returns
to bondholders to issue characteristics
Independent 
variables
 
Dependent variable: excess return to bondholders of for the selling companies: event 
window (-2,2)
Banking institutions Non-banking ﬁnancial 
institutions
Other issuers
Overall MBS ABS Overall MBS ABS Overall MBS ABS
Lnproceed -0.8949 -2.2062** 0.4181 0.0300* 0.1027 0.0461 0.1539 -0.0900 -0.6079
(0.6314) (0.7564) (1.0593) (0.1460) (0.1698) (0.2692) (0.2647) (0.3403) (0.7874)
Issuing 
frequency
-0.0808 0.0067 -0.0715 -0.0067 -0.0442* 0.0216 0.0145 0.0133 -0.0009
(0.0578) (0.2698) (0.0660) (0.0160) (0.0233) (0.0237) (0.0369) (0.0409) (0.0664)
New market 
entrant
-1.0239 -0.4965 0.6249 0.3873 0.1717 0.2475 0.5898 0.9635
(4.6677) (3.0971) (0.6646) (0.7027) (1.6571) (1.3573) (1.2571) (3.6622)
Lnassets 0.8377* 0.9672 0.9255 0.1645* 0.0963 0.2593* -0.1797 -0.1589 -0.8884
(0.5461) (0.6282) (0.8068) (0.0898) (0.1519) (0.1444) (0.1654) (0.1457) (0.6881)
Constant -1.7874 19.0206 -29.9134 -4.4842 -4.1019 -7.2933 0.5101 4.259 33.8859**
(16.3099) (16.3303) (31.4261) (3.6348) (4.8284) (6.4827) (5.3742) (6.4704) (16.8964)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 88 25 63 176 124 52 275 192 83
F-statistics 1.09*** 2.99** 3.43*** 1.25* 0.98 1.84* 2.07** 0.69 3.28***
R-squared 29.86 39.85 30.10 8.45 2.20 16.48 4.48 4.42 25.02
Note: *,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively
We then take the excess bond return as our dependent variable 
and regress it on various institutional features of securitizations.  We 
do not identify a strong pattern for most of the explanatory variables. 
However, for ﬁnancial institutions, be they banks or non-banks, 
excess bond returns are associated with larger size in terms of logged 
assets.  Again, the level of capitalization is very important for ﬁnancial 
institutions to certify they soundness. In addition, year dummies seem 
to explain much of the variation of excess bond return. 
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5. Summary and conclusion
In this study, we provide the most comprehensive event study 
results on the wealth effects of securitizations for different stakeholders 
of issuing companies. We, using more updated data, ﬁnd that 
securitization is generally associated with negative abnormal return in 
the stock market.  This is true for both MBS and ABS securitizations. 
However, after breaking down our sample according to different time 
periods, we ﬁnd the negative relation is mainly driven by securitizations 
in the 1998-2007 time span.  During time period from 1988 to 1997, 
our results reveal the market reacts neutrally to securitization on 
average.  For the subcategories of MBS and ABS, we ﬁnd that companies 
issuing of pass-through MBS and home-equity-loan-backed ABS 
experience signiﬁcantly negative abnormal returns in the stock market. 
Speciﬁcally, for banking institutions, their capital adequacy ratio is a 
very important signal to investors to assess the riskness associated with 
the securities sold to the market.  Assets selling banks in the top 25 
percentile in terms of capital-to-assets ratio signiﬁcantly do better in 
most time windows for which we examine.  In the regression analysis, 
we identify that the size of the sponsors plays an important certiﬁcation 
role and is positively associated with announcement returns on the 
announcement of securitizations, while frequent market participants 
experience unfavorable market reactions. 
Our results from bond market indicate that bondholders of asset 
sellers generally have positive excess returns on the announcement of 
securitizations.  In a nutshell, our research is explorative in nature. 
However, by adding new evidence to the emerging line of empirical 
research on securitization, we are able to better understand the causes 
and consequences of securitization.  In a following up study, we attempt 
to examine how and to what extent different corporate governance 
practices may affect the market reactions (i.e., from both stock market 
and bond market) to the announcement of securitizations.  
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Goals of this paper
Goal 1: comprehensively examine the response of stock return to 
securitization during 1988-2007 on
A) different markets 
i stock market
ii bond market 
react to the securitization 
B) backed by different types of assets 
i MBS: pass-through and CMO
ii ABS: credit card, home equity 
C) by different types of asset sellers 
i banks (a) above median capital/TA  (b) below C/TA
ii Non-banks ﬁnancial insutituihion
iii other industries
D) in different time period. 
1988 - 1997
1998 - 2007
Goal 2: Excess return  to issue characteristics
• Excess return = 
 f (banking inst., non-bank Inst., proceed, assets, issuing frequency, 
new market entrant, number of managers, year dummies)
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• Table 6: full sample
• Table 7: MBS
• Table 8: ABS
• Table 9: separating banking inst, non-bank inst and others
Goal 3: CG of issuing companies affect the wealth effect
Asset selling company with
 (1) Board indecency: independent directors/total number of directors
 (2) CEO duality: CEO and Chair of board
 (3) Board diversity: number of minority directors/total number of 
directors
 (4) CFO on board: dummy if CFO is also a bored member 
 (5) Auditing Committee Size: number of members in the auditing 
committee
Results
A) different markets 
 i stock market => negative
 ii bond market => positive 
Securitization is associated with sizeable wealth loss for asset selling 
after 1998
B) backed by different types of assets 
 i MBS: pass-through and CMO => positive abnormal
 ii ABS: credit card, home equity => positive abnormal
  
C) by different types of asset sellers 
 i banks  (a) above median capital/TA  (b) below C/TA
 ii non-banks ﬁnancial institution
 iii other industries
D) in different time period. 
 1988 - 1997: neutral response, same as Thomas (1999): 1991-1999;;; 
however, Thomas ﬁnds securitization is signiﬁcantly wealth creating 
for stockholders.
 1998 - 2007: negative response occur during this period. 
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Results of Goal 2
Large asset selling co. increase excess returns
Issuing freq decrease excess returns
Results of Goal 3
Non-banking FI: board structure does not affect. CFO is on board is 
unfavorable
Banking and others: board structure matters. CFO is on board is 
favorable
Some Suggestions for the future studies, not Comments for the 
current one
This is an interesting and close to a pioneered paper
This issue is important but studies are scant. We expect that there are 
more in the future. This paper will be the pioneer and benchmark for 
the comparisons.
They look at the response of market to securitization from various 
dimensions. Data are taken from various sources SDC, CRSP,  Lehman 
Brother Fixed Income and More. The paper is very knowledgeable and 
hardworking. 
This issue is timely important, providing strong policy implications. 
Such as: the wealth effect for bank to issue MBS or ABS may hurt the 
value of shareholder today. Should banks continue to do it?  
It provides lots of issues for the future researchers.
They, however, do not provide too much explanation because the paper 
is long enough for its current format. 
Is it possible to know the quality of asset when securitizing 
(transparency)?
Subprime, home-equity lending and credit cards  form a  major source 
of assets for securitization, yet these loans have high probabilities of 
default. Is it possible (i.e., is data available)  to know the quality of 
assets? 
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For example: Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) predict that banks will 
securitize their best assets, retaining their worst. Can we test it in the 
future?
Once we know the quality, we could conjecture the response in 
advance.
Securitization: Gain and Loss, do issuers know these?
Securitization is associated with
Loss: sizeable wealth loss for asset selling after 1998.
Gain: diversify and securitizing funding channels
banks, for example
Loss: stock returns drop
Gain: diversifying, increasing ROA
If issuers know this, will they continue to securitize their assets?
Maybe, we could have some conjectured reasons to explain the 
results (hypothesis)
Because this is already a huge study, authors  do not propose conjectured 
reasons behind results in this paper and probably will explain the 
results in the next one.
Next time, maybe, there  will be  hypotheses proposed. Such as, negative 
stock return and positive stock returns.
Such as again. Positive bond market responses may be owing to that 
fact that securitization increase funding channels and thus raters issue 
higher credit ratings.  
To explain results: diversiﬁcation argument ...
The responses in two sub periods are opposite. Can we interpret it in 
this way:
For their ﬁrst sub period: => positive stock abnormal return 
Market think that securitization can diversify the risk
For their second sub period => negative abnormal returns
market though now it could diversify risk, it can sense that securitization 
will create an unknown “risk” in the future (efﬁcient market), though 
market does not know what it is.
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To explain the results: Asset Quality Hypothesis 
For the ﬁrst subperiod:
 Better assets to be securitized
For the second subperiod:
 Worse assets to be scurried
Is it possible to further separate the sample after 2006
1998--2007 : negative response occur during this period 
Is the sample enough to further separate the sample into two sub-
periods since sub prime crisis occurred in 2006?
If we can, we expect stronger negative response because the quality of 
assets is even worse for securitizations.
Table 5 dividing the sample into well capitalized and not 
capitalized banks
Lockwood et al. (1996): securitization increases shareholder wealth in 
well-capitalized banks but reduces sharehold wealth in weak banks.
In ABS: support
In MBS: not support
Can discuss the difference of ABS and MBS for two types of banks.
Minor Comments
Page 14: authors say: “We ﬁnd the in both event windows (i.e., (-30,0) 
and (-3,0), assets selling banks are doing well if they have higher capital-
to-assets ratio.” 
I am not sure whether I am right or not: looking at Table 5, the sign is 
negative. Thus, there is a negative abnormal return.
Does Event study consider the heteroscedasticity of residuals. Many 
studies have shown that event studies may suffer from the substantial 
heteroscedasticity.

I speak with some embarrassment. I have never been nor am 
I academically or professionally an economist. Academically I was a 
jurist. However, listening to the papers, I have realised that the question 
involves institutional aspects, to which unavoidable issues are attached. 
It may be useful to spend a few words on this. Two opposite lines of 
thought, I think, emerge from the papers. The crisis we are facing is 
clearly a crisis of the market. As such, according to the ﬁrst line of 
thought, it must be solved by the market. No public intervention is 
needed. Indeed it should be avoided. Whatever happens, it is the market 
that will re-launch the economy.
The scenario suggested by the second line of thought is the 
opposite. Public intervention is indispensable. But the intervention 
of a single State, however important and powerful it is, would not be 
sufﬁcient. The crisis is of a global nature. A new world order is needed 
to solve it. The principal large economies must contribute.
I see that the choice between one line of thought and the other, or 
of any other idea, involves the “time” factor. We are facing a crisis, whose 
ultimate cause has not yet been investigated, the exact dimensions of 
which we are unable to establish, and which has already produced 
serious effects in many sectors, but whose further developments are 
unpredictable. There is a widespread fear that it could suddenly produce 
an avalanche effect. If danger is imminent there must be a prompt 
response. The agreement between the major States to give a clearer, 
more stable and secure order to global ﬁnance takes time. It is an 
objective to pursue. But this is a medium or even long term operation.
If we consider the short term, there is only one alternative. If we 
count on the market we have to accept all possible consequences, even 
the most painful ones.   These will be necessary to clear the system of 
all the waste products that have hindered its physiological functioning. 
After completing the cleaning up process, the market will impress a 
rapid trend on the economies, compensating for the previous sufferings 
with a ﬂorid development.
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If however these sufferings are such that they are not acceptable 
socially nor politically, nor owing to their excessive economic cost, public 
intervention will be inevitable. It will be up to the State where the crisis 
began or where it is having the most serious effects. It will therefore be 
up to the USA and must be immediate. It is much more likely that this 
will happen, because it is difﬁcult to imagine that under the present 
conditions the American economic system can react alone.
We have the precedent of 1929. We do not know if the present 
crisis is more or less serious, whether it is of the same kind or of a 
different kind. But we recall that the ’29 crisis  was solved in the short 
term with public intervention, the T.W.A., of a kind and extent that was 
very unusual at that time.  Ten years later, in 1939, the effects of the 
crisis were nonetheless still present and serious: there were 15 million 
unemployed. A dramatic event, the outbreak of World War II, offered a 
way out. Loans to the UK, to be spent on purchases in the USA, the start 
up of a grandiose and onerous armaments plan; then Pearl Harbor and 
the war got the economy right back on its feet.
In Germany, second in importance among the countries hit by 
the crisis, there was an almost parallel process. The devastating effects 
on the economy facilitated Hitler’s rise to power. This was followed by a 
big rearmament and public works plan,  largely connected with military 
requirements; then came the war. 
The experience of ’29 conﬁrms the hypothesis of immediate public 
intervention in the USA. It also teaches us what types of intervention 
to avoid. Therefore public intervention in the USA is a possibility, which 
must be immediate, and will be of an essentially ﬁnancial nature.
The European Union, due to its larger population, in terms of real 
purchasing power, is the most afﬂuent world market. It is a market regime 
which, though bearing the same name, is different from that of the USA. 
In the US market, the US President determines with wide discretion 
the volume of expenditure and the means of allocation and at the same 
time the volume of the revenues and the channels through which the 
revenues are to be acquired. The Federal Reserve in coordination with 
the President, governs the currency, weighing out its aims of stability, 
employment and development. The European market is subject to strict 
controls. These derive from the budgetary restraints, substantially that 
of parity for the EU budget and a  60% debt/GDP ratio and 3% (tending 
to decrease to 0%) debt/GDP ratio for the  National budgets. In addition 
there is the obligation of stability as the primary aim which the ECB, 
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solely responsible for managing the Euro, is obliged to pursue.   The EU 
has no discretionary power in relation to economic policy except if the 
States unanimously agree to transfer their own resources to increase 
those of the EU. The States in their turn have individual discretionary 
powers only within the percentages in which the ratio between their 
debt and state borrowing remains below the parameters. This possibility 
diminishes as economies gradually mature.
In an acute crisis phase the EU, as a market regime, could 
hypothetically coordinate with the USA in their search for common 
remedies, of the types compatible with the market and in implementing 
them. There is a desire to do so. But the presence of strict standardised 
restrictions on the EU budget and on the member states’ budgets and 
in the management of the common currency, allow this to be done only 
within the limited margins of the residual discretionary power, with 
the relative conditioning. Much less than the serious urgency would 
demand.
Connected with the crisis is the management of sovereign 
funds. Sovereignty should be identiﬁed not so much in the fact that its 
ownership  belongs directly or indirectly to a foreign State, but rather in 
the circumstance that the fund escapes the control of the State in which 
it operates and is not subject to the regulations that apply in the said 
State. This means that if the fund is sovereign, the State where the fund 
operates is not sovereign in respect to it. May I add a further remark 
of a more general nature. It also concerns sovereign funds. There are 
two absolute novelties in the present world order, both political and 
economic, but not only that. The speed and intensity of relations, the 
onset of indivisible global problems  mean that the States of the world 
are effectively and irreversibly a single, indivisible community. The 
entities that compose the world community, and which cannot but be 
part of it, are not at the same level and are not all of the same nature. 
There are some, among the territorial ones, that in terms of size and 
power, inﬂuence all the others. There are others, not strictly political, 
such as the ultimate holders of the international liquidity removed 
from the control of the central banks, or the cartels of the essential raw 
material producing states (OPEC is just one of them), whose behaviour 
equally exerts widespread inﬂuence. Nor should the smaller political 
entities which operate as a group be underestimated. The diversity 
of the single entities makes each one of them subject to internal 
development processes, which are affected by external conditioning and 
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which cause them in their turn. The consequences are of two orders and 
cannot be ignored. The ﬁrst is that if a crisis involves a large number 
of countries, it will inevitably end up involving all the others; if it is of 
a political nature, it will be difﬁcult to solve only on a political level; 
if it is ﬁnancial it is likely to also involve production and politics. The 
second consequence, which derives from the diversity of the internal 
processes and from the mobility and variety of outside inﬂuences, is 
to be found in the unlikelihood that the effects of the remedies applied 
will last unaltered through time. On the contrary it will be necessary to 
introduce continuous monitoring mechanisms and therefore a certain 
degree of ﬂexibility of the solution applied which will need to be adjusted 
to the continually changing global environment.
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